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TENTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF NORTH
CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Tenth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is de-
signed to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court
during the period covered and to supplement past and future Surveys
in presenting developments in North Carolina case law over a period
of years.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that
were decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to
discuss only those decisions which are of particular importance-
cases regarded as being of significance and interest to those concerned
with the work of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial
changes and matters of first impression in North Carolina. Where a
case embraced within the period covered by the Survey has been the
subject of a note in this Law Review, the holding is briefly stated and
the note is cited.
Most of the research for and writing of this Survey was accom-
plished by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the
Law Review, working under the supervision of the Faculty of the
School of Law of the University of North Carolina. Some sections,
however, represent the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review, or candidates for member-
ship and the sections for which they are responsible are: Robert G.
Baynes (Damages, Eminent Domain and Wills and Administra-
tion) ; Frank W. Bullock, Jr. (Municipal Corporations and Public
Utilities) ; George C. Cochran (Civil Procedure (Pleading and Par-
ties) ) ; Marion A. Cowell, Jr. (Business Associations, Contracts and
Insurance) ; Borden R. Hallowes (Credit Transactions, Negotiable
Instruments and Sales); Lawrence T. Hammond (Administrative
Law); William R. Hoke (Agency and Workmen's Compensation
and Real Property); James M. Kimzey (Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure) ; Mack B. Pearsall (Domestic Relations); S. Epes Robin-
son (Evidence); H. Arthur Sandman (Taxation); J. Harold Thar-
rington (Equitable Remedies and Labor Law); William E. Under-
wood, Jr. (Torts) ; Arnold T. Wood (Constitutional Law).
Throughout this Survey the North Carolina Supreme Court will
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina
Supreme Court reported in 256 N.C. 1 through 258 N.C. 210.
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be referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The
United States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name.




The Supreme Court held in In re Dillingham' that the license of a
real estate broker cannot be revoked for running a house of prostitu-
tion or for committing fraudulent acts in dealing with his own prop-
erty, since under the statute the grounds for revocation of license
apply only to conduct as a real estate broker, and the acts complained
of were not done in that capacity.
2
The Court found the case to be one of first impression in this
state, but pointed out that there are supporting decisions in Iowa,3
California,4 and Missouri,' refusing to allow revocation of license on
similar grounds. In each of these cases the broker had been guilty of
some questionable conduct which was virtually unrelated to his activi-
ties as a broker. Each court held that the broker had not violated the
statute and that his license could not be revoked. Our Court agreed,
and pointed out that however immoral the acts committed might have
been, the statute must be construed to include only those matters done
in the capacity of a real estate broker.'
1257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-6 (a) (1958) sets out eleven acts which are
grounds for revocation. Among them are making willful misrepresentations,
making false promises, fraudulent advertising, acting for more than one
party in a transaction, representing two brokers at once, failing to account
for money in his possession which belongs to others, etc. The Court con-
strued the statutory requisites for revocation as having to do with the busi-
ness of a real estate broker, and not as allowing revocation on the general
grounds of illegal or immoral conduct committed outside the realm of a
broker's business.
'Blakely v. Miller, 232 Iowa 908, 7 N.W.2d 11 (1942).
"Schomig v. Keiser, 189 Cal. 596, 209 Pac. 550 (1922).
'Robinson v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 280 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.
1955).
New Jersey Real Estate Comm'n v. Ponsi, 39 N.J. Super. 526, 121
A.2d 555 (1956), a lower court decision, allowed revocation, but is distin-
guishable. There the petitioner had been.guilty of fraudulent acts involving
his own property, which would not be grounds for revocation in North
Carolina (nor specifically in New Jersey) but the New Jersey statute re-
quires one applying for a license to exhibit good moral character, which the
North Carolina act does not. The New Jersey court carried the specific
[Vol. 41
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SCOPE OF HEARING
Carolina Power and Light Company applied to the Utilities Com-
mission for approval of a new rate schedule, designed to modernize
its rates but not to increase its income. Protestants intervened and
contested the new schedule for textile mills. At a pre-hearing con-
ference the Commission determined that only the new rate schedule
for textile mills was in issue, and that this did not require a deter-
mination of the total earnings of the company on all its rate schedules.
At the hearing the Commission found that the new rate schedule for
textile mills did not increase the company's total revenue, and that
there was no increase in the charges to textile mills as a class. The
only change was one of twelve per cent between the energy com-
ponent (cost of supplying kilowatt hours) and the demand com-
ponent (cost of maintaining sufficient equipment to deliver maxi-
mum requirements of consumers at a given time). The cost of equip-
ment to meet maximum demand had increased, while the energy
costs (depending on such things as coal prices) had declined. The
Commission further found that the shift in components was proper
and that the new rate schedule was just.
The superior court upheld the Commission and the protestants
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed in State ex rel. Utili-
ties Comm' v. Carolinas Comm. for Indus. Power Rates & Area
Dev., Inc.7 Protestants contended that the matter constituted a gen-
eral rate case as a matter of law. The Court held that the Commission
properly treated this as a complaint proceeding, because only a single
rate was involved. A general rate case, which is extremely compli-
cated and time-consuming, is used only where the company's entire
rate structure is involved.8 The Commission has the power to de-
termine its own rules within statutory bounds,9 and this includes a
requirements for application over to the general requisites for license revoca-
tion (which were substantially similar to those of North Carolina) and
found a legislative intent to allow revocation on the facts presented.
1 257 N.C. 560, 126 S.E.2d 325 (1962).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-71 (1960) provides for a fairly informal complaint
proceeding when a company seeks to change only one or a few rates. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-124 (1960) provides for a general rate case as the proper
proceeding to hear proposed changes in a company's entire rate structure,
or a great portion thereof, or upon a challenge of its overall profit structure.
This proceeding requires evaluation of all the company's property when
acquired (and depreciated to date), fair market value of the services
rendered, probable earning capacity, and like matters which require a
voluminous amount of evidence and a lengthy proceeding.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-26 (1960).
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determination of what forum is correct for hearing rate schedule
matters.
The Court said that if by pleading excessive rate of return parties
could command a complete review of rate structures on every occa-
sion that a matter relating to a rate schedule arises, the reasonable
regulation of rates would be impossible."0
Protestants were not prejudiced by this decision, for matters
excluded from the hearing are not res judicata and protestants can
bring a rate case before the Commission at a future time if they have
grounds for such. The burden of proof is not shifted by this decision.
Protestants would have had the burden of proof had this hearing been
a general rate case, and they would have the burden if they instituted
a separate general rate case.
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY
Adverse Interest of Agent
In Sparks v. Union Trust Co.' the bank's agent, a branch man-
ager, fraudulently withheld more than 150 thousand dollars worth of
checks drawn by Williams, a bank customer and co-conspirator. If
these checks had been presented for payment, Williams would have
become insolvent. The plaintiff dealt with the agent when borrowing
money from the bank to erect a building to lease to Williams. Al-
though he knew the plaintiff's business plans, the agent did not dis-
close Williams' true financial condition. Consequently, the plaintiff
suffered pecuniary damage which became apparent when the acts of
the two wrongdoers were discovered. The plaintiff brought this
action against the bank for the alleged fraud of its agent in failing to
disclose Williams' true financial condition. Denying relief, the Court
held that banks have no duty to warn the investing public as to the
financial condition of depositors ;2 moreover, the bank had no con-
10 State ex. rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 250
N.C. 421, 109 S.E.2d 253 (1959) was cited and quoted with approval by the
Court for the general proposition that where a single rate is involved the
proper action is a complaint proceeding and not a general rate case, under
the applicable statutes.
'256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.Zd 365 (1962).'This holding reflects the general rule. See Cunningham v. Merchant's
Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925); Citizens' Trust & Say. Bank v. Falli-
gan, 4 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1925) ; People's Nat'l Bank v. Southern States Fin.
Co., 192 N.C. 69, 133 S.E. 415 (1926) ; Annot., 48 A.L.R. 528 (1927).
[Vol. 41
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
structive knowledge of its agent's conspiracy with Williams since the
knowledge of an agent is not imputed to a principal when the agent
is acting adversely to the principal.
If we assume that the absence of duty of the bank to warn was
sufficient ground for the decision, the opinion on these facts concern-
ing imputed knowledge is probably dictum. Accepting the dictum,
what would have been the result if the bank had had the duty to
apprise the plaintiff of Williams' insolvency? The Court seems to
think it would be the same.
But should the "adverse interest" rule be invoked here to prevent
the operation of the principle announced in the leading case of Ham-
bro v. Burnard?' That case held that a principal may be liable for
the acts of his agent, notwithstanding the fact that the latter acted
entirely for his own purposes. In an action that seeks to charge the
principal vicariously with the fraud of his agent, imputed knowledge
normally is not a consideration.' However, if the bank had been
charged hot vicariously but directly with fraud in failure to disclose,
then the principal's knowledge of Williams' financial condition should
have been a vital question. But since the principal in this case did not
deal with the plaintiff directly, it seems obvious that the cause of
action was concerned with vicarious liability.
Custodian of a Child
While in the care of a custodian, a four year old child was fatally
burned after coming into contact with one of the defendant's flare
pots at a street excavation. A wrongful death action was brought in
Jeffreys v. City of Burlington.5
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in leaving
the flare pots unattended in the afternoon hours in an area where
children were known to play. The defendant, basing its affirmative
defense on alleged contributory negligence of the parents, hoped to
show either that (1) the parents were directly negligent in that they
' [1904] 2 K.B. 10. See also Gleason v. Seabord Air Line Ry., 278 U.S.
349 (1929) ; Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 262 (1958).
' When an agent is acting adversely to his principal, it may be said that
he is not acting as an agent, but for himself. Citizens' Trust & Say. Bank v.
Falligan, 4 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1925). Cf. Sledge Lumber Corp. v. Southern
Builders Equip. Co., 257 N.C. 435, 126 S.E.2d 97 (1962). But if there is
reasonable reliance on his holding himself out as an agent, adverse interest
does not affect the principal's liability. Seavey, Notice Through an Agent,
65 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 30-32 (1916).
256 N.C. 222, 123 S.E.2d 500 (1962).
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failed to exercise due care in their supervision of the child,' or (2)
that the custodian was negligent and her negligence was imputed to
the parents.
Reversing a verdict below for the defendant, the Court held that
the defendant failed to prove that the parents were negligent or that
an agency relationship existed between the parents and the custodian.
"Where ... the relation of master and servant or principal and agent
with respect to the care, custody and control of the child does not exist
between the parent and custodian, the negligence of the latter is not
imputed to the parent. ... "'
Liability Insurance-Omnibus Clause
The employer, upon leaving for a two-weeks vacation, gave his
employee permission to drive the company truck home each night.
According to the employer, he instructed the employee to drive it
straight home, park it, and drive it straight back to work the next
morning. According to the employee, he was admonished not to do
"too much running around with it at night." While driving the truck
on a personal errand at night, with three passengers in the cab, the
employee was involved in a collision with the plaintiff's automobile.
In Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co." the plaintiff brought an action
against the employer's insurer, based on the omnibus clause0 in the
liability insurance policy. The Court, remanding a verdict for the
plaintiff because of an error in the jury instruction, held that North
Carolina will abide by the so-called "moderate" rule in construing
omnibus clauses.
The term "permission" (of the insured) in omnibus clauses is
0 "The ordinary rules of the law of negligence apply in determining the
parent's contributory negligence. It is the duty of a parent or other person
having the care, custody, and control of a child to exercise ordinary care for
its safety, and, where failure to do so contributes proximately with the
negligence of third persons to cause injury to the child, such parent, or other
custodian, is guilty of contributory negligence." 67 C.J.S. Parent & Child
§ 46 (1950).
"65 C.J.S. Negligence § 163 (1950), cited by the Court. See also Comer
v. City of Winston-Salem, 178 N.C. 383, 100 S.E. 619 (1919), containing a
comprehensive discussion of the supervisory duties of custodians of children;
and Ferrell v. Dixie Cotton Mills, 157 N.C. 528, 73 S.E. 142 (1911).
-257 N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d 161 (1962), noted in 41 N.C.L. REv. 232
(1962). Also discussed under INSURANCE, Automobile Liability Insurance,
infra.
' The policy provided that "insured" referred to any person using the
vehicle, "provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured
... or with the permission" of the named insured. Id. at 382, 126 S.E.2d at
163.
[Vol. 41
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subject to divergent interpretations by the courts. The three general
views are (1) the strict rule, under which the employee must have
permission to use the vehicle for the particular use being made of it
at the time in question; (2) the liberal rule, by which the employee
need only have initial permission, and any subsequent use is covered;
and (3) the moderate rule, under which a slight deviation from per-
missive use is not enough to withdraw coverage. Under the strict
and moderate rules the plaintiff has the burden of showing the nature
and extent of the permission granted.Y0
As a result of this decision it appears that, in an area of the law
characterized by a dearth of authority in this jurisdiction, North
Carolina now has a firm precedent."
Servants and Non-servant Agents
Overnite Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters' was
an action to recover damages for alleged unfair labor practices of the
union in maintaining a strike and secondary boycott against the plain-
tiff. Although the complaint charged the union directly with calling
the strike and directing the boycott, the trial court instructed the jury
that the union, as the sole defendant, could be held liable for the acts
of its agents performed "within the scope of their employment."' 3
10 Id. at 384-86, 126 S.E.2d at 165-66.
1 The Court was of the opinion that the legislature, in adopting the 1953
amendment to the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act,
intended to adopt the moderate rule. The amendment provided that the
owner's policy shall "insure the person named therein and any other person
... using any such motor vehicle... with the express or implied permission
of such named insured . . . ." N.C. GEN STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp.
1961). Compare the language of the statute before amendment: "[The owner's
policy shall] insure ... the person named, and any other person using or re-
sponsible for the use of the motor vehicle with the permission, expressed or
implied, of the named insured, or any other person in lawful possession."
N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 1006, § 4(2) (b). The Court in the instant case
thought that this language was "sufficiently broad to embrace the liberal rule."
But see Hooper v. Maryland Cas. Co., 233 N.C. 154, 63 S.E.2d 128 (.1951),
where the Court, while not finding it necessary to adopt a rule, used this
language: "[The employee] could not define or enlarge the scope of his
permitted use of his employer's truck by anything said or done by him with-
out the knowledge of his employer, or its proper representatives." Id. at 158,
63 S.E.2d at 131.
12257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d 277 (1962). Also discussed under DAMAGEs,
Punitive Damages-Loss of Profits, and LABOR LAW, Secondary Boycott-
Suit for Damages under § 303(b), infra.
" Quaere: Is it permissible to impose vicarious liability upon the defendant
by allegations that he himself committed the act and by proof that his agent
committed it? See Cowan v. Cowan, 179 N.C. 695, 102 S.E. 613 (1920)
(semble). It is not clear in the Cowan case nor in the principal case whether
the defendant was found liable vicariously or directly.
1963]
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The jury thus instructed apparently found the defendant liable for
the acts performed by the agents, i.e., the members of the locals in-
volved. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
award of actual damages and reversed the punitive damages.
While the trial court's delineation of the agency relation does not
appear to alter the liability of the defendant, considering the nature of
the plaintiff's evidence,14 the jury instruction is nevertheless interest-
ing, especially since the Supreme Court quoted the following portion
of it with seeming approval:
The distinguishing difference between an agent and servant
is that an agent can contract for his principal and bind his
principal contractually, whereas a servant cannot so bind in
contract his master. Both principal and master are liable for
the torts of their agents and servants when acting in the scope
of their employment."5
This statement of the relation, although mostly in accord with our
recent judicial language,1" could cause difficulty by its sweeping pro-
visions, especially if quoted out of context.
To grasp this concept it is convenient to speak of two types of
agents: servants and non-servant agents. The Restatement of Agen-
cy which states the concept clearly, points to the element of physical
control as the distinguishing characteristic between a servant and a
non-servant agent.1 While the non-servant agent usually represents
14 The evidence, if believed, would indicate that the International Brother-
hood exercised such strict control over the locals that the latter would never
engage in the acts complained of without the approval and direction of the
former. If this was true, the defendant could be held liable outside the agency
relationship. "A person is subject to liability for the consequences of another's
conduct which results from his directions as he would be for his own personal
conduct if, with knowledge of the conditions, he intends the conduct, or if
he intends its consequences . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 212
(1958).
1r 257 N.C. at 27-28, 125 S.E.2d at 284.
"The Court usually seems to consider that the terms "agent" and "serv-
ant" are synonymous and that their hallmark is physical control by the prin-
cipal or master. Under this rationale the independent contractor cannot bind
another in contract, and, moreover, there is no recognition of an agent who
can bind his principal in contract without being subject to physical control.
See Pressley v. Turner, 249 N.C. 102, 105 S.E.2d 289 (1958); Lindsey v.
Leonard, 235 N.C. 100, 68 S.E.2d 852 (1952); Carter v. Thurston Motor
Lines, Inc., 227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947) ; Kesler Constr. Co. v. Dixson
Holding Corp., 207 N.C. 1, 175 S.E. 843 (1934); Aderholt v. Condon, 189
N.C. 748, 128 S.E. 337 (1925). But see Holleman v. Taylor, 200 N.C. 618,
158 S.E. 88 (1931), where the Court did recognize the existence of the non-
servant agent.IRESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 220 (1958). Cf. FERSON, PRIN-
[Vol. 41
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his principal contractually and is not subject to the principal's physical
control, the servant is subject to physical control by his master. And
while the servant does not normally contract for his master, there is
no reason why he cannot. An example is the express company's truck
driver, who is a servant in driving his master's truck and a contract-
ing agent when he receives a package and signs a bill of lading bind-
ing his principal (and master) to deliver it.'"
The difference between a servant and a non-servant agent becomes
critical in the doctrine of respondeat superior. Vicarious liability for
physical torts under this doctrine attaches only where there is physical
control,' 9 i.e., in the master-servant relation.2" In the light of this
well-established rule the trial court in the-principal case probably did
not mean that both principal and master are liable for the physical
torts of their servants and non-servant agents when acting in the
scope of their employment. If this was the Court's intention, it
probably meant to restrict the statement to apply to physical torts
directed by the principal. But since directed acts result in non-vicar-
ious, direct liability of the principal, such liability must not be con-
fused with the doctrine of respondeat superior.2 '
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Accident-Definition
In Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co.22 the claimant sustained
an injury, diagnosed as a slipped disc, while picking up a twelve-
pound box of coffee in his usual manner, as he had regularly done in
his employment for over six years. Held: no accident, and conse-
quently, no compensation.
The applicable statute" provides that injury in workmen's com-
pensation cases "shall mean only injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of the employment." The Court has defined acci-
dent as (1) an unlooked-for and untoward event which is not ex-
CIPLES OF AGENCY § 20 (1954); TIFFANY, PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 37 (Zd
ed. 1924).
18 See generally MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 12, 13
(1952).
Beal v. Champion Fiber Co., 154 N.C. 147, 69 S.E. 834 (1910).
0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 220 (1958). In general, a princi-
pal is not liable for the physical torts of his non-servant agent. Id. at § 250.
21 It is true, of course, that a principal may be, liable for the fraud of his
non-servant agent. Cf. Sparks v. Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d
365 (1962) discussed supra.-2256 N.C. 427, 124 S.E.2d 109 (1962).
"2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1958).
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pected or designed by the injured employee, and (2) a result pro-
duced by a fortuitous cause.2 ' Generally, the Court requires an ex-
ternal accident. It sees no fortuitous cause when the injury arises
from a situation where the employee is merely carrying on his
customary duties in the usual manner. 5 Conversely, where the
claimant was not engaged in his usual task in the usual manner at
the time of his injury, compensation may be awarded. 2' This doctrine
often prevents compensation for hernia and slipped disc injuries,
which rarely arise from an external accident, but are often directly
connected with some type of accident nevertheless.
It is significant to note that in the Harding case the Court for
at least the third time in the past five years28 gave some indication
that it is not entirely satisfied with the rule announced. 9
Judicial Power of Industrial Commission
In Letterlough v. Atkins"0 the employee and the employer, who
had not brought himself under the provisions of the act, executed a
"Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124 S.E.2d 109
(1962) ; Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 231 (1940);
Love v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N.C. 28, 1 S.E.2d 121 (1939).
2" See Turner v. Burke Hosiery Mill, 251 N.C. 325, 111 S.E.2d 185 (1959)
(leaning over knitting machine to make adjustment in usual manner); Holt
v. Cannon Mills, 249 N.C. 215, 105 S.E.2d 614 (1958) (lifting hundred-pound
box in usual manner); Hensley v. Farmers Co-op., 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d
289 (1957) (turning and twisting in normal way to pick up basket of chick-
ens); Buchanan v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 217 N.C. 173, 7
S.E.2d 382 (1940) (lifting scoop of dirt in usual manner, became sick and
blind) ; Neely v. City of Statesville, 212 N.C. 365, 193 S.E. 664 (1937) '(heart
failure by fireman as result of fighting fire); Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills,
209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844 (1936) (normally got wet while washing ma-
chinery, died of pneumonia). But see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co.,
227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947) (concurring opinion), and Smith v.
Cabarrus Creamery Co., supra note 24, where Seawell, J., did not favor this
rule. See also Note, 27 N.C.L. Rlv. 599 (1949).
20 See Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96 (1947)
(heart failure by policeman after subduing prisoner); Moore v. Engineering
& Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424, 199 S.E. 605 (1938) (lifting heavy pipe with
insufficient help, not in normal line of work).
2' "The discs ... are not subject to displacement several times a day or
month or year. God is not so poor an engineer." Seawell, J., in Edwards v.
Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 192, 41 S.E.2d 592, 598 (1947) (con-
curring opinion).
2 See Holt v. Cannon Mills, 249 N.C. 215, 105 S.E.2d 614 (1958) ; Hensley
v. Farmers Co-op., 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
20 "Our interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act is well known
to the legislative department of the State. If and when a change is desirable,
the General Assembly has ample power to make it." Harding v. Thomas &
Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 429, 124 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1962).
60258 N.C. 166, 128 S.E. 2d 215 (1962).
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settlement of the employee's claim for injury. In approving the
settlement the Industrial Commission issued an order directing the
employer either to provide compensation insurance or else reject the
provisions of the act, as provided by law, within thirty days. Finding
that the employer had fewer than five employees, the superior court
ordered the Commission to set aside its approval of the agreement
and to dismiss the proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that it was correct for the Com-
mission to set aside the order and award, but that it should not have
dismissed the proceeding.
This decision is in accord with the Court's former holdings as to
how the judicial power of the Industrial Commission may be in-
voked."' While it may not institute a proceeding ex mnero Motu, the
power of the Commission is invoked when a claim is filed with it3 2 or
when a settlement is submitted to it for approval. 3  In such event
the Commission may hold hearings to determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction of the case.
Reopening Claims-Estoppel
In Ammons v. Z. A. Sneeden!s Sons, Inc.34 the claimant, with-
out the advice of counsel, notified his employer within twelve months
after his last compensation payment of a change in his condition.
Because he relied upon his employer to handle the matter for him,
he did not notify the Industrial Commission of his desire to reopen
the claim until after the statutory period had expired.35 The Com-
mission declined to reopen. Allowing the claimant to invoke estoppel,
the Court on appeal held that the employer and its insurer may not
"lull the claimant into a sense of security" and then plead the statute
in bar of review. The Industrial Commission was directed to hear
evidence and determine whether the defendant's plea in bar should
be sustained or set aside.
No new attitude of the Court is indicated. Although the facts
were insufficient to invoke estoppel in an earlier case, the Court said
"See Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953);
Thompson v. Johnson Funeral Home, 208 N.C. 178, 179 S.E. 801 (1935)." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-87 (1958).
,257 N.C. 785, 127 S.E.2d 575 (1962).
" G.S. § 97-47 sets a twelve-month limitation on applications for review
of any award after the date of last payment.
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then that "the law of estoppel applies in compensation proceedings as
in all other cases."
3 6
Rescission for Mistake
In Caudill v. Chatham Mfg. Co." an employee sustained an in-
jury to his back in the course of his employment. He signed a
release for consideration, effecting a settlement of past, present, and
future claims against his employer, and waiving his right to reopen
the claim for change of condition. The release was approved by the
Industrial Commission. Later, further complications respecting his
injury arose. There was evidence that the difficulty complained of
existed in a latent state at the time the settlement was made, and
that the first diagnosis had been erroneous. The Industrial Commis-
sion rescinded the settlement on the ground of mutual mistake of
fact. Reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
settlement was a compromise agreement and took into account the
possibility of future disability.
The case is interesting for the question the Court announced it
did not decide: does the Industrial Commission have the equitable
jurisdiction to rescind approved settlements on the ground of mutual
mistake of fact? The Court pointed out that some states have stat-
utes8s which confer such jurisdiction. In the absence of a statute the
theory seems to be that a commission has the necessary power only
if it has continuing jurisdiction over the case, i.e., if no final award
has been made.39 After final award it has been held that res judicata
applies.40 But if the settlement agreement is drafted so as to confer
continuing jurisdiction upon the commission, some courts have held41
" Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953), where
the Court held that the employer's paying the claimant's medical bills, without
a formal denial of liability, did not result in the employer's admission of
liability or constitute a waiver of the requirement of filing claim by the
employee under G.S. § 97-24. Cf. Ashe v. Barnes, 255 N.C. 310, 121 S.E.2d
549 (1961), where the employer did not take steps to exempt himself from
the act, but had accident insurance covering the employee, who accepted the
benefits and then brought an action to recover workmen's compensation. The
Court did not allow the employer to plead estoppel.
"'258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962).
8" See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.125 (1962); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §
176.60 (1946).
"See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 81.53 (1952).
,Miller v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 86 Ga. App. 503, 71 S.E.2d 782
(1952).
,Georgia Marine Salvage Co. v. Merritt, 82 Ga. App. 111, 60 S.E.2d 419
(1950) ; Harnischfeger Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 253 Wis. 613, 34 N.W.2d
678 (1948).
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that the award is temporary and subject to review within a reasonable
time.
Apart from the change of condition provision, can the North
Carolina Industrial Commission retain jurisdiction over an award?
The Wisconsin commission did so by using these words: "[Appli-
cant] developed osteomyelitis which has now subsided, but which
may, in the future, recur and result in additional disability; that the
commission, therefore, reserves the right at a future date to pass
upon additional liability. .. " The North Carolina Supreme Court
disapproved of a similar award,4 3 the Court saying:
There is nothing in the statute, G.S. Chap. 97, that con-
templates or authorizes an anticipatory finding by the Com-
mission that a physical impairment may develop into a com-
pensable disability. Neither does the statute vest in the Com-
mission the power to retain jurisdiction of a claim, after
compensation has been awarded, merely because some physical
impairment suffered by the claimant may, at some time in the
future cause a loss of wages.44
It would seem, then, that the Court normally does not favor con-
tinuing jurisdiction in the Commission. This being so, it is probable
that only a broad equitable jurisdiction of the Commission would
allow it to reopen for mutual mistake of fact. As the Court indicated
in the principal case, the legislature may desire to set up such a pro-
vision in order that the North Carolina position on this point may be
made definite.
Traveling Employees
An employee in Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc.45 was sent by his
employer to South Carolina for several days to repair hurricane-
damaged power lines. The employer furnished food and a motel
room. Having finished his day's work at six P.M., the employee
' Harnischfeger Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 41, at 615, 34
N.W.2d at 678.
" In Dail v. Kellex Corp., 233 N.C. 446, 64 S.E.2d 438 (1951) the Com-
mission had ordered that "if at any time within 300 weeks [see G.S. § 97-30]
from date of injury by accident the plaintiff, as a result of said injury... is
totally disabled... and does not earn any wages, that he will be entitled to
compensation.... ." Id. at 449, 64 S.E.2d at 440.
"Id. at 447, 64 S.E.2d at 439. But see Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel
Co., 233 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865 (1943), where jurisdiction was allowed to
continue. See also Harris v. Asheville Contracting Co., 240 N.C. 115, 83
S.E.2d 802 (1954), where the Branham case was distinguished.
" 258 N.C. 194, 128 S.E.2d 218 (1962).
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left his room about nine o'clock and went to a restaurant approxi-
mately one-quarter mile down the highway, where he drank a soft
drink and bought beer to bring back to the motel. Before reaching
his room he was struck by a car and killed. The Court upheld the
Commission's decision and denied compensation, holding that the
accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.
Cases of injuries to employees away from home on company
business-usually traveling salesmen-are similar to cases of in-
juries to employees who are required to live on the employer's
premises, in that compensation is sometimes awarded where the
source of the injury is directly traceable to the conditions under which
the employee is required to live.4" If the employee in the instant case
had been killed while on a side trip to find his evening meal, some
courts would have allowed compensation." But where he was merely
on a social excursion from his lodgings, compensation is usually
denied.4s The rationale is that injuries the employee sustained while
engaged in a purely personal activity spring from the risk to which
he would have been exposed whether employed or not,4" while other
hazards, such as going in search of food, are peculiar to the abnormal
condition of living on the employer's "leased" premises, the motel
room.
Violation of Traffic Statute
The Court held in Brewer v. Powers Trucking Co." that the
claimant's speeding and driving on the left side of the highway did
"11 LARSON, WORXMEN'S COmPENsATioN LAW §§ 24.10, .20, 25.10, .21
(1952). The fact of being on call at all times may allow recovery for injuries
received by the employee while engaged in eating or recreation on the prem-
ises, even while not actually working. Ibid.
" See, e.g., Alexander Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Colo. 486, 319
P.2d 1074 (1957) ; Walker v. Speeder Mach. Corp., 213 Iowa 1134, 240 N.W.
725 (1932).
's United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823, 5 S.E.2d 9
(1939) (eighteen-mile side trip to ocean resort to get a seafood dinner and
see the ocean); O'Connor v. Complete Mach. & Equip. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d
741, 168 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1957) (drinking with companions at a restaurant);
Thornton v. J. A. Richardson Co., 258 N.C. 207, 128 S.E.2d 256 (1962) (un-
explained trip away from lodgings at 2:40 A.M. after having been bowling
and to a ball game).
"' "[T]he danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the
neighborhood." Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc., 258 N.C. 194, 128 S.E.2d 218
(1962), quoting Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N.C. 356, 196 S.E.
342 (1938). For a discussion of accidents of traveling employees and the
risks of the occupation compared with ordinary risks, see Note, 23 N.C.L.
REv. 159 (1945).3o 256 N.C. 175, 123 S.E.2d 608 (1962).
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not constitute such willful failure to perform a statutory duty as to
cause a reduction in his award. 1 Ruling on this fact situation for
the first time, the Court aligned itself with the majority view,5 2 which
holds that a simple violation of traffic statutes, such as speed laws,
does not constitute the willful misconduct contemplated by the work-
men's compensation acts.
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
INSPECTION OF CORPORATE RECORDS
In White v. Smith,' a case of first instance under the 1957
North Carolina Business Corporation Act,2 the Court held that public
policy required building and loan associations to be included under
the provisions allowing shareholder inspection of corporate records.
Action for mandamus was instituted to require "defendents to
provide plaintiffs an opportunity to inspect the records... so that
plaintiffs might solicit proxies for use at stockholder's meetings." 3
Defendents denied the right, insisting that the records were confi-
dential. The trial court held plaintiffs were entitled to the informa-
tion and that it could be furnished by defendents. Affirming on
appeal, the Supreme Court found the right of shareholders to inspect
records of building and loan associations in other states depends
upon an interpretation of their individual statutes.
4
Building and loan associations have been subject to private
corporation law in North Carolina since 1905'. The Court found
that upon an interpretation of the applicable North Carolina stat-
utes6 there was no perceivable reason why the shareholder of a
" "When the injury or death is caused by the willful failure of the em-
ployee to use a safety appliance or perform a statutory duty... compensa-
tion shall be reduced ten per cent." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1958).
" See Ford Motor Co. v. Smith, 283 Ky. 795, 143 S.VWr.2d 507 (1940);
Lemmler v. Fabacher, 19 La. App. 144, 139 So. 683 (1932); Day v. Gold
Star Dairy, 307 Mich. 383, 12 N.W.2d 5 (1943); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 35.30 (1952). Contra, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 171 Cal. 728, 154 P. 834 (1916); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333, 150 S.E. 208 (1929). Cf. Note, 8 N.C.L. REV.
326 (1930).
'256 N.C. 218, 123 S.E.2d 628 (1962).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 55 (1960).
256 N.C. at 218, 123 S.E.2d at 629.
'Id. at 221, 123 S.E.2d at 631.
Id. at 221, 123 S.E.2d at 631; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-7 (1960).'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-37(a) (1960), requires the corporation to keep
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building and loan association should be denied the right to inspect
the records of the association, considering that such right is granted
to shareholders of other corporations. The Court added that the
right was limited to an inspection for a proper purpose.
A noted commentator states that shareholders in building and
loan associations are not entitled to inspect the books and records of
the association.7 However, it would appear that the situation is
much as our Court states: "[the decisions] which deny a shareholder
of a building and loan the right to inspect books in general are based






In Roberts v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,' the plaintiff, pursuant to
the provisions of G.S. § 1-121' filed an application with the clerk of
superior court of Buncombe County requesting an extension of time
in which to file his complaint. The application stated that the nature
and purpose of his action was a suit grounded on negligence to re-
cover the sum of 100,000 dollars. The clerk granted the plaintiff
books and records, and a record of the names and addresses of all share-
holders and the number of shares held by each. Subsection (b) provides
for mandamus to compel compliance with the section; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
64 (1960), provides that the officer or agent having charge of the share-
holder record shall make a list of shareholders ten days before each meeting
of shareholders, and that such list is subject to shareholder inspection; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-3(a) (1960), states that the Business Corporation Act is
applicable to every corporation for profit, and to those not for profit which
have a capital stock. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-5 (1960), building and
loan associations have a capital stock, and the right to inspect books of a
bank is expressly given in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-85 (1960).
'5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2227 (perm. ed. rev. vol.
1952).
'State ex rel. Wicks v. Puget Sound Say. & Loan Ass'n, 8 Wash. 2d 599,
113 P.2d 70 (1941); Henzel v. Patterson Bldg. & Loan Ass'n No. Two, 128
Pa. Super. 531, 194 Atl. 683 (1937); State ex rel. Schomberg v. Home Mut.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 220 Wis. 649, 265 N.W. 701 (1936) ; Annot., 134 A.L.R.
699 (1941).
256 N.C. 434, 124 S.E.2d 105 (1962).
2 "[T] he clerk may . . .on application of the plaintiff by written order
extend the time for filing complaint to a day certain not to exceed twenty
(20) days .... said application and order shall state the nature and purposes
of the suit." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-121 (Supp. 1961).
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an extension and issued the appropriate order. Within the period
granted, but subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations
on his cause, the plaintiff filed his complaint. The complaint was not
grounded on negligence, alleging instead a breach of warranty. The
defendant made a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff's
application did not authorize the filing of a complaint alleging breach
of warranty. The lower court overruled the motion. On appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the two causes alleged by the
plaintiff could have been joined initially under the "same transaction"
clause of G.S. § 1-123. 3 This being so, the Court decided that, having
"alleged only one, he could as a matter of right before time to answer
expired, amend and allege the other. Or he could amend by striking
one and substituting the other."4
On return to the trial court the defendant made another motion,
this time to dismiss the action on the basis that the statute of limita-
tions had run on the plaintiff's cause of action. The trial court over-
ruled the motion and the defendant again appealed. On appeal,' the
Supreme Court stated that if the plaintiff had filed his complaint
alleging negligence the cause would have related back to the time of
the issuance of the clerk's order thus stopping the running of the
statute.' However, since the plaintiff had chosen to allege a new
cause, the action was "deemed to have been instituted on the date that
the complaint was actually filed,"' and accordingly the judgment was
reversed.
In finding that the complaint was good for one purpose and bad
for another the Roberts case brings out vividly the Court's attitude
toward amendments. Although the cases are the first of this type8
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953) reads in part that "the plaintiff may
unite in the same complaint several causes of action, of legal or equitable
nature, or both, where they all arise out of-(1) The same transaction, or
transaction connected with the same subject of action."
'256 N.C. at 437, 124 S.E.2d at 107.
'Roberts v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 257 N.C. 656, 127 S.E.2d 236 (.1962).
o "The application and order extending the time to plead were, . . . barely
sufficient to enable the plaintiff to file a complaint stating a cause of action
for damages based on negligence. Such a complaint would relate back to
the date of the summons." Id. at 657-58, 127 S.E.2d at 238.
7 Id. at 658, 127 S.E.2d at 238.
'An evenly divided Court in Whitehurst v. Anderson, 228 N.C. 787, 44
S.E.2d 359 (1947), in a per curiam decision affirmed a trial court holding
that when the order issued under G.S. § 1-121 does not sufficiently state the
nature and purpose of the action the service is not fatally defective and the
plaintiff may cure a deficiency by amendment. Since the Court was evenly
divided on this issue no precedent was set.
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to be decided under G.S. § 1-121 the holdings are in accordance with
previous decisions reflecting the current amendment philosophy of
the Court. The finding in the first instance that it was permissible
to allege a breach of warranty is in accord with the general rule that,
prior to trial, a plaintiff is given comparative freedom to amend even
to the point of introducing a new cause of action, subject only to the
"joinder of causes" provisions of G.S. § 1-123.' As demonstrated
in the second case, this rule is not applicable once the statute of limi-
tations comes into play.Y The finding that the statute continued to
run until the time that the complaint was filed follows the now general
rule in North Carolina that any amendment that changes the cause as
originally set out does not relate back to the time that the action is
originally initiated.'1 Thus even though the complaint was otherwise
good, it relegated the plaintiff to the position of having for the first
time stated a cause of action against the defendant.' 2
Damages
In Kizer v. Bowmaie3 the plaintiff was awarded damages for
nursing, medical, hospital, and other expenses incurred as a result of
her personal injuries even though they had not been specifically
'The plaintiff should be given complete freedom of amendment confined
only by "the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, in connection with the
provisions of G.S. 1-123 . . . ." Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N.C. 240, 244, 63
S.E.2d 565, 569 (1951), interpreting G.S. § 1-163. "[I]t was permissible
under G.S. 1-163 to allow plaintiff to introduce a new cause of action by way
of amendment if the facts constituting the new cause of action arise out of or
are connected with the transactions upon which the original complaint is
based." Mica Indus., Inc. v. Penland, 249 N.C. 602, 605-06, 107 S.E.2d 120,
124 (1959). It is interesting to note that there has not yet been a decision as
to whether a plaintiff may amend his complaint to include a new cause'of ac-
tion initially joinable under any other provision of G.S. § 1-123 than the "same
transaction" clause. The decisions have been interpreted by one authority,
N.C. INDEX, Pleadings § 25 (1960), to hold that this would not be possible.
There would appear to be no sound reason for this conclusion. Free amend-
ment is allowed prior to trial because the opposing party still has ample
time to investigate the new matter set up. Perkins v. Langdon, supra; accord
Modern Elec. Co. v. Dennis, 255 N.C. 64, 120 S.E.2d 533 (1961). Therefore
it would seem to make no difference which provisions of G.S. § 1-123 are
used to justify the insertion of a new cause of action.
"0 See, e.g., Perkins v. Langdon, 233 N.C. 240, 245, 63 S.E.2d 565, 570
(1951)..
" Perkins v. Langdon, supra note 10; Nassaney v. Culler, 224 N.C. 323,
30 S.E.2d 226 (1944).
2 It would appear that the plaintiff will not be able to bring a new action
under the provisions of G.S. § 1-25 since where a new cause of action is
alleged the original action is no protection against the statute of limitations.
See Woodcock v. Bostic, 128 N.C. 243, 38 S.E. 881 (1901).
"256 N.C. 565, 124 S.E.2d 543 (1962).
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alleged. The defendant appealed, assigning as error both the award
of damages and the instructions given as to damages to the jury by
the trial judge.1 4 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under a
general allegation of bodily injury all such damages were provable.
It is generally held that medical and hospital expenses, expenses
of drugs, loss of time from work, loss of earning capacity, and loss
of profits are elements of special damages which must be specifically
pleaded."5 The principal case in refusing to follow this rule relied on
the earlier case of Sparks v. Holland.'6 There the Court held that
hospital expenses were collectible under a general allegation. In a
dictum, however, it pronounced the much broader doctrine that all
these damages, with the possible exception of loss of profits, may be
proved under a general allegation of circumstances giving rise to
personal injury.
One striking difference between Sparks and Kizer should be
noted. Sparks was based partly on the de minimis rule, the amount of
"special damage" being trivial.' The Court in Kizer" made no
mention of this factor, thus giving rise to the presumption that North
Carolina has committed itself to an "enlightened rule which should
receive general application."' 9
Express and Implied Contract
In McCraw v. Llewllyr20 the plaintiff alleged the testatrix had
made a will in which he had been devised and bequeathed all of her
property. He did not claim as a beneficiary under the will since he
recognized that it had been revoked by the testatrix's subsequent
14 The instruction appealed from was as follows: "If the plaintiff is
entitled to recover at all she is entitled to recover as damages one compensa-
tion in a lump sum, for all of her injuries, past, present, and prospective, in
consequence of the defendants acts and conduct . . . (These damages are
understood to embrace indemnity for actual loss of time, nurses, medical
expenses, loss from inability to perform any of her ordinary duties.)" 256
N.C. at 576, 124 S.E.2d at 551.MCCORMicK, DAMAGES § 8 (1935).
16209 N.C. 705, 184 S.E. 552 (1936).
'7 The hospital bill amounted to fifteen dollars as compared with a total
judgment of fifteen hundred dollars." The "special damages" in this case were not by any means trivial,
amounting to over three thousand dollars. Record pp. 36-38." Brandis & Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North
Carolina, 31 N.C.L. REV. 249, 256 (1953).2256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962). Also discussed in CONTRACTS,
Contracts to Devise and in WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, Contracts to Devise
-Sufficiency of Memorandim, infra.
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marriage.21 Instead he alleged that the will had been made in con-
sideration of services rendered and sought to recover for breach of
an express contract. The Supreme Court reversed a judgment for
the plaintiff deciding that the will was not a sufficient memorandum
to show a special contract. In reversing, the Court stated that the
plaintiff had tried his case on an erroneous theory, and that there
should be a new trial at which the parties may "present such evidence
as they may have relating to an implied promise to pay for services
rendered. 22
In Yates v. W. F. Mickey Body Co.3 the plaintiff alleged that
pursuant to an express contract he had printed five thousand catalogs
for the defendant, and that a certain sum was due thereon. The
defendant answered admitting that he had accepted and used one
thousand of the books, but denied liability on the contract alleging
that they were not printed to specification. There was conflicting
evidence presented on trial as to whether or not the catalogs were
printed correctly. The judge submitted only one issue to the jury:
."How much, if anything is the plaintiff entitled to recover ?-124 The
jury found for the plaintiff on the contract and the defendant ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court held that the submission of a single issue
was erroneous since many issues had been presented. In reversing,
the Court declared that since the plaintiff had received and used one
thousand books, an issue should be submitted to the jury as to
liability on an implied contract basis since it could be found that no
express contract existed, or that if one did exist, the defendant could
possibly not be liable thereon.
By reversing in McCraw for a trial based on implied contract and
by expressly approving of the submission of issues of implied con-
tract and express contract liability on an alternative basis in Yates
the Court followed what now appears to be the general rule that when
a plaintiff declares upon an express contract, grounded on considera-
tion of services rendered, and subsequently fails to prove the contract,
he may then proceed on the theory of implied contract without amend-
ing his complaint.25 This principle would seem to be applicable in all
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.3 (Supp. 1961).22256 N.C. at 217, 123 S.E.2d at 578.
23258 N.C. 16, 128 S.E.2d 11 (1962).
2,Id. at 21, 128 S.E.2d at 14.2 Thormer v. Lexington Mail Order Co., 241 N.C. 249, 85 S.E.2d 140
(1954); Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E.2d 561 (1948); Lipe v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 206 N.C. 24, 173 S.E. 316 (1934); Harris v.
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situations where a quantum meruit recovery is warranted by the
facts alleged irregardless of whether the express contract is not
provable as a matter of law2" or is a question of fact for the jury.
27
The two cases serve the purpose of buttressing against an earlier
suggestion that a plaintiff may be forced to an election between the
two remedies since they are inconsistent."' By consistently allowing
the plaintiff to proceed on both theories the Court has reached the
laudable result of allowing an entire case to be tried on the merits
without being interrupted and plagued by the technicalities that still
survive the common law.
Extention
In Roberts v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 29 the plaintiff requested and
received an extension of twenty days in which to file his complaint
under the following provision of G.S.§ 1-121:
Provided that the clerk may at the time of the issuance
of summons on application of plaintiff by written order extend
the time for filing complaint to a day certain not to exceed
twenty (20) days, and a copy of such order shall be delivered
to the defendant, or defendants, at the time of the service of
summons in lieu of a copy of the complaint: Provided further,
said application and order shall state the nature and purpose
of the suit."
Buie, 202 N.C. 634, 163 S.E. 693 (1932) ; Dorsey v. Corbett, 190 N.C. 783,
130 S.E. 842 (1925); Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N.C. 394, 10 S.E. 566 (1889).
See also Coley v. Dalrymple, 225 N.C. 67, 33 S.E.2d 477 (1945); Grady v.
Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E.2d 760 (1944). In Thormer v. Lexington Mail
Order Co., supra the facts were almost identical with those in Yates. The
complaint alleged a contract, duly performed by the plaintiff, to provide illus-
trations for a mail order catalog. There was conflicting testimony as to the
specifications of the illustrations, but it was established that the defendant
received and kept at least one for his own use. The trial court in that case,
however, sent the case to the jury on theories of both express and implied
contract. The case was reversed on appeal, but the Supreme Court seemed
to approve the submission of alternative theories.
E.g., McCraw v. Llewllyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962.).
E.g., Yates v. W. F. Mickey Body Co., 258 N.C. 16, 128 S.E.2d 11
(1962).
28 Graham v. Hoke, 219 N.C. 755, 14 S.E.2d 790 (1941) criticized in
20 N.C.L. Rtv. 205 (1942). See also Hayman v. Davis, 182 N.C. 563, 109
S.E. 554 (1921), where the Court stated that since the plaintiff had elected
to sue on quantum meruit he had renounced all right to recover on the special
contract which he had attempted to plead.
20256 N.C. 434, 124 S.E.2d 105 (1962).
"0 N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-121 (Supp. 1961).
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The clerk's order read, " 'the nature and purpose of the action is
to recover the sum of $100,000.00 for personal injuries received as
a result of the negligence of the ... defendant.' "1 On receipt of the
order, the defendant moved to quash the summons and dismiss the
action for failure of the plaintiff's application and the clerk's order to
sufficiently give the defendant notice of the nature and purpose of
the suit.
In what appears to be a case of first impression32 the Court held
that "the intent of the statute was to require the plaintiff to alert the
defendant by giving preliminary notice of the nature of the claim
and the purpose of the suit, and that the ultimate factual averments
would follow in a complaint later to be filed." 3  The Court held,
accordingly, that the application and the order had sufficiently met
the statutory requirement.
Insurance-Nonpayment of Premiums
In Crisp v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.34 plaintiff brought a
suit as a third party beneficiary under an automobile liability in-
surance policy issued by the defendant. Plaintiff had previously
brought an action against the insured for injuries sustained as a
result of the insured's negligence. In that action plaintiff recovered a
judgment against the insured but it was unsatisfied.
On appeal the defendant contended that the plaintiff had failed to
make out a prima facie case in that he had failed to allege and prove
that the premiums on the policy had been paid. Thus, the defendant
argued, there had been no affirmative showing by the plaintiff that
the policy was in effect at the time of the accident. The Court, after
first stating that the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Responsibility
Act of 1957"5 are applicable to all automobile liability policies, found
that the required FS-1 certificate had been issued to the insured, and
held that this certificate represented that all conditions precedent had
been performed, including payment. 6 The Court further surmised
1 Roberts v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 256 N.C. 434, 435, 124 S.E.2d 105,
106 (1962).
" In Whitehurst v. Anderson, 228 N.C. 787, 44 S.E.2d 358 (1947) an
evenly divided Court handed down a per curiam decision stating that the
plaintiff could amend the order issued under G.S. § 1-121 if it did not suffi-
ciently state the "nature and purpose of the action."
"256 N.C. at 436, 124 S.E.2d at 107 (1962).
,256 N.C. 408, 124 S.E.2d 149 (1962). Also discussed in INSURANCE,
Automobile Liability Insurance, infra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961).
" "Where a statute is applicable to a policy of insurance, the provisions
[Vol. 41
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that after the plaintiff has alleged and proved that the policy has been
issued, and that it covered the automobile in question, the only way
for the insurer to escape liability is to prove that the policy has been
cancelled in accordance with the applicable statutory procedure.
It has been held in numerous instances 7 that nonpayment of
premiums is an affirmative defense, unless the policy stipulates other-
wise.38 It is desirable that this defense be unavailable to the issuer of
an automobile liability policy since the main purpose of the Motor
Vehicle Responsibility Act is to protect those injured by automobiles.
With the holding in the principal case the Court has further guaran-
teed that those injured by the negligent operation of an automobile in
North Carolina will receive compensation for their injuries.
Joinder of Parties and Causes
In Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co. 9 plaintiff alleged in his
complaint facts tending to show that he was arrested for the crimes
of rape and robbery, that the victim failed to identify him, and that
defendant-constable, knowing of the failure of positive identification,
announced to the contrary. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant
broadcasting company, with full knowledge that there had been no
identification, disseminated through its radio and television facilities
statements that the plaintiff had been arrested and had been positively
identified by the victim. By way of amendment the plaintiff further
alleged that the two defendants had conspired to libel and slander
him. Defendant broadcasting company demurred on the grounds of
misjoinder of parties and causes.4" The trial court overruled the
of the statute enter into and form a part of the policy to the same extent as
if they were actually written in it." Crisp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
256 N.C. 408, 413, 124 S.E.2d 149, 153 (1962).
"E.g., Cato v. Hospital Care Ass'n, 220 N.C. 479, 17 S.E.2d 671 (1941);
Blackburn v. Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, 219 N.C. 602,
14 S.E.2d 670 (1941).
" Creech v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 224 N.C. 144, 29 S.E.2d 348 (1944);
accord, Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 212 N.C. 516, 193 S.E. 728
(1937).
256 N.C. 382, 124 S.E.2d 98 (1962). This case is discussed in ToRTs,
Defamation, infra.
" The broadcasting company contended that the complaint alleged four
causes of action: (1) a cause of action against the constable as an individual
for false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution; (2) a cause
of action against the constable as an individual for libel; (3) a cause of action
against the broadcasting company for libel; and (4) a cause of action against
both defendants for conspiracy to libel and slander the plaintiff.
The Court stated that although it was possible to allege a cause of action
against a law enforcement officer for malicious prosecution, State v. Swanson,
223 N.C. 442, 27 S.E.2d 122 (1943), the complaint in question did not do so
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demurrer and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the de-
fendants were properly joined by reason of the allegations of a con-
spiracy to injure the plaintiff.
It is generally held that two or more individuals uttering slanders
against the same person cannot be held jointly liable even though
the words may be the same.41 Once the allegation of conspiracy is
inserted however, the requirement that all causes must affect all
parties is met.42 Thus the principal case holds in accord with prior
North Carolina decisions4" that a plaintiff may join all parties who
join in a conspiracy to libel or slander.
Notice
Ordinarily, the giving of timely notice as required by a municipal
charter is a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action
in tort against a municipality.44 If the plaintiff fails to allege and
prove notice, a nonsuit is proper.45 There is an exception to this
rule, however, where the plaintiff alleges and proves that at the time
notice should have been given he was under a mental or physical
disability. In such a case the plaintiff is not required to give notice
so long as he remains disabled.46
The general rule was applied recently47 in a situation where the
because of the failure of the plaintiff to allege that he was arrested without
probable cause.
As to the causes of action for false imprisonment and false arrest the
Court concluded that since the warrants were properly issued the officer was
protected, thus precluding a cause of action on those grounds. This would
have been true even though the warrants were defective. Alexander v.
Lindsey, 230 N.C. 663, 55 S.E.2d 470 (1949).
"E.g., Gattis v. Kilgo, 125 N.C. 133, 34 S.E. 246 (1899).
"2 N.C. GENr. STAT. § 1-123 (1953). If there is only one libel, however,
it is well settled that all who participate in its publication may be sued by the
person defamed either jointly or severally. Taylor v. Kinston Free Press Co.,
237 N.C. 551, 75 S.E.2d 528 (1953); Tucker v. Eatough, 186 N.C. 505, 120
S.E. 57 (1923).
"2E.g., Lewis v. Carr, 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919); Rice v. Mc-
Adams, 149 N.C. 29, 62 S.E. 774 (1908).
"Carter v. City of Greensboro, 249 N.C. 328, 106 S.E.2d 564 (1959);
Barnett v. City of Elizabeth City, 222 N.C. 760, 24 S.E.2d 264 (1943) ; Foster
v. City of Charlotte, 206 N.C. 528, 174 S.E. 412 (1934) ; Hartsell v. City of
Asheville, 166 N.C. 633, 82 S.E. 946 (1914).
"E.g., Barnett v. City of Elizabeth City, supra note 44
"E.g., Carter v. City of Greensboro, 249 N.C. 328, 106 S.E.2d 564
(1959). It is also stated that after the disability has been removed it must
be shown that the plaintiff "gave notice within a reasonable time affer the
disability was removed." Sowers v. Forsyth Warehouse Co., 256 N.C. 190,
193, 123 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1962). The rule is obviously sound but as to this
time there has been no specific case dealing with this point.
' Sowers v. Forsyth Warehouse Co., supra note 46.
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minor plaintiff was injured when she stepped into a defective place
in a sidewalk. After finding no extenuating circumstances 48 to excuse
the failure of the plaintiff to give notice to the defendant municipality,,
the Court took judicial notice of the date of appointment of the next
friend, citing Rowland v. Beauchamp.49 Rowland held that in an
action by a minor to recover for personal injuries negligently in-
flicted, the statute of limitations begins to run upon the appointment
of a next friend for the special purpose of bringing the action. Thus,
by citing Rowland, the Court seems to infer that even if a minor
plaintiff is incapacitated, once the next friend is appointed notice be-
comes a necessity for maintaining an action.
Plea of Abatement
In Perry v. Owens"0 A and B were involved in an automobile
collision. B brought suit in the Durham County Civil Court which
has a limited jurisdiction (1500 dollars)." While this suit was pend-
ing A brought another action in the Wake County Superior Court
alleging damages totalling 11,650 dollars. B answered by pleading
in abatement, alleging the prior action in bar. A demurred to the
plea. The trial court overruled the demurrer and accordingly dis-
missed the action. On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that
if the demurrer was sustained there would be many difficulties arising
from the fact that suits were being prosecuted in two different courts,
especially in respect to res judicata.52 These considerations, though,
I8 256 N.C. at 193, 123 S.E.2d at 605. The Court considered the plaintiff's
education, physical condition, reactions of parents and relatives, and age in
reaching the conclusion that there was nothing that hindered prompt notice
from being given. As demonstrated by the case, the fact that the plaintiff is
a minor does not per se do away with the requirement that notice be given.
Cf. Carter v. City of Greensboro, 249 N.C. 328, 106 S.E.2d 564 (1959);
Webster v. City of Charlotte, 222 N.C. 321, 22 S.E.2d 900 (1942). In
Webster v. City of Charlotte, supra, the plaintiff was eight years old at the
time of the injury. Suit was brought when he reached the age of thirteen.
On appeal the Court held for the plaintiff although no notice had been given.
This case was relied upon by the plaintiff in the principal case for the prop-
osition that minority per se will nullify the requirement of notice. Brief for
the Plaintiff, p. 18. Although the decision is not clear as to why the Court
held that the plaintiff's cause was still good it made the statement that "in-
ability to comply strictly with the requirement has been recognized as an
exception to the rule." 222 N.C. at 323, 22 S.E.2d at 902. This would lead to
the conclusion that there were extenuating circumstances that were not
brought out in the opinion, thus placing the case within the general rule.'p253 N.C. 231, 116 S.E.2d 720 (1960).
80 257 N.C. 98, 125 S.E.2d 287 (1962).
8 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-372 (3) (1953).
257 N.C. at 102, 125 S.E.2d at 291.
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were overridden by the fact that A would not by counterclaim in B's
action have her claim fully satisfied,13 and accordingly the judgment
was reversed.
Although the case is one of first instance, 4 this situation was
foreseen by a previous writer for the Law Review in a note" that
discussed the need for a statute providing for removal of a trial to
the superior court when an adverse party has a claim exceeding the
jurisdictional limit of the court in which the action is initiated. The
Court in the instant case took judicial notice of this suggestion and
stated that the enactment of such a statute "merits the attention and
consideration of the General Assembly."56
Prior to the instant decision, the appropriate course of action for
a defendant confronted with this situation was not clear. It had
been decided that he could not counterclaim past the limits of juris-
diction and have the action removed to the superior court. 7 But
since the ingredients of our judicially constructed compulsory coun-
terclaim exist in this situation5" it was not certain whether the de-
fendant could maintain a separate action. This case resolves that
point. However, it expressly does not resolve the problem which
still inheres in the situation and which gives rise to the compulsory
counterclaim conception which ordinarily would prevent a separate
suit, namely, collateral estoppel. As resolved by the Restatement of
" For the defendant's plea of abatement to suffice two prerequisites must
be met: (1) the plaintiff in the second action must be capable of obfaining
the same relief in the prior action; and (2) a judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff in the prior action would be res judicata to the second action. Perry v.
Owens, 257 N.C. 98, 125 S.E.2d 287 (1962) ; Hill v. Hill Spinning Co., 244
N.C. 554, 94 S.E.2d 677 (1956). Based on this criterion the defendant (B)
failed in meeting prerequisite (1) in substantiating his plea of abatement.
"'A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Auto Fin. Co. v.
Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119 (1958). The plaintiff filed suit in
the Durham 'County Civil Court. The defendant then counterclaimed 'for an
amount in excess of the jurisdictional limit and moved that the case be re-
moved to the superior court by reason of his counterclaim. The Supreme
Court held that it was error for such an order to issue as there was no statu-
tory provision authorizing such an action.
32 N.C.L. Rxv. 231 (1954). This point was also made in the Sixth
Annual Survey of Case Law, 37 N.C.L. REv. 468 (1959), commenting on
Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, supra note 54.
257 N.C. at 102, 125 S.E.2d at 291.
"'Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119 (1958).
" A defendant is placed in the position of mandatory counterclaim "where
the issues raised in the plaintiff's action, if answered in his favor, will
necessarily establish facts sufficient to defeat the defendant's cause of action
Bullard v. Berry Coal & Oil Co., 254 N.C. 756, 758, 119 S.E.2d 910,
911 (1961).
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Judgments the judgment rendered in the first action would not be
conclusive as to the second.59 Although this solution would resolve
the immediate problem presented, it appears that a legislative enact-
ment allowing removal of such suits would allow orderly handling
free from such complications and would produce a much more
desirable result.60
Splitting Causes of Action
As a general rule all damages resulting from a single wrong or
cause of action must be recovered in one suit.6 ' This rule against
splitting causes of action is based partly on the theory of res judicata
and partly on "sound policy to prevent the harassing of defendants
and the wasting of the time of courts. ' 62 A recognized exception
arises when the wrongful act causes both personal injuries and
property damage and the injured party has insurance covering the
total amount of the property damage. If the insurer, in such a case,
pays the loss in full 63 it becomes the "real party in interest"'  as to
the property damage and must sue in its own name to enforce its
right to subrogation.65 On the other hand the insured may sue in his
own name to recover for his personal injuries.66 Thus, an otherwise
indivisible cause of action may be split.
In Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. McLean Trucking Co." North Carolina,
for the first time, allowed splitting of a cause of action where only
property damages were involved. In McLean plaintiff was the insurer
of cargo which was destroyed in a collision between a truck owned
" "[W]here an action is brought in such a court [i.e. one of limited
jurisdiction] to enforce a claim for less than the designated amount, and
the liability of the defendant depends upon the determination of a particular
matter, the determination of this matter, although conclusive in this action,
is not conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties involving a claim
exceeding the designated sum, brought in a court whose jurisdiction is not
limited as to the amount in controversy." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71,
comment d. (1942).
" On March 20, 1963, a bill was favorably reported to the Senate to
remedy this situation.
" E.g., Eller v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 140, 52 S.E. 305 (1905).
" CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 73 (2d ed. 1947).
"' An assignment by the insured to the insurer of the amount not paid may
act as a substitute for a complete payoff. Anything less than that will not
suffice. Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d 618
(1959) (loan agreement for amount deductible insufficient). For a complete
analysis of this and related problems see 38 N.C.L. REv. 99 (1959).
,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
" Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929).68E.g., Underwood v. Dooley, supra note 65.
"8256 N.C. 721, 125 S.E.2d 25 (1962).
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by the insured and a truck owned by the defendant. In a prior action
the insured successfully sued for the damage to the truck and took
a voluntary nonsuit as to the loss of the cargo."' The plaintiff then
brought suit to recover for the loss of the cargo. The defendant
pleaded the prior judgment as a bar and the trial court dismissed the
action. Plaintiff appealed and, at the same time, filed a motion in
the Supreme Court to amend its complaint to allege that it paid the
insured the total value of the cargo loss prior to the commencement
of the first action. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and
denied the plaintiff's motion without prejudice. Thus plaintiff was
allowed to apply to the trial court for permission to so amend its
complaint. The Court reasoned that had the plaintiff totally paid for
the loss to the cargo, then the insured would have had no right to
recover for such loss in the prior action. In such a case, the plaintiff
would become the "real party in interest" as to the cargo.
Prior to the instant decision there had been what appeared to be
a wealth of authority that causes of action as to property damage are
indivisible,69 and that the insurer may sue in its own name only after
it has paid to the insured compensation for the total amount of all
property damage."° If the amount paid is less, the rule in Burgess v.
Trevathan7' is then applicable:
Where the insurance paid by the insurance company covers
only a portion of the loss, the insured is a necessary party
plaintiff in any action against the tort-feasor for the loss.
The insured may recover judgment against the tort-feasor in
such case for the full amount of the loss .... [holding] the
"McCombs v. McLean Trucking Co., 252 N.C. 699, 114 S.E.2d 683
(1960). Another action for the wrongful death of the driver of the insured's
truck was also consolidated with this case, both resulting in judgments
against the defendant.
" E.g., Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 160, 72 S.E.2d 231, 233
(1952); Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry., 179 N.C. 255, 261, 102
S.E. 417, 421 (1920). Two exceptions have appeared. (1) If the defendant
does not object to the causes being split, the objection is deemed waived.
Southern Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Raleigh, C. & S. Ry., 179 N.C. 290, 102 S.E.
504 (1920). (2) If the insured settles with the tort-feasor for all the damages
over and above the amount paid by the insurance company the cause is said
to be split by the agreement of the parties. In this instance the insured loses
all beneficial interest in the cause and the insurer may bring an action against
the tort-feasor for the amount that he has paid the insured. Powell & Powell,
Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916).
E.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Modern Gas Co., 247 N.C. 471, 101 S.E.2d
389 (1958).
71236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952).
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proceeds of the judgment, however, as a trustee for the benefit
of the insurance company to the extent of the insurance paid
by it.
72
In the instant case the insurance paid by the plaintiff covered
only a portion of the entire property damage; therefore, it would
appear that the sole right of action remained with the insured.73
However, other factors must be taken into consideration. First, the
insured did not own the cargo, but was a mere bailee. Second,
the defendant was given due notice that there had been a cargo loss,
and when the insured moved to take a voluntary nonsuit as to its loss,
he could have moved to have the insurer brought into the action.
Thus, as a matter of policy the decision appears sound. In any event
it should stand as a warning to all future defendants in similar situa-
tions to attempt to bring in all parties that have an interest in the
subject of the action.
Statute of Limitations
In Kizer v. Bowman7 4 the plaintiff brought suit for personal
injuries sustained in an automobile accident that occurred in Florida.
After the statute of limitations had run on her cause of action, plain-
tiff amended to further allege that the defendant's acts constituted
gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. 5 After the
plaintiff's evidence the defendant's motion for nonsuit was denied.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the amend-
ment alleged no new cause of action or any new facts, and thus the
amendment related back to the time that the complaint had been
initially filed. The Court stated that "the pleader merely characterized
the alleged acts theretofore set out in her complaint . . .71
Although the Court applied Florida substantive law, it would
appear that the same result would have been reached under North
Carolina law. The purpose of pleading willful and wanton negligence
in this jurisdiction is to eliminate contributory negligence as a de-
" Id. at 160, 72 S.E.2d at 233.
" Compare Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry., 179 N.C. 255,
102 S.E. 417 (1920), where the Court allowed separate suits by five different
insurance companies after each had paid a part of the total property damage.
256 N.C. 565, 124 S.E.2d 543 (.1962).
5 1t would appear that the reason for the later amendment was to insure
that the plaintiff brought herself within the provisions of the Florida guest
statute.
7 256 N.C. at 570, 124 S.E.2d at 547.
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fense' 7 or to lay a foundation for punitive damages." Although it
is good practice to specifically plead such allegations, if they are
omitted the issue will still be considered if the facts alleged are suffi-
cient to show that the defendant's conduct warranted such a charac-
terization. 9 In making these additional allegations the plaintiff is
merely '"dressing up" his complaint, adding nothing in the way of a
new cause of action.s°
Variance
In Hall v. Poteat8' the plaintiff alleged that she sustained in-
juries when the defendant pulled his automobile into the path of the
plaintiff's oncoming car. On trial, the plaintiff's testimony tended to
show that the defendant's car was stopped in his lane of travel at the
time of the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of
nonsuit on the basis that the variance between the plaintiff's proof
and allegation was fatal.
The case is in accord with a line of decisions 2 holding that if a
plaintiff varies his proof from that which he has alleged he is subject
to nonsuit, regardless of whether or not the defendant satisfied the
trial court that he was misled or prejudiced by the introduction of
the new evidence.8" This case is noted at page 647 infra.
PARTIES
Proper Parties
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchan 4 the testator died
8,256 N.C. 142, 123 S.E.2d 489 (1962).
leaving a will which set up one trust for his widow and another trust
for the benefit of his minor daughter. The widow filed a dissent.
While the dissent was pending, Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., acting
as trustee and executor of the will, and the widow agreed on a tenta-
tive settlement. Action was then brought in equity to obtain the
E.g., McAdoo v. Richmond & D.R.R., 105 N.C. 140, 11 S.E. 316 (1890).
8E.g., Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956).
, 9Id. at 27, 92 S.E.2d at 396. This case is placed in the context of puni-
tive damages, but it would appear that the same would be true if the issue is
contributory negligence. Accord, Hansley v. Jamesville & W.R.R., 115 N.C.
602, 20 S.E. 528 (1894).
" When such allegations are made, they are treated as mere "conclusions
of law" and will be stricken if the facts in the complaint do not substantiate
them. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956).
81257 N.C. 458, 125 S.E.2d 924 (1962).
8 2Beginning with Whichard v. Lipe, 221 N.C. 53, 19 S.E.2d 14 (1942).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168 (1953).
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advice and consent of the court on the settlement. The court appointed
a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of the daughter and made
a finding approving the settlement. The guardian ad litem appealed
stating that the findings were insufficient to determine whether the
proposed settlement adequately protected the vested trust estate of the
daughter.
The Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the guardian's con-
tentions. In its order of reversal, the Court, acting ex mero motu
ordered that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent the con-
tingent interests of the possible issue of the daughter, and that a
guardian ad litem should also be appointed to represent the heirs-at-
law of the testator since they had a contingent interest in the trust if




In Surplus Stores, Inc. v. Hunter' the Court noted the distinc-
tion between those "Blue Laws" which prohibit "all occupations on
Sunday" and those, like the one under consideration, which apply
solely to "certain business activities."2 In holding the act unconstitu-
tional the Court concluded that its proviso listing the articles which
could not be sold on Sunday was so vague that men of common intelli-
gence could not guess as to its meaning.
3
'257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962).1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1961) provided: "Any person, firm,
or corporation who engages on Sunday in the business of selling, or sells or
offers for sale, on such day, at retail, clothing and wearing apparel, clothing
accessories, furniture, housewares, . . . and articles necessary for making
repairs and performing services, shall, upon conviction thereof be fined or
imprisoned in the discretion of the court. Each separate sale or offer to sell
shall constitute a separate offense."
The Court mentioned other improprieties in the statute such as the ban
on retail sales, but not on wholesale transactions, and the fact that the act
made no attempt to control the sale of goods not listed. These inconsistencies
were not passed upon since they were not raised by the plaintiffs.
An interesting comparison can be noted between the present case and the
United States Supreme Court's holdings in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1960), the banner case on Sunday -f¢ork laws. The Court considered a
law which prohibited all work on Sunday, except for retail sales of "merchan-
dise essential to, or customarily sold at, or incidental to, the operation of"
bathing beaches, amusement parks, etc. This "exception" proviso was held
to be not so vague as to violate due process.
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CLASS TAXATION
In 1959 the Legislature passed three acts which were intended to
set up a fund for retired firemen.' Under the acts a tax was to be
levied on insurance companies of one per cent of the premiums from
fire and lightning policies. This tax was not to be levied on contracts
of insurance written on property in "unprotected areas." The in-
surance companies challenged the statutes as a composite act claiming
all three parts were invalid because: (1) the maintenance of fire
fighting facilities is a local and not a state problem; (2) the proviso
referring to "unprotected areas" was void for vagueness; and (3)
the insurance companies cannot be taxed as a group for the purpose
of paying the salaries of another class or group which consists of
public employees. The Court in Great American Ins. Co. v. Johnson'
upheld the third contention of the insurance companies. It was con-
cluded that state funds could be used to aid local governments and
also that the term "unprotected areas" was not vague. However,
to have a tax imposed on a particular group of insurance companies
for the special benefit of a group of public employees is unconstitu-
tional, especially where the tax is imposed without any suggestion
of benefit to the group upon which it is levied.
DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY
In Dudley v. Staton6 the Court declared a part of the new Intes-
tate Succession Act invalid as it applies to the husband's right to
dissent from his wife's will.7 The Court held that the husband could
not dissent from his spouse's will since under article X, section 6, of
the North Carolina Constitution a married woman in this state is
granted the right to devise property as if she were unmarried.8
I N.C. SEss. LAWS 1959, ch. 1211, H.B. 689; N.C. SESs LAWS 1959, ch.
1212, H.B. 690; N.C. SESs. LAWS 1959, ch. 1273, H.B. 785.
257 N.C. 367, 126 S.E.2d 92 (1962).
- 257 N.C. 572, 126 S.E.2d 590 (1962). For further discussion on this
case see Note, 41 N.C.L. Rnv. 311 (1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961).
' "The real and personal property of any female in this State acquired
before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which she may, after
marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole and
separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any
debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and
bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as
if she were unmarried." N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 6 (1868).
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ELECTIONS
In Thomas v. Board of Elections the petitioner attempted to
enter the 1962 Democratic primary to run for candidate for the
office of Lieutenant-Governor which had become vacant prior to
the expiration of the term. Thomas claimed the right to run under
a statute' ° which provided for the filling of vacancies in state offices
at the next regular elections, "except as otherwise provided for in
the Constitution." The State Board of Elections refused to accept
petitioner's notice of candidacy or filing fee, alleging that the office
would not be open for the filing of candidates until the primary of
1964. On motion for mandamus the Court agreed with the Board
and held that the constitution provided for the succession of the
Governor and Lieutenant-Governor" and does not authorize the
filling of the vacancy by election prior to the expiration of the term.
The Court further held that the Governor could not appoint a suc-
cessor, but that the duties of the Lieutenant-Governor are to be
carried out by the President of the Senate.
In Ratcliff v. Rodman'2 the Court refused to decide the validity
of the oath required of candidates in primary elections."3 The sec-
tion of the oath which was under attack states that the candidate will
support all of his party's nominees in the general election.' 4 On
an action for mandamus the Court refused to decide the issue, find-
ing that since the primary had been held the question was aca-
demic.1r'
256 N.C. 401, 124 S.E.2d 164 (1962).11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-7 (1952).
"N.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 12 (1868).
258 N.C. 60, 127 S.E.2d 788 (1962).
'3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-119 (1952).
14The oath, as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-119 (1952), reads: "I
hereby file my notice as a candidate for the nomination as - in the
primary election to be held on . I affiliate with the - party, and
I hereby pledge myself to abide by the results of said primary, and to support
in the next general election all candidates nominated by the - party."
"o It would appear that in this case an action for damages against the
board on the ground that the constitution grants to everyone the civil right
to run in an election, regardless of party allegiance, would have been proper.
Such an action could be sustained under Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Ise-
ley, 203 N.C. 811, 167 S.E. 56 (1933), where the Court said: "Where, how-
ever, it appears from the allegations of the complaint . . . (2) that such
controversy arises out of opposing contentions of the parties, made in good
faith, as to the validity or construction of a statute . . . and (3) that the
parties to the action have or may have legal rights.., the court has jurisdic-
tion .... ." The action for mandamus was moot upon the election, but an
action for damages would have remained as a live issue since the cause of
action would have vested prior to the election.
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NOTICE
In In re Simions 6 the appellants attempted to have a lunacy
hearing set aside on the ground that there was insufficient notice to
the alleged incompetent. The man was given thirty minutes notice
prior to the hearing at which he was found non compos mentis. The
Court held the hearing valid, saying that the incompetent had been
present and was examined by a jury.17 Citing Collins v. Highway
Comm'n.,' s the Court held that his failure to request a continuance
when he had the opportunity to do so was a waiver of his right to
attack the soundness of the hearing.19 Following a line of cases
starting with Ex parte White," the Court stated: "A party who is
entitled to notice of a motion may waive notice. A party ordinarily
does this by attending the hearing of the motion and participating
in it." The application of the standards of attendance and participa-
tion for waiver of sufficient notice would seem to be cursory at best.
These requirements presuppose the incompetent's adequate prepara-
tion and apparent readiness which are more likely to be missing in
lunacy hearings than any other type proceeding.
The Court in Sutton v. Davenport2' restated a line of decisions
which hold that notice is a prerequisite to legal actions. 22  In this
case the defendants were pleading res judicata, but in the prior action
to settle title to land the grantor of the plaintiff had not been given
sufficient notice. Publication of the notice was made to "any and
all unknown heirs" and was found invalid. In so holding the Court
" 256 N.C. 184, 123 S.E.2d 614 (1962).
" In Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956), the United States
Supreme Court found similar notice to be in violation of due process as
guaranteed in the fourteenth amendment. In that case, notice of foreclosure
for tax delinquency was given an elderly woman. Several days later she was
adjudged insane. The notice, although given in compliance with statutory
provisions of mailing, posting and publishing was held insufficient. The
Court said that notice to an incompetent person is not notice but a mere
gesture and does not comply with the requirements of due process.
18237 N.C. 277, 74 S.E.2d 709 (1953).
Although the right to counsel in lunacy hearings was not discussed, it
appears that the incompetent appeared alone. It was stated that by his
failure to ask for a continuance he waived his right to object. It has been
held that such failure to object or appeal in criminal cases where no counsel
is provided only emphasizes the need for counsel and such lack of counsel
defeats the right for which protection is sought. Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471 (1944).
2°82 N.C. 377 (1880).
21258 N.C. 27, 128 S.E.2d 16 (1962).
22E.g., Bank v. Jordon, 252 N.C. 419, 114 S.E.2d 82 (1960); Peel v.
Moore, 244 N.C. 512, 94 S.E.2d 491 (1956); Ferguson v. Price, 206 N.C.
37, 173 S.E. 1 (1934) ; State v. Collins, 169 N.C. 323, 84 S.E. 1049 (1915).
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stated: "The notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to




In Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc.,' the
subcontractor, in compliance with the terms of a contract, agreed
that before beginning work on a construction project he would
deposit a certain sum in the bank to be used for purchasing supplies
and other items. The sum was not deposited and the subcontractor
began work. The contractor forced him to give up the project,
claiming that his failure to make the deposit was a breach of the
contract. The subcontractor then brought an action seeking to
recover for the work already performed on a quantum meruit theory.
It was argued that the deposit was a condition precedent to the
arising of a contract and therefore he could collect the reasonable
value of the work rather than being bound by the terms of the con-
tract. The Court, evidencing its historic dislike for conditions prec-
edent,2 held that the contract was complete and in effect and the
deposit was merely a condition precedent to the right to perform the
work rather than to the arising of the contract.3
One factor rightfully given great weight by the Court was that
both the parties had manifested an intent consistent with the holding
that the contract was in effect from the time of the agreement rather
than from the time of the contemplated deposit.4
23258 N.C. at 30, 128 S.E.2d at 18 (1962). The defendant's motion to
dismiss because of res judicata was based on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-108 (1953).
That statute relates only to defendants "against whom publication is oralered"
and publication had not been ordered against the plaintiff's intestate in the
prior action.
1256 N.C. 110, 123 S.E.2d 590 (1962).
- See generally McCall, Estates on Condition and on Special Limitation
in North Carolina, 19 N.C.L. REv. 334, 345-46 (1941).
3256 N.C. at 118, 123 S...2d at 596.
' The general rule is that where a material provision of a contract is left
open for future treaty or negotiation the contract is rendered incomplete and
uncertain. Here the contract was made and there remained nothing for the
parties to do as to the formation of a contract. Federal Reserve Bank v.
Neuse Mfg. Co., 213 N.C. 489, 196 S.E. 848 (1938).
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CONTRACTS OF SALE
In Yates v. Mickey Body Co.5 the defendant had contracted with
the plaintiff, printer, for five thousand catalogs. The first one
thousand were received by the defendant and despite the fact that
he alleged they were not as he had ordered, he, due to an emergency
situation, found it necessary to use them in the alleged faulty condi-
tion. Upon receipt of this first delivery he immediately contacted
the plaintiff and attempted to cancel the order for the remainder.
The plaintiff sued for the total price, and argued that the defendant
had waived his right to refuse the remainder of the catalogs by
accepting the initial group.
The Court held that the defendant had not waived his right to
refuse the remainder of the order because his acceptance of the
initial catalogs was in an emergency situation. This decision, in
accord with the existing North Carolina law,6 is well calculated to
meet the ends of equity and does no harm to any existing contract
policies.
CONTRACTS TO DEVISE
In McCraw v. Llewellyn7 the plaintiff brought an action for
breach of a contract to devise real and personal property in return
for personal services rendered. Defendant, deceased's second hus-
band, denied the special contract to devise, thus invoking the Statute
of Frauds.' Plaintiff offered as a memorandum of the contract a
revoked will, made prior to the deceased's second marriage,0 which
devised and bequeathed certain real and personal property to the
plaintiff. The will recited no consideration for the devise. The trial
court submitted the question to the jury on the special contract and
allowed a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted a
new trial, holding that the revoked will of the deceased did not
suffice as a memorandum or note of a contract which would meet
5258 N.C. 16, 128 S.E.2d 11 (1962). This case is discussed in CIVIL
PROCEDURE, Express and Implied Contracts, supra.
'E.g., Howie v. Rea, 70 N.C. 559 (1874); c.f. West v. Laughinghouse,
174 N.C. 214, 93 S.E. 719 (1917).
1256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962).
8 "All contracts to sell or convey any lands ... shall be void unless said
contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in writing and signed
by the party to be charged therewith .. . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1953).
See, e.g., Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933).
Marriage after the execution of a will serves to revoke the will. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-5.3 (Supp. 1961).
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the requirements of the Statute of Frauds."° The Court said that
"exercise of the statutory right to dispose of one's property at death
is not of itself evidence that the disposition directed is compelled by
a contractual obligation."" A writing to be sufficient must show the
promise of obligation which the complaining party desires to en-
force.'2 The contract being void under the Statute of Frauds, the
plaintiff's remedy was in quantum meruit for the reasonable value
of services rendered under an implied contract to pay.'
3
INTERFERENCE BY THI1D PARTY
In Fowler v. Nationwide Ins. Co. 4 the plaintiff-attorney had a
contingent fee contract with his client. The potential action was
against the defendant insurance company. During the existence of
the attorney-client relationship, the client went to see the defendant
without the knowledge of plaintiff, and was induced by the defend-
ant to breach her contract with the plaintiff. Some time later the
"An indivisible oral contract to devise both real and personal property
is void under the Statute of Frauds. E.g., Grady v. Faison, 224 N.C. 567,
31 S.E.2d 760 (1944). See note 8, supra. In Doub v. Hauser, 256 N.C. 331,
123 S.E.2d 821 (1962), action was instituted to recover for services rendered
under an abandoned oral contract to devise. Defendant lived alone and
needed someone to care for him. Plaintiffs and the defendant orally agreed
that if they would live with and care for defendant he would give them
part of his farm. Plaintiffs complied with the defendant's request, and lived
there for seven and one-half years. Plaintiffs cared for defendant's personal
needs, worked the fields, and paid the bills. Defendant made a will leaving
property to the plaintiffs which was later revoked. Defendant, after receiv-
ing a windfall of a few thousand dollars, forced the plaintiffs to leave and
they demanded compensation for services rendered; defendant refused. The
evidence was controverted, but the jury found that there was an agreement
between the parties as alleged and that plaintiffs rendered services to de-
fendant and improved his property. A judgment was entered for plaintiffs,
and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court stating:
"When it is alleged that there was an agreement to provide compensation by
will for services rendered and there is proof that services were rendered,
but claimant fails to satisfy the jury by the greater weight of the evidence
that there was an agreement to make testamentary provision for compensa-
tion, the claimant may still recover upon a quantum meruit for services ren-
dered." 256 N.C. at 337, 123 S.E.2d at 826. In Doub the jury found that there
had been an agreement for compensation by will, but the remedy of a promisee
rendering services under a void oral contract to devise is in either event an
action on implied assumpsit or quantum meruit for the value of services ren-
dered. Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958).
11256 N.C. at 217, 123 S.E.2d at 578.
E.g., Yeager v. Dobbins, 252 N.C. 824, 114 S.E.2d 820 (1960).
"8 Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Grantham v.
Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933). For a late decision see Pickel-
simer v. Pickelsimer, 257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962).
1'256 N.C. 555, 124 S.E.2d 520 (1962).
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client, realizing that she had been duped by the defendant, entered
into a new contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff negotiated a
settlement in the case and received his contingent fee. The theory
of the instant case was based upon a cause of action for wrongful
interference with contractual relations by a third party.'"
The trial court allowed the motion for non-suit by the defendant
and the Supreme Court affirmed. It was held that when the plain-
tiff accepted benefits under the new contract, it worked a novation
on the original contract and therefore any action upon the original
contract must fail.' 6
RELEASE AGREEMENTS
In Davis v. Davis" the plaintiff, prior to presenting her claim
on the merits, was faced with the necessity of destroying the effect
of a release which she had signed. It is readily deductible from the
language quoted in the opinion and the facts of the case that the
plaintiff was either illiterate or semi-literate.'"
The Court held that in order to escape the consequences of her
actions, i.e. signing the release, on the grounds of fraud in the in-
ducement, the plaintiff would have to show that she had acted with
reasonable prudence under the circumstances. This holding is argua-
bly opposed to the old North Carolina case of Bean v. Western
N.C.R.R.'9 where the Court intimated that when the signer of a
release is ignorant and illiterate an almost irrebutable presumption
of fraud arises and the document will most often be struck down.
Certainly the latter view is more productive of fundamental fairness.
"5 "[A]n action lies in tort against an outsider who knowingly, intentionally
and unjustifiably induces one party to a contract to breach it to the damage
of the other party." E.g., Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 674, 84 S.E.2d
176, 181 (1954).
'" The instant case seems to be an extension of the doctrine. In Morgan
v. Speight, 242 N.C. 603, 89 S.E.2d 137 (1955), where the same result was
reached, the original contract was unenforceable; and in Burns v. McFarland,
146 N.C. 382, 59 S.E. 1011 (1907), the original contract had been abandoned.
In Swift v. Beaty, 39 Tenn. App. 292, 282 S.W.2d 655 (1954), the injured
party had given the party breaching the contract an effective release and
cancellation of the contract alleged to have been interfered with and the're had
been no fraudulent interference.
256 N.C. 468, 124 S.E.2d 130 (1962).18Id. at 470, 124 S.E.2d at 132.
19107 N.C. 731, 12 S.E. 600 (1890).
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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
CONDITIONAL SALES
Re-possession Without Notice to Vendee-Damages
In Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,' the defendant, assignee
of a conditional sales vendor of an automobile, upon default and
without notice to the vendee, went on the latter's property, unlocked
the car with a coat hanger, and drove it away. The vendee alleged
there were 650 dollars worth of tools in the car when it was re-
possessed and that the defendant had converted them. The condi-
tional sales contract contained a clause providing that unless the
vendee, within twenty-four hours after re-possession, notified the
vendor that there were articles in the car not covered by the con-
tract, any claim for them would be waived. Damages were awarded
in the lower court for the wrongful seizure. The Supreme Court
ordered a new trial.
After default a conditional vendor is entitled to the possession
of the chattel and may seize and take possession without legal
process provided he does so without provoking a breach of the
peace.' The right to re-possess after default includes the right of
the vendor to enter peaceably upon the premises of the vendee.3
The Court held neither compensatory nor punitive damages may be
recovered against one exercising his legal rights. Therefore, the
trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff might recover for
wrongful seizure. However, in failing to advertise the foreclosure
sale as required, the defendant subjected himself to the penalty of
1257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962).
Freeman v. GMAC, 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63 (1933); UNIFORM CON-
DITIONAL SALES Acr § 16.
'Westerman v. Oregon Auto Credit Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P.2d 435
(1942) ; Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E. 410 (1909). North Carolina,
in the only case in point, has allowed nominal damages to the vendee where
the re-possessor's agent entered the vendee's home while he was away. But
the Court did say that in the absence of any injury to the premises, the
vendee could not recover compensatory damages. Parris v. Fischer & Co.,
221 N.C. 110, 19 S.E.2d 128 (1942). Whether or not this is the established
rule in North Carolina is immaterial in the instant case, since the contract
expressly provided that the vendor or his assignee had the right upqn de-
fault to enter the vendee's premises.
While the Court speaks of the mortgagee's right to re-possess, it is well
settled in North Carolina and elsewhere that a conditional sale has the legal
effect of a chattel mortgage. State v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 829, 167 S.E. 63
(1933); Harris v. Seaboard Air Lines Ry., 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E. 319
(1925); Willis v. Whittle, supra; Note, 30 N.C.L. Rnv. 149 (1952).
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the excess of the fair market value of the car over the balance due
under the sale contract.'
In addition the defendant is liable in conversion for the value
of the tools left in the car. The Court held the contract provision
as to waiver does not apply where the car is re-possessed without
notice to the conditional vendee.
MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST
Independent Trustee
In Denson v. Davis,' an action to try title to land, the Court
attempted to distinguish Mills v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Assn.' In
Mills the original owners executed a deed of trust to the chief active
executive officer of a corporation to secure a debt to the corporation.
The powers to demand a foreclosure, to advertise and sell, and to
determine the bid were vested in a single agent of the creditor who
was also the trustee. The Court held that the trustee's acting in a
dual capacity rendered the transaction, in effect, a mortgage, and
made the foreclosure sale to the mortgagee voidable.7 In the instant
case the trustee of the trust deed was an agent of the creditor-cor-
poration, but had no power to order a foreclosure or to determine
the bid-these powers were held by another agent. The purchaser
at the foreclosure sale was also an agent of the creditor. The trial
court's charge was based on the assumption that these facts consti-
tuted the transaction a mortgage and not a deed of trust. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that where two agents of the
creditor supervise the foreclosure instead of one, the rule of Mills
does not apply.
In the principal case the trustee, in relation to the other two
agents, did not seem to have been acting in his capacity as an impar-
tial trustee any more than did the trustee in the Mills case. The
distinction made by the Court concerning the principles of law in-
volved is without substance. There is no reason to believe that
'257 N.C. at 642, 127 S.E.2d at 225.
S256 N.C. 658, 124 S.E.2d 827 (1962).0216 N.C. 664, 6 S.E.2d 549 (1940) ; Note, 18 N.C.L. IEv. 350 (1940).
'The same is not true of a creditor-beneficiary under a deed of trust.
This difference is based on the idea that with a deed of trust, the trustee is
acting in his capacity as an independent third party, which prevents the
creditor from having an undue advantage over the debtor. But on a showing
of fraud or collusion with the trustee, the cestui que trust has no right to
buy in the property at the foreclosure sale. Graham v. Graham, 229 N.C. 565,
50 S.E.2d 294 (1948) ; Hare v. Weil, 213 N.C. 484, 196 S.E. 869 (1938).
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where corporate power is dispersed among three agents rather than
concentrated in one, any more independent judgment will be exer-
cised by the agents in the former than in the latter case.
REGISTRATION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY
Estoppel by Conferral of Indicia of Ownership
In Central Nat'l Bank v. Rich' a buyer, resident of Virginia,
gave a worthless check in payment for a car bought in North Caro-
lina. Before the check had cleared the seller delivered the car and
gave the buyer a Dealer's Application for Certificate of Title for
New Motor Vehicle. The buyer returned to Virginia and obtained
a title certificate in that state. Later his assignee gave a deed of trust
on the car to secure a loan from the plaintiff bank in Virginia. The
deed of trust was never recorded in Virginia or North Carolina.
When the check was not honored the seller demanded and obtained
return of the car. The seller then sold the car to the defendant Rich.
From a judgment for the foreclosure of the bank's security Rich
appealed. The Supreme Court granted a new trial.
Since a purchaser who gives a worthless check in payment for
merchandise acquires no title9 as against his vendor, the bank's
deed of trust cannot prevail, unless it can be shown that the seller
is estopped to assert rightful ownership against a party who in good
faith has relied on the indicia of ownership conferred on the ostensi-
ble vendee.Y If we assume the dealer here invested the buyer with
sufficient indicia of ownership to invoke estoppel in an action by the
creditor of the buyer, does the estoppel extend to a good faith
purchaser without notice from the dealer? As a general rule, the
operation of an estoppel against the claim of a grantor does not
extend to the claim of his grantee."1 But where the grantee at the
8 256 N.C. 324, 123 S.E.2d 811 (1962).
' Carrow v. Weston, 247 N.C. 735, 102 S.E.2d 134 (1958). The seller
may elect to rescind the sale and re-possess or he may ratify the sale and sue
for the purchase price. Here the seller elected the first remedy. First
Anmual Case Law Survey, 32 N.C.L. Rnv. 491 (1954).
" Wilson v. Finance Co., 239 N.C. 349, 358, 79 S.E.2d 908, 915 (1954).
In this case, while the vendor delivered possession of the car and the unsigned
registration card to the vendee, he retained the certificate of title,
11 United States v. Chatham, 298 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1962); Avery v.
Drane, 77 Ariz. 328, 271 P.2d 480 (1954); Dade County v. South Dade
Farms, 133 Fla. 288, 182 So. 858 (1938); Boyden v. Clarke, 109 N.C. 664,
14 S.E. 52 (1891).
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time of his purchase knew of the existence of the facts which operate
as a bar to the claim of the grantor, he is likewise estopped. 12 Rich
at the date of the purchase acted in good faith and without actual or
constructive notice, since the plaintiff's deed of trust was unre-
corded.
If Rich was not estopped to claim good title this should properly
have disposed of the case. But the Court went further and intimated
that Rich was also protected by G.S. § 44-38.1. That statute pro-
vides that a security on personal property brought into this state
is not valid as against lien creditors and purchasers of the grantor
or mortgagor unless it is properly registered in the state of prior
location. Rich did not acquire his title from the grantor of the deed
of trust, but from the vendor of such grantor. The Court was of
the opinion that to hold the statute inapplicable in this case would
defeat the legislative intent. This view is in contrast with the Court's
construction of the general recording statute, G.S. § 47-20, which
provides that no encumbrance of real or personal property is valid
as against lien creditors or purchasers "from the grantor, mortgagor
or conditional sales vendee" unless recorded. In Friendly Fin. Corp.
v. Quinnz the Court held that as between an out-of-state conditional
sales vendor and a subsequent purchaser of the car, the former pre-
vailed even though the contract was not recorded because it did not
appear that the purchaser had acquired title directly or by mesne
conveyances from the conditional vendee.14
Due to a 1961 statute,15 which requires any dealer transferring
a new vehicle to a consumer-purchaser to furnish the latter with
the proper manufacturer's certificate of origin, the estoppel problem
of the principal case is not likely to arise again. Having delivered
the certificate of origin to the first vendee, the dealer's inability to
1 Rone v. Sawrey, 197 Ark. 472, 123 S.W.2d 524 (1939); Davis v.
Auerbach, 78 Ga. App. 575, 51 S.E.2d 527 (1949).232 N.C. 407, 61 S.E.2d 192 (1950).
1,The Court said: "The conditional vendor in a conditional sale contract
(when such contract is properly recorded in the State of its execution if
registration is required by the law of that state. G.S. 44-38.1) possesses a
valid title to the property therein described, enforceable in this State without
registration as against anyone in possession except 'creditors or purchasers
for a valuable consideration' from the conditional vendee; that is, the title is
valid as against all except those who deraign their title from the conditional
vendee .... They alone are the beneficiaries of the statute." 232 N.C. at
410, 61 S.E. 2d at 195." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1 (Supp. 1961).
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furnish one to the second vendee should at least put the latter on
inquiry notice as to the facts. However, unless the mortgagee
records his lien he may lose nevertheless if the Court adheres to its
construction of G.S. § 44-38.1.
Fraudulent Assignment-Negligence of Creditor
Smart Fin. Co. v. Dick 6 involved the problem of registration,
not of the car, but of a lien on the car. Dick, as agent for a corpora-
tion, bought a car for it. He then transferred the title to himself,
and procured from the plaintiff a loan secured by a chattel mortgage
on the car.'7 The plaintiff allowed Dick to keep the original dealer's
application and assignment forms so that he could apply for a cer-
tificate of title.'" Dick detached the assignment form on which the
lien of the plaintiff was noted, attached to the original dealer's
application a new assignment form, and as an officer of the corpora-
tion transferred the car to a third party. In an action against Dick
and a subsequent purchaser the lower court concluded as a matter
of law that plaintiff was estopped to assert its mortgage because
plaintiff was negligent in allowing Dick to retain both forms.19
The Supreme Court disagreed and granted a new trial. While it
is probably sound to assume that the proper procedure was for the
creditor to transmit the application to the department, there is no
language in the statute which declares such a duty.2" The Court
found that there had been no former dealings between Dick and
the plaintiff, and that there was no inference that would suggest
that plaintiff did not act in good faith, or that it had any reason
256 N.C. 669, 124 S.E.2d 862 (1962).
The mortgage was duly recorded.The only application for certificate of title ever made was that of the
subsequent purchaser.
" Cf. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957). Here a car
dealer took a check (which later bounced) and gave the buyer a carbon copy
of an order blank showing that the car had been purchased and paid for. The
dealer had signed the order blank. The buyer later sold the car to the de-
fendant. In an action to reclaim the car it was held that the dealer was
estopped to assert title.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58 (Supp. 1961) provides that a security interest
shall be perfected by delivery to the department of either the certificate of
title or the application for one which contains the name and address of the
lien holder, the date, the amount and nature of his security agreement and
the required fee. It further provides that the lien is perfected as of the time
of its creation if the delivery of the certificate or application is completed
within ten days, otherwise it is perfected as of the time of delivery.
1963]
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to suspect that in order to perpetrate a fraud Dick would detach the
two forms.
Time of Acquisition of Title to Motor Vehicles
In Community Credit Co. v. Norwood21 the defendant bought a
second hand car under a conditional sales contract. The defendant
received the old certificate of title from the dealer and applied to the
Department of Motor Vehicles for a new one.22 On the same day
as the application, but before actual issuance of a new title by the
department, the plaintiff levied on this car under an execution issued
on a judgment duly docketed in its favor. General Motors Accept-
ance Corporation, as the assignee of the sales contract, had failed
to register the conditional sales contract until the day that the de-
fendant received his new certificate of title. It intervened and con-
tended the execution levy was void 3 since the defendant did not
have title to the car on the day the plaintiff made the levy. The
Supreme Court reversed judgment for GMAC and held that the
amendments to G.S. § 20-72(b) and § 20-7524 now provide that
the transferee of a car has title as of the time he receives the old
certificate of title and applies for a new one, if the other require-
ments of the statute are observed. Therefore, it was not necessary
to the defendant's title that a new certificate be issued to him. The
case was remanded to determine if the levy was in conformity with
the statutory requirements.25
21257 N.C. 87, 125 S.E.2d 369 (1962).
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-73 (Supp. 1961).
28In North Carolina conditional sales contracts are treated the same as
chattel mortgages. Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N.C. 42, 94 S.E. 526 (1917).
Such sales contracts are valid against lien creditors and purchasers for a
valuable consideration only from the time of registration. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 47-20 (Supp. 1961). Since GMAC had failed to register before the plain-
tiff's levy, its only recourse was to contend that the levy was void, and not
merely inferior to its lien.
24 The amendments only provide that the transfer of ownership in a
vehicle is not effective until the provisions of the sections have been complied
with. They do not relate to the duty of the department to issue a new certifi-
cate, but rather to the dealings between the transferor and transferee. The
Court felt that if the legislature had intended the amendments to mean the
purchaser acquired no title until the department issued him a new certificate,
it would have said so.
" An additional condition has been imposed to constitute the levy a valid
one. That is, to treat the levy as a security interest valid against subsequent
creditors and purchasers, the officer making such levy must notify the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles of the execution. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.6 (Supp.
1961).
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SURETYSHIP
Non-disclosure of Facts Increasing Risk
In Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc.,6 a
compensated surety had promised to reimburse a main contractor
for any damages suffered due to default of the principal-subcon-
tractor. The subcontractor defaulted. The surety denied liability
on the grounds that plaintiff concealed a letter from the defendant
subcontractor tending to reflect on the subcontractor's ability to
perform. Held, surety's motion for non-suit properly disallowed.
The Supreme Court held that even if the main contractor had made
further investigations of the subcontractor's ability to perform the
contract, the evidence did not disclose that it learned any facts not
already known to the surety or which the surety could not have dis-
covered by a reasonable investigation of its own. It is now well
settled that a creditor is under no duty to disclose every fact within
his knowledge to the surety, except a material fact, which the creditor
knows the surety will not discover, and which is of such importance to
the risk that the creditor must have been aware that the non-dis-
closure would in effect amount to a contrary representation to the
surety. 7 The nature of the surety contract does not require full
disclosure unless there is a duty on the part of the creditor to do so.
Further still, the concealment must in fact or in law be fraudulent.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW
Kidnaping
G.S. § 14-39 provides in part that it shall be "unlawful for any
person ... to kidnap ... any human being. . . ."' This statute, passed
in 1933, omits the words "forcibly or fraudulently" found in the prior
kidnaping statute.' In two cases where the taking was by force, dicta
indicate that taking by either fraud or force invokes the present
statute.3
20256 N.C. 110, 123 S.E.2d 590 (1962). Also discussed under CoNTRAcTs,
Construction Contracts, supra, and DAmAGEs, General Overhead Expense,infra.
if 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1249 (rev. ed. 1936).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1953).
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 699, § 1.
' State v. Dorsett, 245 N.C. 47, 95 S.E.2d 90 (1956) ; State v. Withering-
ton, 226 N.C. 211, 37 S.E.2d 497 (1946).
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In State v. Gough4 the Court was faced for the first time with
an alleged kidnaping by fraud rather than by force. The defendant
telephoned a fifteen year old girl who had advertised as a babysitter.
Representing himself as a doctor in need of a babysitter he got the
girl and her sister to ride with him "to his house." Instead he stopped
on a country road and told the girls "to be nice to him and co-operate
with him" and they wouldn't get hurt; whereupon the girls fled to the
nearest house in safety. The Court affirmed a conviction for kid-
naping.
The word kidnap as used in G.S. § 14-39 was defined by the
Court as "the unlawful taking and carrying away of a person by
force or fraud and against his will, or the unlawful seizure and deten-
tion of a person by force or fraud and against his will."' The prose-
cuting witnesses being minors incapable of consent,6 the taking of
them allegedly for a baby-sitting job, but in fact for immoral pur-
poses, constituted a fraudulent taking and the elements of the defini-
tion established by painstaking analysis were met.
Shoplifting
Prior to the passage of the shoplifting statute, G.S. § 14-72.1, in
1957, a person suspected of shoplifting was charged with common-
law larceny which required the proof of larcenous intent as well as
wrongful taking.7 As a matter of practicality store owners waited
until the goods were out of the store to accost the suspect. This
aided the proof of larcenous intent and lessened the possibility of a
suit for malicious prosecution, false arrest, or similar tort. In State
v. Hales8 the Court made it clear that such precautions are no longer
necessary. The ruling upheld the constitutionality of G.S. § 14-72.1,
the shoplifting statute. In this, the first case construing the new
statute, the Court held the crime of shoplifting to consist of four
elements. They are: (1) a person acting without authority, (2) will-
fully conceals goods, (3) which are not theretofore purchased, (4)
while he is still on the premises.'
The decision recognizes the intent of the legislature that felonious
or criminal intent should not be a necessary element of the crime.
'257 N.C. 348, 126 S.E.2d 118 (1962).
1 Id. at 356, 126 S.E.2d at 124 (1962).' State v. Marks, 178 N.C. 730, 101 S.E. 24 (1919).
" State v. Griffin, 239 N.C. 41, 79 S.E.2d 230 (1953).8256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961).
9Id. at 33, 122 S.E.2d at 773.
[Vol. 41
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
The Court agreed that goods concealed upon a person, even while
still in the store, can logically be deemed prima facie evidence of a
"willful concealment" as the statute provides. This liberal construc-
tion subjects the statute to possible abuse since the prima facie case
can be made equally against the prospective purchaser who places
merchandise into a purse or other container and the wrongdoer acting
with criminal intent. However, the decision looks to the nature of
the crime and the difficulty of protection against it under the com-
mon law,"0 and interprets the North Carolina shoplifting statute in
a manner that should provide maximum protection for merchants.
Unauthorized Practice of Law
G.S. § 84-4 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person or
association of persons, except members of the Bar, to prepare for
another person, firm or corporation, any legal document." However,
State v. Pledger'2 held that a lay person acting for a firm or corpora-
tion having a primary interest, not merely an incidental interest, in a
transaction may prepare legal documents necessary to the furtherance
and completion of the transaction without violating this statute.' 3
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Absence of Counsel-Implied Motions
The defendant was found guilty in State v. Whitfield'4 of a charge
that he "feloniously did steal and carry away" a pony. Defendant's
evidence showed that he thought he was taking the pony of the
prosecuting witness in a trade for the defendant's chain saw. The
state's evidence was insufficient to show any felonious intent in the
taking. Not represented by counsel, the defendant stated to the
Court, "I don't see how I can be guilty when Mr. Pendergrass helped
load the pony on the truck."
The Court reversed the conviction stating that the defendant's
statement, in absence of counsel, should be treated as a demurrer to
the evidence and motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit. Such
10 Id. at 31, 122 S.E.2d at 771-72.
"1N.C. Gm¢. STAT. § 84-4 (1958).
257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962).
' For a complete discussion of the ramifications of this decision as well
as other possible remedies see Note, 41 N.C.L. REv. 225 (1963).
1'256 N.C. 704, 124 S.E.2d 869 (1962).
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opinions have a salutary effect in correcting the lack of court-
appointed counsel in less than capital crimes.'"
Alibi
In State v. Allison'8 the Court held that an instruction placing
the burden of proof on a defendant relying on an alibi was reversible
error even though the error occurred in the last sentence of an other-
wise correct paragraph.'1  Refusing to apply the doctrine of contex-
tual interpretation as grounds for upholding inexact charges on an
alibi, the Court narrows that doctrine oft repeated in prior North
Carolina cases.'
8
In State v. Spencer'" the Court dealt further with instructions
regarding an alibi, and held that the defendant was entitled to an in-
struction on his defense of alibi without asking for it. Clarifying
North Carolina procedure,20 the Court suggested the following
charge that should be given when a defendant relies on an alibi.
An accused, who relies on an alibi, does not have the
burden of proving it. It is incumbent upon the State to satisfy
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole evidence
that such accused is guilty. If the evidence of alibi, in connec-
tion with all the other testimony in the case, leaves the jury
with a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, the State
- See FED. R. CRIm. P. 44; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See
generally Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts,
30 NEB. L. REv. 559 (1951). See Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
4291 (U.S. March 18, 1963).
"0256 N.C. 240, 123 S.E.2d 465 (1962).
:7 Id. at 242, 123 S.E.2d at 466.
8 For cases where the doctrine of contextual interpretation was used to
uphold inexact charges on alibi see State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374, 174 S.E.
105 (1934); State v. Rochelle, 156 N.C. 641, 72 S.E. 481 (1911); State v.
Freeman, 100 N.C. 429, 5 S.E. 921 (1888); State v. Starnes, 94 N.C. 973
(1886) ; State v. Jaynes, 78 N.C. 504 (1878). The Court distinguished these
cases saying they expressly or substantially stated that the burden of proving
an alibi does not rest upon the defendant. The refusal to follow this doctrine
in the principal case seems to be a substantial limitation since the instruction
here could be interpreted to have substantially placed the burden in the proper
place in spite of the last sentence.'o256 N.C. 487, 124 S.E.2d 175 (1962).
20 These two "instructive" decisions clarify prior law on the subject of
alibi in North Carolina. On the first point of the exactness of the instruction
see State v. Minton, 234 N.C. 716, 68 S.E.2d 844 (1952); and concerning
the latter point of defendant being entitled to the instruction see, e.g., State
v. Ardrey, 232 N.C. 721, 62 S.E.2d 53 (1950); State v. Sutton, 230 N.C. 244,
52 S.E.2d 921 (1949).
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fails to carry the burden of proof imposed upon it by law,
and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
21
Double Jeopardy-Different Degrees of Same Offense
When a single act violates two statutes and a different element is
required for proof under each statute, the offenses are exclusive, and
conviction or acquittal of one does not bar prosecution for the other.
State v. Birckhead,22 following a prior line of North Carolina de-
cisions,2" held that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser de-
gree of the crime of rape.24 The state contended that the two are
mutually exclusive because they arise out of different statutes2 5 and
because proof of rape requires an additional element not required in
the proof of assault with intent to commit rape. It cited three cases
as authority for this contention.28  However, each of these three
dealt with statutes requiring different elements for conviction under
each statute. This was distinguished by the Court from the present
situation where a single element, penetration, is sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the rape statute once the elements of the assault
statute are present. Showing that all elements of assault with intent
to commit rape are included in the elements of rape, the Court said
"when all pertinent tests are applied ... the offense of assault with
intent to commit rape is a lesser degree of the offense of rape, when
based on the same occurrence, and the two offenses are the same in
fact and in law."27
21256 N.C. at 489, 124 S.E.2d at 177.
256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838 (1962). See Effect of Mistrial, infra.
'3 State v. Green, 246 N.C. 717, 100 S.E.2d 52 (1957); State v. Roy, 233
N.C. 558, 64 S.E.2d 840 (1951); State v. Williams, 185 N.C. 685, 116 S.E.
736 (1923).
2" As is shown in the remarks on this case under Effect of Mistrial, infra.,
the holding here came up in an unusual context. Instead of a conviction of the
lesser crime on an indictment for rape, the reverse was attempted after mis-
trial was granted on the indictment for assault. with intent to commit rape.
The adherence to the lesser included offense interpretation in this context led
to a reversal of a conviction for rape.
25 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-21 (rape) and 14-22 (assault with intent to
commit rape) (1953).
20 State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650, 86 S.E.2d 424 (1955) ; State v. Midgett,
214 N.C. 107, 198 S.E. 613 (1938); State v. Malpass, 189 N.C. 349, 127 S.E.
248 (1925).
j 256 N.C. at 504, 124 S.E.2d at 846. This definitive holding should put
to rest any further attempts to urge separateness of the offenses of rape and
assault with intent to commit rape, whether the context be one of conviction
of the lesser degree on an indictment of rape or an attempt to secure convic-
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Double Jeopardy-Effect of Mistrial
In a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape, evidence
developed at the trial that penetration had occurred.28  The solicitor
then requested that the Court order a mistrial in order that he might
submit an indictment for rape. The Court acquiesed "to the end that
Justice might be served and that a correct charge may be presented
to the Grand Jury." Upon appeal of the subsequent conviction of
rape the Supreme Court reversed, holding that jeopardy attached at
the original trial.29
The question presented for the first time in North Carolina was
whether jeopardy attaches when the trial court, without consent of
the defendant, discharges the jury because it is of the opinion that
the evidence shows him guilty of a higher crime. Answering in the
affirmative, the Court reiterated North Carolina's stand against
double jeopardy, although no constitutional provision expressly
prohibits it,30 and set forth precisely when jeopardy attaches.81 How-
ever, even with these conditions met North Carolina has held that
the judge may discharge the jury and hold the prisoner for another
trial without his consent when "necessity" makes the mistrial manda-
tory."2 Although this has been interpreted only to mean either "physi-
cal necessity"38 such as illness of a juror or the defendant, or the
"necessity of doing justice"34 when some fraudulent practice has
made a fair trial impossible, these standards have been loosely applied
in non-capital cases."
tion of rape, once the state has proceeded on the assault theory to the point
where jeopardy attaches.
8 State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838 (1962).
" See generally Different degrees of same offense, supra."' "It is a fundamental and sacred principle of the common law, deeply
imbedded in our criminal jurisprudence, that no person can be twiqe put in
jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense .... While the principle is
not stated in express terms in the North Carolina Constitution, it has been
regarded as an integral part of the law of the land within the meaning of Art.
1 Sec. 17." State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 449, 80 S.E. 243, 245 (1954).
" jeopardy attaches when a defendant in a criminal prosecution is placed
on trial: (1) on a valid indictment or information, (2) before a court of
competent jurisdiction, (3) after arraignment, (4) after plea, and (5) when
a competent jury has been empaneled and sworn to make true deliverance in
the case. 256 N.C. at 504, 124 S.E.2d at 846.
" State v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604 (1930); State v. Cain, 175
N.C. 825, 95 S.E. 930 (1918); State v. Upton, 170 N.C. 769, 87 S.E. 328
(1915) ; State v. Washington, 89 N.C. 535 (1883) ; State v. Bell, 81 N.C. 534
(1879); State v. Wiseman, 68 N.C. 203 (1872).
"3 State v. Wiseman, supra note 32.
", State v. Cain, 175 N.C. 825, 95 S.E. 930 (1918) ; State v. Upton, 170
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Recognizing the tendency to leave the decision of mistrial to the
discretion of the trial judge, the Court nevertheless took a firm stand
holding that "necessity of doing justice" does not exist where the
sole purpose of the mistrial is to prosecute the defendant for a higher
offense.36
Jurisdiction Over Federal Enclave
G.S. § 104-737 grants jurisdiction to the federal government of
lands purchased by the United States. Jurisdiction vests when title
is passed to the United States and shall continue so long as the United
States owns such lands. In State v. Burell3s the title to land that was
the situs of a crime was in the United States. However, the federal
government had not indicated acceptance of jurisdiction by the re-
quired procedure.39 Does the unequivocal cession of jurisdiction in
G.S. § 104-7 deprive the state of any jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted on federal land over which the United States has not assumed
jurisdiction? Faced with this problem for the first time, the Court
refused to interpret the state statute literally. Applying the principle
that a literal interpretation will not be given a statute if it leads to
absurd results,40 the Court refused to create a no man's land by the
relinquishment of sovereignty as the statute literally directs.
Post-Trial Investigation
In two companion cases4' the defendants contested their impris-
onment on the grounds that they were not present at the conference
when the judge determined applicable sentences to be imposed after
pleas of guilty. The Court refused to overturn the convictions. 2
N.C. 769, 87 S.E. 328 (1915); State v. Washington, 89 N.C. 535 (1883);
State v. Bell, 81 N.C. 535 (1879).
" State v. Humbles, 241 N.C. 47, 84 S.E.2d 264 (1954) ; State v. Guice,
201 N.C. 761, 161 S.E. 533 (1931).
" This is the rule of the majority with similar procedure that have been
faced with the problem. See, e.g., Application of Williams, 85 Ariz. 109, 333
P.2d 280 (1959) ; People v. Ny Sam Chung, 94 Cal. 304, 29 Pac. 642 (1892) ;
Griffin v. State, 28 Ga. App. 767, 113 S.E. 66 (1922) ; State v. Noel, 66 N.D.
676, 268 N.W. 654 (1936).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104-7 (1953). For comment on the problems en-
visioned at the time see Note, 23 N.C.L. Rnv. 258 (1945).
38256 N.C. 288, 123 S.E.2d 795 (1962).
'040 U.S.C. § 255 (1952). See Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312
(1943).,o State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 107 S.E. 505 (1921).
41 State v. Anderson, 257 N.C. 336, 126 S.E.2d 134 (1962); State v. Pope,
257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962).
4' Noted in 41 N.C.L. REV. 260 (1963).
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DAMAGES
BREACH OF WARRANTY
In Seymour v. W. S. Boyd Sales Co.' plaintiff, operator of a
trucking company, purchased a tractor from the defendant, making
a down payment of fifty dollars and receiving one thousand dollars
on a trade-in for a used truck. The balance was financed through a
credit company. A substantial portion of plaintiff's business was
carried on in the State of New York, but he was refused a license
to operate the truck in that state because of an unsatisfied fuel lien
against the truck. When plaintiff notified defendant of the outstand-
ing lien, defendant promised to discharge it, but failed to do so.
The defendant subsequently repossessed the truck from a garage
where plaintiff had left it for repairs. Defendant then offered to
sell it at auction to satisfy the lien. Plaintiff sued for breach of war-
ranty of good title and against encumbrances, and for conversion.
He contended that he was unable to make the payments on the condi-
tional sales contract or to repurchase the truck at the auction because
he could not operate the truck in New York. As to the cause of
action for breach of warranty, it was held that the plaintiff could
recover no more than nominal damages until he paid the amount of
the outstanding lien or had been deprived of possession because of
the lien. The Court pointed out, however, that plaintiff would pre-
vail if he could show special damages within the contemplation of
the parties at the time the contract of sale was made.2
It was further held that plaintiff could not recover the loss of
anticipated profits without allegation and proof that they were within
the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.'
1257 N.C. 603, 127 S.E.2d 265 (1962). Also discussed under SALES,
Express Warranty-Failure to List Existing Liens on Motor Vehicle Title
Certificate, infra.
2 The case is apparently one of first impression on this point in North
Carolina. The Court relied on Close v. Crossland, 47 Minn. 500, 50 N.W. 694
(1891), and Paul Hellman, Inc. v. Reed, 366 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1961). The
Court has applied the same measure of damages for breach of covenant in
cases involving real estate transactions. See Fishel v. Browning, 145 N.C. 71,
58 S.E. 759 (1907); Lane v. Richardson, 104 N.C. 642, 10 S.E. 189 (1889).
This is in accord with the great weight of authority. See, e.g., Went-
worth & Irwin, Inc. v. Sears, 153 Ore. 201, 56 P.2d 324 (1936). See generally
MCCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 8 (1935). North Carolina had previously held in
Price v. Goodman, 226 N.C. 223, 37 S.E.2d 592 (1946), that a defendant
could not recover loss of profits by way of counterclaim without allegation
and proof that the plaintiff had knowledge that the defendant intended to
resell the goods. There the action was to recover the unpaid balance on a
contract for the sale of goods.
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COLLATERAL RECOVERY
In Tart v. Register4 the plaintiffs were passengers in an automo-
bile operated by defendant X, which collided with an automobile
operated by defendant Y. One of the plaintiffs received payment for
his medical and hospital expenses under the medical payments provi-
sion of defendant X's comprehensive automobile liability insurance
policy.5 The trial judge permitted the plaintiff to testify that she
incurred these expenses, and the jury was allowed to consider them
in awarding damages. On appeal, the judgment was reversed.
According to the majority view, a person injured by the operation of
an automobile insured under a comprehensive policy is entitled to
recover under both the liability clause and the medical payments
provision, even though this amounts to a double recovery.6 The
North Carolina Supreme Court viewed the trend of decisions in this
jurisdiction as away from the majority position, however, and held
that defendant X was entitled to a credit against the judgment in
the amount paid by his insurance carrier.
There was an indication that the Court would so hold in the
earlier case of Jordan v. Blackwelder.7 There the parties stipulated
that a joint tortfeasor, joined for contribution by the original de-
fendant, would be entitled to a credit against his pro rata share of
the judgment since his insurance carrier had already paid a portion
of the plaintiff's medical and hospital expenses. The Jordan case is,
of course, distinguishable because of the stipulation by the parties.
Nevertheless, it foretold our Court's aversion to a double recovery
in this situation.
' 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962). Also discussed under EVIDENCE,
Spontaneous Statements and Res Gestae, infra.
'A comprehensive automobile liability policy is one which "in addition
to the liability clause for payment on behalf of insured [of] any tort liability
within policy limits, contains a medical payment clause obligating insurer to
pay directly to persons injured, irrespective of negligence, medical expenses
incurred by reason of the operation of the described automobile." 257 N.C.
at 172, 125 S.E.2d at 763.
'Dumas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 125 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 1960);
Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961); Southwestern Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Severson v. Milwau-
kee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953). See generally 8
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4896 (1962). Louisiana had
previously held that one could not recover under both the medical payments
provision and the liabiilty provision. Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So. 2d 49
(La. App. 1956). This, of course, is the view taken by the North Carolina
Court in Tart. Appleman, in discussing the Hawayek case, called the de-
cision "clearly erroneous."
"250 N.C. 189, 108 S.E.2d 529 (1959).
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GENERAL OVERHEAD EXPENSES
In Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc.' the
defendant submitted the winning bid to construct improvements for
a municipality. The defendant had an agreement with plaintiff
(which did not have a state contractor's license and was therefore
ineligible to submit its own bid) whereby the latter was to secure a
performance bond, deposit a sum of money in a designated bank sub-
ject to the joint control of the parties, and perform the contract. When
defendant discovered that the bank deposit had not been made, it
ordered plaintiff to leave the job site, and undertook to complete the
work itself. Plaintiff brought this action for breach of the subcontract
agreement, and defendant counterclaimed. Among the items of ex-
pense claimed in defendant's counterclaim, and allowed by the lower
court, was one for "overhead." On appeal the Court, in a case of first
impression in North Carolina, held that general overhead expenses
are not allowable items of damage for breach of contract.'
PUNITIVE DAMAGES-Loss OF PROFITS
The Labor Management Relations Act"° permits only the award-
ing of actual damages." Where the defendant's conduct involves a
tort in violation of state law, however, punitive damages may also be
awarded. Such damages, however, are properly assessed only where
there is allegation and proof of violence, threats of violence, and
intimidation.'" Thus, in Overnight Transp. Co. v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters3 where plaintiff sought to recover for injuries
-256 N.C. 110, 123 S.E.2d 590 (1962). Also discussed under CREDIT
TRANSACTIONS, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Iidepedent Trustee, and
CONTRACTS, Construction Contracts, supra.
' The Court in reaching its decision considered the following cases: Lytle,
Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler & Todd Co., 276 Pa. 409, 120 At. 409
(1923), where general overhead expenses were not allowed; Grand Trunk
Western R. R. v. H. W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1941), where
overhead expenses were allowed, but limited to on-the-job expenses; Snyder
v. Reading School Dist., 311 Pa. 326, 166 Atl. 875 (1933), where overhead
expenses were allowed, but it does not appear whether or not they were
limited to on-the-job expenses; Elias v. Wright, 276 F. 908 (2d Cir. 1921),
and Sofarelli Bros. v. Elgin, 129 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1942), where general
overhead expenses were allowed. The Lytle case is the subject of a note in 40
N.C.L. Rnv. 799 (1962).
10 See 61 Stat. 159 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1958).
11UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954).12UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 881 (1960); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957);
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
'-257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d 277 (1962). Also discussed in AGENCY AND
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Servants and Non-servant Agents, supra, and
in LABOR LAW, Secondary Boycott-Suit for Damages Under 303(b), infra.
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caused by defendant-union's unfair labor practices, 14 it was held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover punitive damages upon an
allegation merely of willful, wanton, and malicious conduct.
Since the plaintiff accurately established a loss of profits resulting
from the wrongful interruption of his business, and such loss was
not merely conjectural, it was properly included as an item of actual
damages.
TEMPORARY DAMAGES
In Owens v. Elliott 5 plaintiff was the owner of a house and lot
which adjoined a subdivision, but which was not a part thereof. A
street graded and gravelled by the owner of the subdivision was
plaintiff's only means of access to his home. The street was closed
by the defendant, and plaintiff instituted this action to recover
damages and for injunctive relief. The trial court found as a matter
of law that the street had been dedicated to public use and instructed
the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the reasonable
market value of his house and lot immediately prior to the closing,
less the reasonable market value immediately afterwards. Reversing
for error in the trial court's holding that the street had been dedicated
as a matter of law, the Supreme Court stated that the permanent
damages rule was not applicable here. Thus, if the plaintiff was
entitled to recover at all, his remedy was by way of injunction plus
temporary damages. In so holding, the Court adopted the rationale
of an earlier case,"8 easily distinguishable from Owens on its facts, to
the effect that where the injury is impermanent or temporary in the
sense that it could be removed voluntarily or abated by equitable-
proceedings, the permanent damages rule is not applied.
WAIVER
In a suit by a mother, as next friend, for personal injuries sus-
tained by her infant child in an automobile accident, an award of
damages including medical and hospital expenses was affirmed17
1 It was alleged that defendant-union called a strike of plaintiff's em-
ployees without being certified as bargaining agent for them, and instituted
a secondary boycott.
15257 N.C. 250, 125 S.E.2d 589 (1962).
Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N.C. 566, 58 S.E.2d 343 (1950), which involved
the construction of a wall and extensive excavation by the defendant which
resulted in a diversion of the natural watercourses and a consequent overflow
onto the plaintiff's land." Doss v. Sewell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899 (1962).
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Both parents had filed express waivers of their rights to sue for such
expenses.
The necessary medical expenses of an unemancipated minor are
the responsibility of the father if living, or the mother if he is not,
and a separate cause of action for these items exists in favor of the
appropriate parent."8 It had previously been held that where the
parent having the cause of action participated in the litigation as next
friend, and no limitation on the minor's right to recover was pleaded
and the charge of the court was sufficient to include the medical ex-
penses of the minor, the parent's right to bring a subsequent action
was waived." In the instant case, the parent participating in the trial
was not the one having the cause of action.20 Nevertheless, both
parents having made express waivers, it was permissible for the trial
court to include medical and hospital expenses in the judgment recov-
ered by the child's mother as next friend. The Court pointed out that
it is "immaterial to the defendants whether the infant or the parent
asserts the claim,"2 1 assuming, of course, that having once suffered
damages, the defendant would be protected from a subsequent suit




In Taylor v. Taylor' the husband filed for absolute divorce on
grounds of two years separation. The wife admitted the allegation
of two years separation but alleged that the separation was brought
about and continued due to the willful abandonment of her by the
plaintiff. The wife in further answer and defense, and as a cross
action for alimony without divorce under G.S. § 50-16, alleged
abandonment without just cause. She also alleged that the plaintiff
had been convicted in a municipal court of abandonment and non-
support from which conviction the plaintiff admitted he had not
"Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957); Ellington
v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E.2d 925 (1955) ; Williams v. Charles Stores
Co., 209 N.C. 591, 184 S.E. 496 (1936)." Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948).
"0Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E.2d 925 (1955).
21257 N.C. at 410, 125 S.E.2d at 903.
1257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962).
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appealed. She attached a copy of the criminal proceedings to her
answer and asked for judgment on the pleadings dismissing the
plaintiff's action. The plaintiff in reply denied the further defense
and alleged that he had denied his guilt in the criminal proceeding
and continued to deny it. The lower court, however, concluded as a
matter of law, that the plaintiff, having admitted the prior criminal
conviction for abandonment and nonsupport, could not maintain an
action for absolute divorce based upon the facts which constituted the
defendant's plea in bar. The wife's motion to dismiss was, therefore,
granted.
This decision was affirmed on appeal. After citing Pruett v.
Pruett,2 to the effect that a wife may defeat a husband's action for
absolute divorce on grounds of two years separation by alleging and
establishing as an affirmative defense that the separation was caused
by the husband's willful abandonment, the Court stated:
The issue raised by plaintiff's plea of not guilty in said crim-
inal prosecution is the identical issue raised by the plaintiff's
denial of defendant's alleged affirmative defense or plea in bar.
The only difference is that in the criminal prosecution the
State had the burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.3
247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).
'Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 132-33, 125 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1962).
According to the dissenting opinion in this case the majority holding is
to the effect that the judgment of the municipal court is res judicata as to
the question of abandonment and nonsupport. This was the appellant's argu-
ment. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 3-4, Taylor v. Taylor, supra.
If this were so, the conclusion reached by the Court here would appear
to be in conflict with the decision in Durham Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104 (1961), in which the Court held that
evidence of a conviction and judgment therein or acquital rendered in a crim-
inal prosecution was not admissible in evidence in a purely civil action to
establish the truth of facts on which the verdict of guilty or acquital was
rendered. There the Court made it clear that while the same facts may be-
involved in two cases, one civil and the other criminal, the parties are neces-
sarily different because the one action is maintained by the state while the
other is prosecuted by an individual. The Pollard case is also discussed under
EVIDENCE, Evidence of Prior Criminal Convictions, infra. Accord, Wicker v..
Wicker, 255 N.C. 723, 122 S.E.2d 703 (1961). There it was held that an order
entered in a habeas corpus proceeding based on facts found by the trial
judge was not res judicata to an action for divorce on grounds of adultery.
North Carolina in Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 402, 2 S.E.2d
17 (1939), placed itself with the numerical majority in concluding that the
introduction of criminal records and judgments thereon in a civil proceeding
was not permissible. E.g., State v. Fitsgearld, 140 Me. 314, 37 A.2d 799'
(1944); Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Atl. 666"
(1931). See generally Annot., 130 A.L.R. 690 (1941). The principal case,
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In further support of its decision the Court concluded that if the
plaintiff were allowed the absolute divorce, the defendant's right to
support, which arose out of judgment in the criminal action imposing
sentence on the plaintiff being suspended on condition that he make
specified payments for support of his wife, would be terminated in
violation of the provisions of G.S. § 50-11.'
ADOPTION
In Hicks v. Russell' the grandparents instituted proceedings for
the adoption of the four children of their deceased daughter. The
however, seems to place a new twist on North Carolina's position in this
respect. Although the Court adhered to this approach in Durham Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Pollard, supra, the distinction between that case and
the principal one appears to be the fact that in the principal case the party
at fault sought to sustain a civil action the basis of which was grounded in
his own criminal conduct; whereas in the Pollard case the party on whose
behalf the action was being brought was the wronged party. Accepting this
as the basic distinction between these two cases, North Carolina puts itself
in stride with the modem trend of decisions which allow admission of
criminal records and verdicts in purely civil actions especially where the
plaintiff seeks to reap the fruits of his own criminal acts. E.g., Osborne v.
People's Benevolent Industrial Ins. Co., 19 La. App. 667, 139 So. 733
(1932); Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 2 N.E.2d 17 (1936).
See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951). When such evidence is
admitted it is considered only evidence of guilt and at most prima facie evi-
dence thereof. E.g., Sovereign Camp. W. 0. W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150
So. 491 (1933); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711
(1932).
On this latter point of the conclusiveness of the evidence, the principal
case would appear to be in the minority. In view of the fact that the lower
court was sustained in giving judgment on the pleadings and holding that
the plaintiff was as a matter of law estopped to bring the action it appears
that evidence of the prior conviction was conclusive as to the plaintiff's
guilt and not merely prima facie evidence thereof. Only one other jurisdic-
tion has adopted this approach. See Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins.
Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1917), discussed in Note, 6 N.C.L.
REv. 333 (1928).
It should be noted the appellee in its brief made it clear that no reliance
had been placed on the proposition that the prior criminal conviction was res
judicata in the divorce action, and it was also pointed out there that the
court below had not ruled that as a matter of law the conviction was such.
Brief for Defendant, p. 6, Taylor v. Taylor, supra. On the contrary, the
argument of the appellee was to the effect that an action never lies when a
plaintiff must base his claim, in whole or in part, on his own violation of the
criminal laws. Lloyd v. R. R., 151 N.C. 536, 66 S.E. 604 (1909). Brief for
Defendant, pp. 4-5, Taylor v. Taylor, supra. The majority seems to have
accepted this approach to the husband's action.
' This statute provides that a decree of absolute divorce shall not impair
the right of the wife to receive alimony and any "other rights" provided for
her under any judgment of a court rendered before the rendition of the
judgment for absolute divorce.
256 N.C. 34, 123 S.E.2d 214 (1961).
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petition alleged abandonment by the father and failure to provide
support for the children. The father was served by publication and
through his attorneys appeared and obtained a consent order grant-
ing additional time for filing of an answer. No answer or other
pleading was ever filed. The petitioners moved for judgment by
default final against the father and such was granted. Thereupon
the final decrees of adoption were entered.
The father made a motion in the cause for vacation of the orders
and decrees claiming that the court did not find that he had willfully
abandoned his children for a period of at least six months immediately
preceding the action, and therefore the court did not have jurisdic-
tion over him or the children. His motion was denied on grounds
that having become a party to the proceedings, and not having filed
an answer or other pleading, or made further appearance, and not
having appealed from the orders of adoption, he was irrevocably
bound by the proceedings and could not question their validity.
This decision was affirmed on appeal. In what appears to be the
first interpretation of G.S. § 48-28' from the standpoint of a direct
or collateral attack by a natural parent the Court said:
We further hold that the provision of G.S. § 48-28, which
permits a direct or collateral attack on an adoption proceeding
by a natural parent or guardian of the person of the child,
is limited to such natural parent or guardian of the person of
the child, who was not a party to the adoption proceeding.7
Thus, this decision now makes it clear that even a natural parent




In Thurston v. Thurstons the wife instituted an action for ali-
mony without divorce, alleging that defendant abandoned her with-
out cause in that he removed his personal belongings from the home
0 This statute prohibits questioning the validity of an adoption proceeding
after the final order of adoption is signed, by anyone who was a party to
the proceeding or anyone claiming under such party by reason of any defect,
jurisdictional or otherwise. Any ambiguity with respect to whether this
statute prohibits a parent who was a party to the proceeding from attacking
its validity was settled by the principal case.
'256 N.C. 34, 41, 123 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
8256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962).
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and announced he was leaving with intent to go to Florida where he
might get a "quickie" divorce. It was further alleged that the de-
fendant had periodically deposited sums of money to the plaintiff's
credit in a local bank.
The plaintiff asked as relief an award of reasonable subsistence
fees, including a pendente lite allowance, and that the defendant be
enjoined from instituting and prosecuting an action for divorce in
any state other than North Carolina during the determination of the
alimony without divorce action. Both of these requests were
granted.9
On appeal the defendant assigned as error, among other things,
the court's failure to sustain his demurrer to the complaint on the
grounds that it failed to state a cause of action in that it did not
allege failure to provide adequate support. Affirming the lower court
decision on this point, the Supreme Court ruled that Pruett v.
Pruett"0 controlled. In that case the Court stated that although a
permanent denial of the husband's society might be mitigated by a
provision for the wife's support, the offense of abandonment is com-
plete if the cohabitation is brought to an end without just cause,
without intention of renewing it, and without consent of the spouse.
Thus, the Court in the principal case makes it clear that abandonment
as used in G.S. § 50-7(1) does not require failure to support. 1
' The injunction aspect of the Thurston case is discussed in EQuiTABLE
REMEDIES, Injunction Against Foreign Divorce, infra."'247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).
"This statute sets out the grounds for divorce from bed and board. It
is tied in with G.S. § 50-16 through the fact that the latter statute provides
that any ground on which an action for a divorce from bed and board, as
well as absolute divorce, can be predicated also provides a ground for an
action for alimony without divorce.
The Court in Pruett v. Pruett, supra note 10, at 23, 100 S.E.2d at 303,
stated that the mere fact that the husband provides adequate support for
the wife does not in itself negative abandonment as used in G.S. § 50-7(1).
The principal case clarifies this point which had not previously been decided
in the context of a separate action by the wife for alimony without divorce
on grounds of abandonment in contrast to the Pruett case type situation
where the wife used such abandonment as a means of defeating the husband's
action for absolute divorce on grounds of two years separation.
To conclude that abandonment under G.S. § 50-7(1) does not require
a failure to support, in a suit for alimony without divorce, seems clearly
correct since G.S. § 50-7(1) refers to abandonment of "his or her spouse"
and there is no support obligation on the part of the wife. But, to take the
additional step taken in Pruett and hold that abandonment being used as a
defense to two years separation also does not require nonsupport seems
questionable. For a discussion of this latter point see Note, 36 N.C.L. Rv.
495 (1958).
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Amount of Award
In Harris v. Harris12 the wife instituted an action for alimony
without divorce under G.S. § 50-16 alleging abandonment and failure
to provide support for her and the children. On plaintiff's motion for
alimony pendente lite the defendant was ordered to pay a specified
sum of money per month. At a subsequent hearing on the merits
the order was continued undiminished.
The defendant on appeal contended that the court below com-
mitted error in not ascertaining his net income and limiting the
award to one-third thereof. He relied on G.S. § 50-14 which, by its
terms, limits an award in actions of divorce from bed and board to
such one-third, but which makes no reference to actions for alimony
without divorce. Answering this contention, the Court ruled that
except when the allowance is made following a decree of divorce
from bed and board the court making the award is not confined to
an allowance of no more than one-third of the defendant's net income.
Thus, the Court makes a complete repudiation of the one-third rule
with regard to actions brought under G.S. § 50-16.13 Previous cases
had indicated that although the one-third rule did not apply to actions
under G.S. § 50-16, it did have the effect of a guide showing legis-
lative intent.1 4
Effect of Appeal from Pendente Lite Award
In Joyner v. Joyner 5 the wife filed suit for alimony without
divorce, counsel fees, and custody of the child. By motion in the
cause she applied for alimony pendente lite for the support of herself
and her child, and for custody of the child. The motion was granted
and the husband filed an appeal.
The wife filed an affidavit one month later alleging the defendant
12258 N.C. 121, 128 S.E.2d 123 (1962).
1" The principal case is not the first to state that the trial court had in
its discretion power to award such alimony as it deemed proper, which
award was not limited to the one-third rule and would not be disturbed
except where such discretion had been grossly abused. See, e.g., Wright v.
Wright, 216 N.C. 693. 6 S.E.2d 555 (1940); Anderson v. Anderson, 183
N.C. 139, 110 S.E. 863 (1922). However, the apparent conclusiveness of
the Court's ruling in the Harris case expresses more definiteness than any
case heretofore.
" Kiser v. Kiser, 203 N.C. 428, 166 S.E. 304 (1932). There the Court
said "while perhaps the limitation in C. S. § 1665 would not apply to C. S.
Supp. 1924, § 1667, nevertheless the two are cognate statutes, dealing with
similar questions, and may be considered as the composite will of the Legis-
lature." Id. at 431, 166 S.E. at 305.
1256 N.C. 588, 124 S.E.2d 724 (1962).
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had violated the court's custody order. A show cause order was
issued and at the hearing it was found that the defendant was in
contempt of court. However, the trial court concluded that since the
defendant had appealed from the order, it was without power to
issue any further orders in the action. Both parties appealed.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the appeal stayed
the contempt proceedings until the validity of the judgment was
determined."0 With respect to the support order for the child, the
Court concluded that the appeal from the order allowing support
pendente lite took the case out of the jurisdiction of the superior court
and during that time the judge was functus officio.'7 On this latter
point, however, it was held that notwithstanding the fact that no
contempt proceedings could be started during the appeal, just as in
the case of a wife's alimony pendente lite,"5 the allowance for the
child could be enforced by execution against defendant's property
pending appeal unless stay or supersedeas was ordered. The Court
intimates, however, that it does not consider execution an adequate
remedy for the child.'"
Pleading
In Creech v. Creech"° the wife brought an action for alimony
without divorce alleging abandonment without just cause and refusal
to provide support for her and the four children. The defendant's
answer denied all allegations except marriage and paternity of the
children and set up adultery as a defense. The wife did not deny
the allegation of adultery and the court made no finding on that
issue.
On appeal the lower court decision awarding alimony pendente
10Lawson v. Lawson, 244 N.C. 689, 94 S.E.2d 826 (1956).
Lawrence v. Lawrence. 226 N.C. 221, 37 S.E.2d 496 (1946). See 4
Am. JtrR. 2d Appeal and Error § 352 (1962).
Functws officio is defined as "having fulfilled the function, discharged
the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or
authority." BLAcK, LAW DIc'rioxANY 802 (4th ed. 1951).
" Vaughan v. Vaughan, 211 N.C. 354, 190 S.E. 49Z (1937). There
the Court stated that "by this judgment plaintiff became indebted to defend-
ant, and she could issue the ordinary execution against the property of
plaintiff to collect the judgment, as no stay bond was given. ." Id. at 361,
190 S.E. at 496.
" "Surely, however, some more adequate provision should be made for
the child during the legal battle of its parents. Frequently it is months after
an appeal is taken until the record is seen here." Joyner v. Joyner, 256
N.C. 588, 592, 124 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1962).256 N.C. 356, 123 S.E.2d 793 (1962).
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lite was reversed for failure to make findings with respect to the
alleged adultery as is required by G.S. § 50-16.21 The Court con-
cluded that although the wife did not expressly deny the defendant's
allegations of adultery, they did not relate to a counterclaim and
therefore came within G.S. § 1-159 which provides that all allega-
tions in an answer are deemed controverted without the necessity of
reply if they do not relate to a counterclaim.
22
Residence
In Harris v. Harris" the wife instituted an action for alimony
without divorce on the grounds that the defendant abandoned her
while they were temporarily residing on a farm owned by the de-
fendant in North Carolina. On application of the plaintiff an order
was made for alimony pendente lite and counsel fees. From this the
defendant appealed. Among numerous exceptions taken by the
defendant on appeal one in particular presented a proposition of first
impression in North Carolina.
The defendant contended that the lower court committed error
in making the pendente lite award in that it did not have jurisdiction
to hear the plaintiff's claim since neither the plaintiff nor the defend-
ant was domiciled in North Carolina, nor did the marriage occur in
this state. To this the Court replied that although neither party was
domiciled in North Carolina they made frequent visits to this state
and it was on one of these visits that the cause of action for abandon-
ment arose. In commenting further on this exception the Court,
apparently for the first time, concluded that residency in North
Carolina was not a prerequisite to the right to institute an action for
alimony without divorce under G.S. § 50-16. On this particular
point there is a conflict of authority. 4
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 provides in part: "[I]n all applications for
alimony under this section it shall be competent for the husband to plead
the adultery of the wife in bar of her right to such alimony, if the wife deny
such plea, and the issue be found against her by the judge . . . ." N.C. G=x.
STAT. § 50-16 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
2 E.g., Nebel v. Nebel, 241 N.C. 491, 85 S.E.2d 876 (1955); Wells v.
Clayton, 236 N.C. 102, 72 S.E.2d 16 (1952).23257 N.C. 416, 126 S.E.2d 83 (1962).
2, On the point of whether an action for alimony without divorce can be
brought in a jurisdiction where neither party is a resident there are basically
two schools of thought.
On one side the view is that the court has no jurisdiction over such suit
where neither party thereto is a resident of the state, although the husband
has property in the state. E.g., Miller v. Miller, 33 Fla. 453, 15 So. 222
(1894); Anderson v. Anderson, 140 Okla. 168, 282 Pac. 335 (1929); Curtis
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CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
In Blankenship v. Blankenship" the husband instituted an action
for absolute divorce on grounds of two years separation. Two years
prior to the husband's action the wife had instituted an action for
alimony without divorce in another county and a temporary order
was entered awarding her subsistence and custody of the children.
The wife entered a general appearance in the husband's action
and alleged as a plea in bar to his prayer for custody that the ali-
mony without divorce action was a prior action pending which in-
volved the question of custody and that the order of subsistence and
custody pendente lite entered in the earlier action was res judicata as
to the custody of the children.
Subsequently, judgment in the absolute divorce action was
entered in the trial court granting the divorce. In the judgment the
court recited that it did not have jurisdiction over the custody ques-
tion. On motion of the husband, in which he asked the trial court
to take jurisdiction over the matter of custody, the court concluded
that the judgment for absolute divorce abated the action for alimony
without divorce under the provisions of G.S. § 50-11, and since no
permanent judgment had been entered in that action prior to the
granting of the absolute divorce it was vested with sole and exclusive
jurisdiction in the matter of custody. Thereupon the trial court
granted the husband's motion and entered judgment under which
the cause was retained for further proceedings and orders with re-
spect to custody of the children.
On appeal by the defendant the North Carolina Supreme Court
v. Curtis, 200 Pa. 255, 49 Ati. 769 (1901). See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.
1242 (1931). The theory behind these cases is that the wife has no right
to alimony in a state of which neither she nor her husband is a resident
because of the possibility that if she were allowed to do this she might
institute a proceeding in every state where her husband had property and
have it decreed to her in each state; while, the court in the jurisdiction
where the parties are domiciled might have decreed restitution of conjugal
rights.
The protagonists for the other side take the view that the court has
jurisdiction on the basis that the action for maintenance is independent of
divorce statutes and is transitory, and may be maintained without reference
to the residence of the parties, or either of them, except for statutory pro-
visions which impose a residence requirement on one of the parties as a
prerequisite to jurisdiction of such suit. E.g., Artman v. Artman, 11 Conn.
124, 149 Atl. 246 (1930); Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 104 A.2d 573
(1954); Wells v. Wells, 27 S.D. 257, 130 N.W. 780 (1911); Kelley v.
Bausam, 98 Wash. 686, 168 Pac. 181 (1917); See generally Annot., 74
A.L.R. 1242 (1931)." Note, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 274 (1962).
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held that the decree of absolute divorce did not oust the jurisdiction
of the court in which the wife's action for alimony without divorce
was pending over the question of custody.
Previously, it was thought that the provision of G.S. § 50-16 in
regard to custody determination in actions for alimony without di-
vorce was merely intended as a substitute for the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding provided for under G.S. § 17-39.2" The Court in a number
of cases had held that the filing of a complaint in a divorce action
immediately ousted the jurisdiction of a habeas corpus proceeding
to determine custody. 7  Thus, the Court could have reached an
opposite result here.
This decision, however, clearly indicates that the result reached
under G.S. § 17-39 does not control the question of jurisdiction for
determining custody when an action for absolute divorce is instituted
subsequent to a pendente lite award of custody in a prior action under
G.S. § 50-16.
DIVORCE
In Donnell v. Howell2  the wife brought partition proceeding
concerning certain property allegedly held with the defendant as
tenants in common as a result of an Alabama divorce. The defend-
ant answered that plaintiff was domiciled in North Carolina at the
time of the divorce, that the decree was void, and that they still held
as tenants by entirety, and that therefore no partition could be had.
The plaintiff replied that the defendant could not attack the validity
of the Alabama decree for two reasons: (1) defendant was estopped
in that he had participated in the divorce proceeding by signing a
written answer in which he waived service of process, jurisdiction,
and admitted that the plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Alabama;
(2) the decree was not subject to attack by virtue of full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution.
It was held that the defendant was not estopped to attack the
decree and the decree was not entitled to full faith and credit. This
case is discussed more fully in a note in this Review.2"
'" This statute sets out the procedure for a determination of custody
between parents who are living in a state of separation but not divorced.
"'E.g., Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956);
Phipps v. Vannoy, 229 N.C. 629, 50 S.E.2d 906 (1948); Robbins v. Robbins,
229 N.C. 430, 50 S.E.2d 183 (1948).
1 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
"Note, 41 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1962).
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GUARDIAN AND WARD
In In re Simmons"0 the movant-ward was insane and had been
such since his birth. Subsequent to the time the ward reached ma-
jority, the guardian, appointed for the ward's minority, made appli-
cation to an appropriate court and was duly authorized to sell cer-
tain land of the ward. In negotiating the sale the guardian placed
the matter in the hands of an attorney, now deceased, with the result
that a sale was made of these lands for less than ten cents per acre.
The ward, now represented by a newly appointed guardian, sought
to have the order authorizing the sale declared void.
In affirming the lower court decision vacating the order of sale,
the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded' that when one is ap-
pointed as a guardian for a minor, his right to act terminates when
the ward reaches majority.3' Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the
ward was insane when he reached majority, the guardian appointed
for his minority had no authority to act in his behalf.32
As a second reason for vacating the order of sale the Court em-
phasized that the guardian must act in the best interest of his ward.8
The Court was unable to conclude that the guardian had fulfilled his
fiduciary obligation to his ward in view of the fact that the land had
been sold for less than a dime an acre, and the entire sale had been
placed in the hands of an attorney who appeared not to be working
solely for the ward's best interest.
MARRIAGE
In Harris v. Harris4 a novel question was presented. Would
North Carolina recoguize a valid foreign common-law marriage?
The Court held that while North Carolina does not recognize
common-law marriage, 5 such marriage being valid in South Caro-
30256 N.C. 184, 123 S.E.2d 614 (1962).
"1 E.g., Adams v. Adams, 212 N.C. 337, 193 S.E. 661 (1937) ; Melton v.
McKesson, 35 N.C. 475 (1852).
For an excellent discussion by the Court of the power of a court to act
on an unauthorized appearance see Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 118
S.E.2d 897 (1961).
"' For a case which very closely resembles the principal case see Cook
v. Cook, 6 Ind. 268 (1839). There it was held that the power of the guardian
to act terminated upon the ward reaching majority, and the fact that the
ward was insane could not prevent her arrival at full age.
"0 E.g., Owen v. Hines, 227 N.C. 236, 41 S.E.2d 739 (1947) ; Adams v.
Adams, 212 N.C. 337, 193 S.E. 661 (1937).
8'257 N.C. 416, 126 S.E.2d 83 (1962).
'= State v. Wilson, 121 N.C. 650, 28 S.E. 416 (1897). See generally
Annot., 39 A.L.R. 538 (1925).
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lina 0 would be given recognition in this state. This appears to be
the first case on the precise point of recognition in North Carolina
of a common-law marriage consumated in a jurisdiction where such
marriages are valid.3 7  This decision, however, comes as no great
surprise in view of the fact that North Carolina had in an early case
given recognition to an interracial marriage which was validly entered
into in another jurisdiction.38
PATERNITY
In State v. Knight 9 the defendant was indicted and convicted of
willful failure to provide support for his alleged illegitimate child.
On appeal the defendant contended that his constitutional rights had
been violated in that he was not tried on the issue of paternity first.
and then if found guilty, tried in a separate proceeding on the general
issue of failure to support the child.
In holding his contention to be untenable the Court stated that
it has been common practice in this state to submit separate issues40
rather than have separate proceedings. This procedure is permissbile
since paternity need be established only once, whereas the willful
failure to support after notice and demand constitutes a continuing
" Frayer v. Frayer, 9 S.C.Eq. (Rich Cas.) 85 (1831).
"The general rule in regard to recognition of common-law marriages
in jurisdictions where such are not permitted is that such marriages will be
recognized if valid under the laws where entered or celebrated. E.g., Tryling
v. Tryling, 245 Ky. 399, 53 S.W.2d 725 (1932); Willey v. Willey, 22
Wash. 115, 60 Pac. 145 (1900); Jackson v. State Compensation Comm'r.,
106 W.Va. 374, 145 S.E. 753 (1928). See generally Annot., 94 A.L.R.
1000 (1935).
"State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877).
"256 N.C. 687, 124 S.E.2d 855 (1962).
40 It appears to be well settled law in North Carolina that there is no
need for a separate and distinct trial on the issue of paternity. The Court
in the case of State v. Love, 238 N.C. 283, 77 S.E.2d 501 (1953), stated in
this connection "that three issues are required to be submitted in a single
case, and that the trial court should instruct the jury to consider them in
the order in which they appear, that is: That the issue of paternity should
be considered first. That if it be answered in the negative, the other issues
would not be considered. But if answered in the affirmative, the jury would
proceed to consider the second issue, as to wilful nonsupport; that if it be
answered in the negative, the answer to the third issue would be 'not guilty.'
But if the first and second issues be answered in the affirmative, the jury
would answer the third issue 'guilty'; that is, the answer to the third issue
would follow as a matter of law." Id. at 286, 77 S.E.2d at 503. Accord,
State v. Robinson, 236 N.C. 408, 72 S.E.2d 857 (1952). There, only the
first and second issues were submitted to the jury and on appeal the verdict
as to the first issue was upheld but a new trial was granted because there
was no verdict as to the guilt of the defendant on the fact found as the
offense charged; so new trial was ordered on the second issue.
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offense,4 and a trial on that issue involves failure to support up to
the date of the indictment or warrant.
SEPARATION AGREEMENT
Fiduciary Relationship Between Recipient and Beneficiary of Support
Payments
In Goodyear v. Goodyear" the Court spelled out the relationship
between a child and a parent who is receiving payments under a sep-
aration agreement which are designated to be for the child's support.
A number of courts adopt this same view which is to the effect that
the parent is a mere trustee of these payments, and is accountable to
the child for that part of the payments not reasonably necessary for
the child's support and maintenance.
43
Pre-separation Conduct
In Richardson v. Richardson44 the husband started an action for
absolute divorce on grounds of two years separation. The wife alleged
in bar of the husband's action that he was at fault and caused the
separation, and that he had failed to comply with the terms of the
agreement. The action for divorce was denied and plaintiff-husband
appealed.
On appeal the lower court decision was reversed for error in cer-
tain instructions, and the Court concluded that since the plaintiff and
defendant had separated and executed the agreement by mutual con-
sent the defendant could not attack the legality of their separation
from and after the date of separation because of alleged misconduct of
the plaintiff while they were living together. Thus, the Court ruled
that the defendant was estopped to assert as an affirmative defense to
the action, under G.S. § 50-6, the pre-separation conduct of the party
seeking the absolute divorce.
In reaching its decision the Court analogized the situation of the
parties in the principal case to that where the husband abandons the
wife and she obtains a divorce from bed and board. There, the decree
in her action has the effect of legalizing their separation from the date
of such judgment, and the husband can bring an action for absolute
• State v. Coppedge, 244 N.C. 590, 94 S.E.2d 569 (1956).
42257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
"E.g., Thomas v. Holt, 209 Ga. 133, 70 S.E.2d 595 (1952); Corbridge
v. Corbridge. 230 Ind. 201, 102 N.E.2d 764 (1952); Watts v. Watts, 240
Iowa 384, 36 N.W.2d 374 (1949).
" 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962).
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divorce on grounds of two years separation at any time after two years
from the date of the decree.4 5
In part the Court seems to base its decision on the case of Pearce
v. Pearce4" which intimates that as long as the agreement is volun-
tarily entered into it will be a bar to the assertion of an affirmative de-
fense relating to pre-separation conduct of a spouse unless the agree-
ment was procured by fraud or deceit.
The lower court had instructed the jury that if it found that the
plaintiff had failed to comply with the agreement simply because he
did not want to, not because he was unable to, this would have the
effect of placing the parties back in the same position, insofar as the
separation was concerned, as they were prior to the time the agreement
was entered. These instructions were held erroneous and the Court
concluded that since there had been a valid separation within the
meaning of G.S. § 50-6, this fact could not be removed nor its legal
significance impaired by the plaintiff's failure to comply with its
terms.47
"E.g., Sears v. Sears, 253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960); Pruett v.
Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223
N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943).
The basis of the appellant's argument centered around the analysis
adopted by the court. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 4, Richardson v. Richardson,
257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962).
'6225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945).
"'The appellee argued in her brief that under the normal rules of con-
tract a party will not be allowed to repudiate part of his entire contract and
retain the benefits of another part. Brief for Defendant, p. 6, Richardson
v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962). LaSalle Extension
Univ. v. Osborne, 174 N.C. 427, 93 S.E. 986 (1917). Her argument con-
tended that in allowing the plaintiff to fail to meet the terms of the separation
agreement and to sustain his contention that the agreement was a bar to
the assertion of the affirmative defense was allowing him to do just what
the LaSalle case had concluded should not be allowed. Perhaps there is
some merit in this contention.
Although the case of Cram v. Cram, 116 N.C. 288, 21 S.E. 197 (1895),
was not cited by the appellee in her brief, it would appear appropriate for
consideration on the matter of repudiation by the husband. There, the hus-
band and wife entered a separation agreement whereby he was to pay her
a stated sum of money per month. The husband made these payments up
until such time as the wife made demands on him for an increase in the
amount to be paid per month, at which time he ceased to pay. The wife
brought an action under an appropriate statute to secure reasonable sub-
sistence for herself and the children. The Court held that the husband could
not after repudiating the agreement set it up as a bar to the wife's recovery
in the action.
Although in Cram v. Cram, supra, the wife was the party seeking affirm-
ative relief, whereas in the Richardson case the party at fault sought the
affirmative relief, it would appear that the former case clearly enunciates
the principle that the party at fault will not be allowed to set up such an
agreement as a defense to relief, either negative or affirmative.
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Validity of Provisions of the Agreement
In Kiger v. Kiger48 the wife instituted an action under G.S. § 50-
16 in which she asked for alimony pendente lite, permanent alimony,
custody of the children, and counsel fees. She alleged adultery as a
ground for the action. The defendant in his answer pleaded a deed of
separation as bar to the lower court's power to award alimony pen-
dente lite and counsel fees. The deed of separation was duly executed
as required by G.S. § 50-12 and contained a provisi6n whereby the
wife agreed that in the event that a suit for divorce should be insti-
tuted by either husband or wife, the wife would not pray the court,
or otherwise ask for counsel fees, alimony pendente lite, or subsistence
of any character for herself. It was this portion of the agreement
that the defendant pleaded in bar to the lower court order awarding
the wife alimony pendente lite and counsel fees.
On appeal the Court concluded that in view of the fact that the
agreement had not been attacked by plaintiff on the grounds of fraud
or coercion in its procurement, or execution, it stood unimpeached
and the parties were bound by its terms. 9 Thus, the Court held that
the lower court was prohibited from making an allowance of alimony
pendente lite and counsel fees for the wife."0
" 258 N.C. 126, 128 S.E.2d 235 (1962).
" It was the plaintiff's contention that the case of Butler v. Butler, 226
N.C. 594, 39 S.E.2d 745 (1946), supported the ruling of the lower court in
making the awards notwithstanding the separation agreement provisions.
The Court, however, disagreed with this interpretation and distinguished
that case, in which the agreement provided that the terms thereof repre-
sented the extent of the rights of the parties, on the ground that the agree-
ment there also reserved the right of appeal by either party to a named
judge for a revision of the amount to be paid the wife. In that case it was
held that the agreement did not prevent an award of alimony pendente lite.
North Carolina has with consistency held that as to the husband and
wife who have entered a valid separation agreement they are remitted to
the rights and liabilities under the agreement or the terms of a consent
judgment entered thereon. E.g., Turner v. Turner, 205 N.C. 198, 170 S.E.
646 (1933); Brown v. Brown, 205 N.C. 64, 169 S.E. 818 (1933); Lentz v.
Lentz, 193 N.C. 742, 138 S.E. 12 (1927). These agreements, however, are
subject to modification in behalf of children of the marriage. Holden v.
Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956). Therefore, it seems logical
that if the agreement provided for no alimony pendente lite and counsel
fees the parties should be bound by this.
There is authority from other jurisdictions for the position taken by the
Court to the effect that where the parties have entered a valid separation
agreement whereby adequate provision for the maintenance for the wife has
been made, courts should not in a subsequent divorce action allow alimony
pendente lite if prohibited by the agreement. E.g., McLaren v. McLaren,
33 Ga. (Supp.) 99 (1864); Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N.Y. 566, 29 N.E.
826 (Ct. App. 1892). See generally Annot., 60 Am. Dec. 678 (1884)."0 This particular point has never been decided before in North Carolina.
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EMINENT DOMAIN
ACCESS POINTS
It has long been the rule in North Carolina that where only a part
of a tract of land is condemned by the Highway Commission for
highway purposes, the measure of damages is the difference between
the fair market value of the entire tract immediately before the taking
and the fair market value of what is left immediately after the taking,
less any general and special benefits resulting to the landowner from
the taking.' This rule has been applied in numerous cases where the
condemnation was for the purpose of constructing a highway across
the owner's property.2  In Kirkman v. State Highway Comm'n,
3
however, an access point to a previously existing highway was taken.
The defendant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct
the jury that it was entitled to have general and special benefits to
the plaintiff set-off against plaintiff's recovery. The Court, however,
affirmed the trial court because the defendant failed to introduce any
evidence as to general and special benefits. It also pointed out that
the question of benefits to the landowner was taken into consideration
when the land was originally condemned for construction of the high-
way, and "a benefit once allowed cannot be reasserted in a further
proceeding to condemn."
4
If an act is a proper exercise of the police power, as distinguished
from the power of eminent domain, the constitutional provision5 that
There appear to be two schools of thought on whether such provisions in
separation agreements can be held to estop the wife from claiming and
being awarded counsel fees in a subsequent action. Such provisions have
been held valid and enforceable where the agreement makes an allowance
for support of the wife, or an adequate award in lieu thereof. E.g., Worman
v. Worman, 118 Fla. 471, 159 So. 677 (1935); Greenfield v. Greenfield,
161 App. Div. 573, 146 N.Y. Supp. 865 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
On the other hand, some courts have held that terms of separation agree-
ments to this effect are void as against public policy. E.g., Edleson v. Edle-
son, 179 Ky. 300, 200 S.W. 625 (1918); Banner v. Banner, 184 Mo. App.
396, 171 S.W. 2 (1914). See generally Annot., 116 A.L.R. 947 (1939) and
164 A.L.R. 1236 (1946).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (Supp. 1961).
" Templeton v. State Highway Comm'n, 254 N.C. 337, 118 S.E.2d 918
(1961); Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 514, 114 S.E.2d
340 (1960); Robinson v. State Highway Comm'n, 249 N.C. 120, 105
S.E.2d 287 (1958); North Carolina State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n
v. Black, 239 N.C. 198, 79 S.E.2d 778 (1954) ; Proctor v. State Highway &
Pub. Works Comm'n, 230 N.C. 687, 691, 55 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1949).:
l257 N.C. 428, 126 S.E.2d 107 (1962).
"Id. at 433, 126 S.E.2d at 111.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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private property shall not be taken for public use unless compensation
is paid is not applicable.6 The establishment of dual lane highways
with median strips has been recognized as a proper exercise of the
police power.' It is generally held that an individual proprietor has
no right to insist that the entire volume of traffic that would natu-
rally flow over a highway pass undiverted and unobstructed. In
fact, he has no right to have anyone pass by his premises at all.8
The latter rule was applied in Barnes v. North Carolina State High-
way Comnm'i where part of a tract of land owned by plaintiff was
condemned for the purpose of converting a single lane highway into
a dual lane highway with a median. The Court held that plaintiff
was not entitled to compensation for the diminution in value of the
remaining land, which was used for commercial purposes, caused
by the fact that there was direct access only to one lane of the new
highway.
As to the elevated concrete traffic islands or curbing placed on
plaintiff's property by the defendant, the Court stated that while
entire access may not be cut off, an owner is not entitled to access
to his land at all points along a highway. If he has free and con-
venient access, and ingress and egress are not substantially impaired,
there is no cause for complaint."0
EQUITABLE REMEDIES
INJUNCTION AGAINST FOREIGN DIvoRcE
In Thurston v. Thurston' the North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed a temporary restraining order enjoining a husband from
instituting or prosecuting a suit for divorce in another state pending
the final determination of his wife's action in North Carolina for
'State v. Fox, 53 Wash. 2d 216, 332 P.2d 943 (1958) ; Walker v. State,
48 Wash. 2d 587, 295 P.2d 328 (1956).
" Muse v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 233 Miss. 694, 103 So.
2d 839 (1958).
'Board of County Comm'rs v. Slaughter, 49 N.M. 141, 158 P.2d 859
(1945) ; City of Memphis v. Hood, 208 Tenn. 319, 345 S.W.2d 887 (1961).
See generally 2 NICHIOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.445 (3d ed. 1950).'- 257 N.C. 507, 126 S.E.2d 732 (1962).
"0 State v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342 (1960); Iowa State
Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957); Annot.,
100 A.L.R. 491 (1936). Plaintiff in the principal case is, however, entitled
to recover for the injury to his remaining property caused by the traffic
islands to the extent that they impair free movement across his property.
-256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962). Also discussed under DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, Abandonment, supra.
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alimony without divorce. The plaintiff asserted that although the
defendant was presently providing her with an adequate means of
support she was vulnerable to instantaneous impoverishment at the
will of the defendant in view of his announced intention to go to
Florida and procure a "quickie" divorce. The issuance of the tem-
porary restraining order had been based upon findings in the lower
court that if the plaintiff were forced to defend an action for divorce
in a foreign state, and if such a decree were rendered prior to her
present action for alimony without divorce, she would suffer irrep-
arable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
2
This was the first such case to arise in North Carolina, and the
decision in the instant case is in accord with the generally recog-
nized principle that a court of equity has the power to enjoin, in an
appropriate case, the commencement or prosecution of an action by
one spouse for divorce in another state.' Such equitable relief has
been considered appropriate where the foreign divorce action is in
evasion of the laws of the parties' matrimonial domicile ;4 where the
establishment of the divorcing spouse's residence is fraudulent upon
the jurisdiction of the foreign court ;5 where the foreign proceeding
is vexatious in nature and would cause the wife unnecessary expense
and inconvenience,' or, as in the present case, where a decree pend-
ing in the injunction forum would be rendered ineffectual by the
foreign divorce.'
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1961) provides: "After a judgment of
divorce ... all rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine
... provided... a decree of absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the
right of the wife to receive alimony . . . under any judgment or decree ren-
dered before the rendering of the judgment for absolute divorce." Under this
section if the foreign decree of divorce were obtained prior to the final
judgment in the plaintiff's action for alimony without divorce and such decree
were not set aside in North Carolina, the defendant could plead it in bar of
the enforcement of any decree entered in favor of the plaintiff. Feldman v.
Feldman, 236 N.C. 731, 73 S.E.2d 865 (1953).
' See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1240 (1957).
'Ashkenaz v. Ashkenaz, 180 Misc. 580, 41 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
E.g., Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 480, 13 A.2d 738 (1940).
'Aghnides v. Aghnides, 150 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 159
N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct.) (permanent injunction), aft'd, 4 App. Div. 2d
498, 167 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1957), mnotion for leave to amend denied, 4 N.Y.2d
676, 149 N.E.2d 538 (1958).
"Palmer v. Palmer, 268 App. Div. 1010, 52 N.Y.S.2d 383, affirming, 50
N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sup. Ct. 1944), miotion for leave to appeal denied, 268 App.
Div. 1076, 53 N.Y.S.2d 309, notion for leave to serve supplemental answer
denied, 184 Misc. 291, 53 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (after divorce ob-
tained).
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Injunctions against foreign divorce had once been denied on
grounds that the foreign state was without jurisdiction since it was
not the matrimonial domicile. Thus, any decree rendered by the
foreign state would be a nullity.' This protection to the non-migra-
tory spouse, however, was removed in Williams v. North Carolina0
which established that if the domicile of the migratory spouse was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the laws of the foreign state,
any decree of divorce rendered therein was prima facie entitled to
extraterritorial recognition and favored by a presumption of valid-
ity.'0 It has since been held that to cast such a burden of proof upon
the non-migratory spouse is a sufficient hardship to warrant the
interposition of equitable relief."
MISTAKE OF LAW AND FACT
In United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Reagan" the plaintiff
sought rescission and restitution of payments made on a policy of
insurance issued to the defendant. Plaintiff alleged that the issuance
of the policy had been induced by the false representation of the
defendant that he was the owner of the insured automobile. The
defendant made a motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit which
was allowed by the lower court. The Supreme Court, reversing,
held that the policy was void because the defendant had no insurable
interest. In so holding, the Court applied the general rule that a
payment made under an erroneous belief induced by a mistake of
fact caused by the false representations of the defendant entitles the
payor to restitution provided the payment has not caused such a
change in the position of the payee that it would be unjust to require
a refund.' 3
8 Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N.Y. 146, 27 N.E.2d 969 (1940) (5 to 2
decision), reversing 258 App. Div. 211, 15 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1939).
S317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"°Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). In this, the second
Williams case, it was held that the finding of bona fide domicile by the di-
vorcing state is not conclusive and may be relitigated in a sister state. For
an excellent review of matrimonial litigation both prior and subsequent to
the Williams cases see Baer, The Law of Divorce Fifteen Years After
Williams v. North Carolina, 36 N.C.L. R-v. 265 (1958).
" Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951), affirming, 277
App. Div. 858, 98 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1950) ; Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div.
281, 70 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1947).12256 N.C. 1, 122 S.E.2d 774 (1961).
13 See, e.g., Sparrow v. John Morrell & Co., 215 N.C. 452, 2 S.E.2d 365
(1939) ; Simms v. Vick, 151 N.C. 78, 65 S.E. 621 (1909) ; Adams v. Reeves,
68 N.C. 134 (1873). Cf. Tarlton v. Keith, 250 N.C. 298, 108 S.E.2d 621
(1959).
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The Court regarded the mistake as to the defendant's title to,
or insurable interest in, the property as a mixed question of law and
fact which has generally been treated as a mistake of fact. 4 Thus
the Court avoided the harshness of the doctrine of Bilbie v. Lumley 5
that there can be no relief for a mistake of law. This doctrine is
founded on the supposition that all persons are presumed to know
the law.16 Because of the obvious injustice inherent in the universal
application of so broad a rule, there has been a gradual process of
attrition whereby the general rule has nearly been engulfed by its
exceptions. Repeatedly courts have, as here, applied to a mistake of
law the same criteria and principles that they would apply to a
mistake of fact in a situation otherwise the same.'7
The doctrine of the Bilbie case is adhered to in North Carolina,
but its application is confined to similar fact situations, that is, to
cases where a payment has been voluntarily made with full knowl-
edge of the facts in response to an honest demand but under a mis-
taken belief as to the law.'" In almost all other instances North
Carolina will grant relief where a benefit has been conferred upon
another under a mistake of law.' 9 The most extreme case in this
process of delimitation of the general rule in North Carolina is that
"' See Baltimore & A.R.R. v. Carolina Coach Co., 206 Md. 237, 111 A.2d
464 (1955); Roney v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 225 Ala. 367, 143
So. 571 (1932).
1" 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B. 1802). This was an action by an
underwriter on a policy of insurance to recover payments made to the de-
fendant under a mistake relating to the time of the sailing of the insured
ship. The defense was that the plaintiff had the means of such knowledge in
his hands, the defendants having placed papers before him containing such
information, and that a payment made with full knowledge of the circum-
stances cannot be recovered back. The Court, ruling in favor of the defend-
ant's contention, said: "Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law;
otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might not
be carried." Id. at 449-50.
2' The rule as announced by Lord Ellenborough has itself been referred to
as a "monstrous mistake of law." Patterson, Improvements in the Law of
Restitution, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 667, 676 (1955).
"' See generally RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, Topic 3, Mistake of Law,
Introductory Note at 179-80 (1937). Several states have now abolished the
doctrine by statute. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PR~c. Acr. § 112-f (revised in N.Y.
CPLR § 3005, effective Sept. 1, 1963).
"s See Collins v. Covert, 246 N.C. 303, 98 S.E.2d 26 (1957); Guerry v.
American Trust Co., 234 N.C. 644, 68 S.E.2d 272 (1951); First Nat'l Bank
v. Taylor, 122 N.C. 569, 29 S.E. 831 (1898).
"o See, e.g., State Trust Co. v. Braznell, 227 N.C. 211, 41 S.E.2d 744
(1947) (reformation allowed where a mistake of law induced a mistake of
fact); M.P. Hubbard & Co. v. Home, 203 N.C. 205, 165 S.E. 347 (1932)
(reformation allowed where unilateral mistake of law induced by fraud).
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of Kornegay v. Everett." There, by mutual mistake of both the
parties, a deed executed by a trustee was not effective to convey
an unencumbered title in fee to the plaintiff. The Court allowed the
instrument to be corrected to conform with the intention of the
parties even though the error was purely a mistake of law.
The present case is another example of the narrowing of the
old rule that a mistake of law cannot be corrected in equity and




When a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case there is no shifting
of the burden of proof to the defendant.' The establishment of a
prima facie case merely assures the plaintiff that he will not be non-
suited, but it in no way keeps the jury from finding for the defend-
ant.2 The jury may return a verdict for the defendant even though
he offers no evidence to rebut the prima facie case made out against
him; however, as a practical matter the defendant usually finds it
necessary to go forward with evidence in his favor.'
In Knighst v. Associated Transp., Inc.' evidence that the defend-
ant's insignia was painted on the side of a truck involved in a wreck
was held to establish a prima facie case under respondeat superior.
The trial court charged the jury to the effect that the establishment
of a prima facie case necessitated a verdict against the defendant if
he offered no evidence in rebuttal. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the lower court, held that the plaintiff must prove his case by the
greater weight of the evidence in order to make out a prima facie case,
but the jury may nevertheless find for the defendant even though he
offers no evidence. This case and the question of the burden of proof
is the subject of a note in this volume of the Law Review.'
° 99 N.C. 30, 5 S.E. 418 (1887).
"1 This case is also discussed under INSURANCE, Automobile Casualty
I urance, infra.
'The making of a prima facie case merely takes the case to the jury who
in turn may decide for either party, and whether the defendant goes for-
ward with the evidence is for him to determine.
2 See STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 203 (1946).
'Vance v. Guy, 224 N.C. 607, 31 S.E.2d 766 (1944) ; Star Mfg. Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 N.C. 330, 23 S.E.2d 32 (1942).
"257 N.C. 758, 127 S.E.2d 536 (1962).'Note, 41 N.C.L. REv. 124 (1962).
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CONDUCT AS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION
The conduct of a party opponent which indicates he is conscious
of the fact that his case is weak or unfounded may amount to an
implied admission that he ought to lose.6 The attempt to bribe
jurors,7 the attempt to commit suicide,8 and the failure to. testify9 have
all been held to be admissible as implied admissions. Conduct, when
treated as an implied admission, raises no presumption of guilt but
is merely competent evidence which may be considered by the jury.'"
In Pratt v. Bishop" the petitioner instituted proceedings to adopt
her grand-daughter alleging that the father had abandoned the child
to her care. As evidence of abandonment the petitioner introduced
certain depositions which tended to show that the respondent, in
violation of a restraining order, had obtained possession of the child
and had taken her out of the state where he negotiated for her return
to the petitioner only upon the payment of 150,000 dollars. The
Court held that the evidence contained in the depositions relating to
the respondent's conduct was receivable against him as an indication
that he had no faith in the merits of his case and therefore amounted
to an implied admission that he ought to lose. The Court felt that
one could certainly infer from the respondent's conduct in ransoming
his child that he had no confidence in his ability to pursue the case on
its merits.
DEAD MAN'S STATUTE (G.S. § 8-51)
In Tharpe v. Newman' the plaintiff alleged that he was injured
in an automobile accident while the defendant's husband was driving
the vehicle as her agent. The defendant's husband was killed in the
accident and there was no other evidence as to who was driving at
the time of the wreck.
The plaintiff's proffered testimony to the effect that the decedent
was driving at the time of the accident was excluded tder G.S. §
8-5111 (North Carolina's Dead Man's Statute). The Court said
'State v. Kincaid, 142 N.C. 657, 55 S.E. 647 (1906); see STANSBURY,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 178.
' State v. Case, 93 N.C. 545 (1885).
' State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 146 S.E. 395 (1929), noted in 7
N.C.L. REv. 290 (1929).
'York v. York, 212 N.C. 695, 194 S.E. 486 (1938).
10 State v. Dickerson, 189 N.C. 327, 127 S.E. 256 (1925).
11257 N.C. 486, 126 S.E.2d 597 (1962).
12257 N.C. 71, 125 S.E.2d 315 (1962).
"3N.C. G=u. STAT. § 8-51 provides that in an action against the admin-
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that when two persons are involved in an automobile accident, the
survivor's testimony as to the identity of the driver at the time of the
accident concerns a personal transaction between the parties within
the meaning of G.S. § 8-51 and is incompetent when offered in evi-
dence against a decedent's estate. 4
While in Tharpe the action was not against the decedent's estate
but against his principal under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
the Court nevertheless pointed out that under respondeat superior
the principal has an implied right of indemnity against the decedent's
estate,"5 and therefore, any testimony allowed against the principal
is also allowed indirectly against a decedent's estate.'
The Court's reasoning is in accord with a line of cases which have
held that testimony offered against a decedent's surety, which may
be adverse to the decedent's estate, is within the purview of G.S. §
8-51 since the surety, after paying the liability, may then go against
the decedent's estate for reimbursement.'1
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION
The proper method for excluding irrelevant matter from a plead-
ing is by a motion to strike.' Whether such matter is relevant or
not depends upon whether the evidence which would support the
allegation would be admissible at the trial.' Accordingly, if certain
evidence would be incompetent upon the trial of the facts then the
allegations relative to such evidence should be struck from the plead-
ings.20 However, regardless of the relevancy of the matter in the
pleadings, a lower court's decision not to exclude the matter will be
istrator of a deceased person an interested party shall not be examined as a
witness "concerning a personal transaction or communication between the
witness and the deceased."
"Accord, Davis v. Pearson, 220 N.C. 163, 16 S.E.2d 655 (1941); Boyd
v. Williams, 207 N.C. 30, 175 S.E. 832 (1934), noted in 13 N.C.L. R v. 230
(1935).
" Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 91 S.E.2d 673 (1956);
Newsome v. Surratt, 237 N.C. 297, 74 S.E.2d 732 (1953).
" Compare Bailey v. Westmoreland, 251 N.C. 843, 112 S.E.2d 517
(1960), where the interested witness was allowed to testify as to a transac-
tion with the defendant's agent due to the fact that the agent would not
have been personally liable and therefore the testimony would have no effect
on his estate.
"E.g., McGowan v. Davenport, 134 N.C. 526, 47 S.E. 27 (1904).
I8 N.C. Gxr. STAT. § 1-153 (1953).
'oPenn Dixie Lines, Inc. v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E.2d 410
(1953) ; Penny v. Stone, 228 N.C. 295, 45 S.E.2d 362 (1947).0 Daniel v. Gardner, 240 N.C. 249, 81 S.E.2d 660 (1954).
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upheld on appeal unless its retention in the pleadings would be preju-
dicial to the moving party. 1
In Durham Bank & Trust Co. v. Pollard22 the defendant moved
to strike from the pleadings the plaintiff's allegations that the defend-
ant had been convicted in a prior criminal action of killing the plain-
tiff's intestate. The North Carolina Supreme Court held, in accord
with the great weight of authority, that evidence of a prior criminal
conviction or acquittal is inadmissible in a subsequent civil action in
an attempt to prove the truth of the facts upon which the prior verdict
was rendered.3 Although the facts are the same in both the civil and
criminal action, the parties are different-one being an action by the
state and the other by an individual. The Court held that the motion
to strike should have been allowed, since the allegations of the prior
criminal conviction were irrelevant and their retention in the com-
plaint would be prejudicial to the defendant.
EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONTRACT
As a general rule, evidence that a defendant made a contract with
one person is not competent for the purpose of showing a similar
contract existed with another.24 However, in the recent case of Doub
v. Hauser,25 where the plaintiff sought to prove an implied contract,
the Court upheld the admission of evidence that the defendant had
proposed a similar agreement with another party. The plaintiffs had
alleged that the defendant, who was in poor health and had been
living alone, had promised to devise them his farm if they would
come live with him and take care of him. The Court held that al-
though the evidence of a similar agreement with another person was
incompetent to prove the existence of a contract between the parties,
it was admissible for the purpose of corroborating the plaintiffs'
evidence that the defendant was sick, lonely, and wanted someone to
live with him.26 Although the trial court failed to restrict the evi-
dence for purposes of corroboration only, its admission was held
"Call v. Stroud, 232 N.C. 478, 61 S.E.2d 342 (1950) ; Hinson v. Britt,
232 N.C. 379, 61 S.E.2d 185 (1950).2256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104 (1961).
"Id. at 79, 123 S.E.2d at 106. Accord, Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
215 N.C. 402, 2 S.E.2d 17 (1939) ; Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1951).
"Winborne Guano Co. v. Plymouth Mercantile Co., 163 N.C. 223, 84
S.E. 272 (1915).
" 256 N.C. 331, 123 S.E.2d 821 (1962)."Accord, Koonce v. Atlantic States Motor Lines, 249 N.C. 390, 106
S.E.2d 576 (1959).
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not to be in error due to the failure of defendant to request such a
restriction.
EVIDENCE OF RACING PRIOR TO COLLISION
In Corum v. Comer 7 the plaintiff's intestate was killed as a result
of an automobile collision between the two co-defendants. The trial
court admitted, over objection, evidence tending to show that the
defendants had been racing about twenty minutes before the collision.
On appeal it was held that evidence of a prior course of action
must be relevant to the issues before the court, and must have a
tendency to prove or disprove, whether directly or indirectly, a
question in issue; otherwise, it is incompetent.2" Evidence which is
too remote or which is merely intended to provoke prejudice is in-
admissible because it would merely confuse the jury and prolong the
trial.29 The Court held that evidence to the effect that the defendants
had been racing about twenty minutes prior to the accident was too
remote to have any bearing upon the defendants' negligence at the
time of the wreck. In order for evidence of racing at a prior time to
be admissible, it must be shown that the race continued to the scene
of the accident.3"
OPINION EVIDENCE-INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY
It is generally held that a lay witness cannot give his opinion on
questions which are to be decided by the jury if he can relate the
facts to the jury so that it will be in as good a position as the witness
to draw its own inferences and conclusions.3 ' It is only when the
facts are incapable of being adequately expressed by the witness so
as to enable the jury to draw a reasonable inference therefrom that
the witness may give his opinion.32
In the recent case of Ponder v. Cobb, 3 it was alleged that the
defendant had caused to be published certain libelous statements
charging the plaintiffs, as the election officials, with ballot-stuffing
2 256 N.C. 252, 123 S.E.2d 473 (1962).
"Accord, Pettiford v. Mayo, 117 N.C. 27, 23 S.E. 252 (1895).
"Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947); Godfrey v.
Western Carolina Power Co., 190 N.C. 24, 128 S.E. 485 (1925).
30 256 N.C. at 254, 123 S.E.2d at 475. Accord, Barnes v. Nello Teer
Constr. Co., 218 N.C. 122, 10 S.E.2d 614 (1940)."1E.g, Jones v. Bailey, 246 N.C. 599, 99 S.E.2d 768 (1957).
2 State v. Peterson, 225 N.C. 540, 35 S.E.2d 645 (1945) ; see generally
STANSBURY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 124.
22257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962). This case is the subject of a
note in 41 N.C.L. Rv. 153 (1962).
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and otherwise conducting a fraudulent election. The plaintiffs had
held the election, counted and recorded the ballots, and certified the
results. The original return of the election results was put in evi-
dence.
The plaintiffs, in an attempt to prove the falsity of the defendant's
statements, were allowed to testify, over objection, that the election
returns in question correctly stated the vote cast in the election. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that whether the election returns
correctly reflected the votes cast was the very issue to be decided by
the jury and not a proper conclusion for the witness to draw. The
Court was of the opinion that the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to
place facts before the jury tending to show the election was con-
ducted in the prescribed manner without resorting to their opinion.
The concurring justice in Ponder felt that the plaintiffs should
have been allowed to testify that the election returns were in fact
correct, for after all, the original return certified by the plaintiffs was
admitted in evidence. The concurring opinion drew a distinction
between cases where a witness attempts to draw deductions and in-
ferences from the actions of others and where testimony is given from
first-hand knowledge. The opinion stated that the plaintiffs should
have been allowed to testify from their own first-hand knowledge in
reply to the charge against them, and that such testimony does not
usurp the function of the jury.
In Carter v. Bradford34 the defendant negligently closed a car
door on the plaintiff's hand, and at the trial the plaintiff was allowed
to testify that by the time of the trial, she had lost ninety per cent of
the use of her right hand. The Court upheld the admissibility of the
plaintiff's testimony on the grounds that a lay witness may give his
opinion as to his present state of health and ability to work. 5 The
Court stated that the ability to perform physical acts is not necessarily
a question for expert opinion, 8 for the plaintiff having suffered the
injury was more qualified than anyone else to testify about her dis-
ability.
3 7
-,257 N.C. 481, 126 S.E.2d 158 (1962).
" Accord, Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 188 N.C. 538, 125 S.E. 186
(1924) ; see STANSBURY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 129.
" See Bulluck v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 200 N.C. 642, 158 S.E. 185
(1931); Note, 16 N.C.L. REv. 180 (1938).
"'Accord, Gossett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 152, 179 S.E.
438 (1935), where a lay witness was allowed to testify as to the plaintiff's
permanent disability. Norris v. Elmdale Elevator Co., 216 Mich. 546, 185
N.W. 696 (1921), where the plaintiff was allowed to testify that due to
his injury his ability to do carpenter work was decreased by one-half.
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PRIOR ACCIDENTS AS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
As a general rule, when one is charged with a negligent act, evi-
dence as to his negligence on prior unrelated occasions is inadmissi-
ble." The lack of relevancy between two independent though similar
acts would allow the evidence of the prior act, if admitted, to be used
to demonstrate the character of a defendant or that his disposition is
such that he would be likely to commit certain acts of a like nature."0
This in turn would clearly violate the rule that character cannot be
proved by specific acts when character is a collateral issue.
40
In Mason v. Gillikin,4' where the defendant was being sued for
negligently causing an automobile collision, the Court held that evi-
dence of defendant's previous accidents was immaterial in determining
his negligence in a completely unrelated instance. The evidence of
the prior accidents was found to be so unrelated to the cause of action
being tried that it could only be accepted by the jury as evidence that
the defendant had a reputation for negligence.
SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS AND RES GESTAE
Spontaneous statements made contemporaneous to the witnessing
of an incident, or shortly thereafter and without time for reflection,
may be admissible in evidence as a part of the res gestae.42 In order
for such statements to be competent as a part of the res gestae, they
must be voluntary and instinctive rather than in the form of a narra-
tive. The spontaneity of a declaration is said to be the assurance of
its trustworthiness.4
In Hargett v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co." the plaintiff's
intestate died from a wasp sting and the plaintiff sought to collect
on a double indemnity life insurance policy. Witnesses testifying for
the plaintiff said that the decedent, who had been walking along the
"8Heath v. Kirkman, 240 N.C. 303, 82 S.E.2d 104 (1954); Robbins v.
Alexander, 219 N.C. 475, 14 S.E.2d 425 (1941); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1210
(1951).
,' See STANSBURY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 91.,0 State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954).
41256 N.C. 527, 124 S.E.2d 537 (1962).
"'Little v. Power Brake Co., 255 N.C. 451, 121 S.E.2d 889 (1961); see
Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Ride and the Unifori Rules of Evi-
dence, 34 N.C.L. Rrv. 171, 188 (1956); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 92 (1946).
"Coley v. Phillips, 224 N.C. 618, 31 S.E.2d 757 (1944); Queen City
Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 11 S.E.Zd 341 (1940) (Court excluded
statement made fifteen minutes after the accident); Batchelor v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 196 N.C. 84, 144 S.E. 542 (1928); see STANSiauRy, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 164.
" 258 N.C. 10, 128 S.E.2d 26 (1962).
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highway, suddenly crossed the road and stated to them that a wasp
had stung him and that the pain was unbearable. This testimony
and other evidence showed the decedent had walked about one hun-
dred yards and that nearly two minutes had elapsed from the time of
the incident to the making of the statement.
Previous North Carolina cases have been inconsistent as to the
interval of time which may elapse between an occurrence and the
making of a declaration in order to have the declaration deemed a
part of the res gestae. In a number of cases the Court has insisted
upon strict contemporaneousness, 45 while in other cases statements
have been held admissible when made after the incident, but before
there had been time for fabrication.46
The Court in Hargett held that the fact that the decedent's state-
ment was made voluntarily, shortly after the incident, and in ex-
planation of his pain, took it out of the hearsay rule and rendered it
competent as a part of the res gestae. The Court indicated that
whether a statement is a part of the res gestae depends upon the par-
ticular circumstances involved, and that the contemporaneousness of
the statement, although important, is only one factor to be consid-
ered.47
In Tart v. Register8 the defendant made a left turn as another
car was passing her automobile, and in the resulting collision a num-
ber of her passengers were injured. There was testimony to the
effect that the passengers had seen a car approaching from the rear
and that they warned the defendant that if she turned they would be
hit. These statements were held to be competent as spontaneous
statements and admissible as a part of the res gestae. The Court
found that the declarations were made as a part of the transaction and
without time for reflection.49
"E.g., Holmes v. Wharton, 194 N.C. 470, 140 S.E. 93 (1927) ; State v.
Butler, 185 N.C. 625, 115 S.E. 889 (1923); Hill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150
N.C. 1, 63 S.E. 124 (1908).
"E.g., State v. Smith, 225 N.C. 78, 33 S.E.2d 472 (1945); Young v.
Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926), where the Court held that the
declaration need not be made immediately upon the happening of the inci-
dent, but any remoteness of time may be considered in determining whether
the declaration was narrative.
," "[T]he court should consider the time, place and content of the utter-
ance, whether it was voluntarily made, motive for fabrication, condition of
the declarant, and corroborating circumstances." 258 N.C. at 14, 128 S.E.2d
at 30 (1962).
"' 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962). This case is also discussed in
DAMAGES, Collateral Recovery, supra and ToRTs, Joint Tortfeasors,'infra.
" Accord, Woods v. Roadway Express, Inc., 223 N.C. 269, 25 S.E.2d 856
(1943).
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INSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE CASUALTY INSURANCE
In United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Reagan' the plaintiff-in-
surer sought to recover payments made on an automobile casualty
insurance policy issued to defendant. Plaintiff alleged that the policy
was issued under the mistaken belief that defendant was the owner
of the insured automobile.2 Upon the close of plaintiff's evidence,
the trial court allowed defendant's motion of involuntary nonsuit.
On appeal the Supreme Court, reversing, found defendant to be with-
out an insurable interest and held the policy void. The Court, upon
sound equitable principles,3 held that the insurer would be entitled
to restitution for money paid under a mistake of fact, even though
defendant had expended the sums in payment for repairs to the
automobile.
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co,
4
an employee of an automobile dealer was a passenger in a car owned
by the dealer for demonstration purposes. The driver lost control
of the car and the employee was injured as a result. The employee,
after recovering workmen's compensation, brought suit against the
driver for the injuries suffered. The driver called upon his insurer,
plaintiff in this action, to defend and discharge his liability. Plain-
tiff brought this suit for declaratory judgment, joining its insured,
the dealer, and the dealer's insurer. Plaintiff admitted that its policy
covered the driver, but contended that it was only responsible for
excess coverage5 and that the dealer's insurance provided the pri-
mary coverage which should be exhausted before a claim is brought
against it. The dealer's insurance, on the other hand, expressly ex-
cluded recovery by an "employee of the insured" for bodily injury
or medical coverage for injuries sustained in the course of employ-
' 256 N.C. 1, 122 S.E.2d 774 (1961).
2 In a prior action against the tortfeasor, plaintiff was allowed a volun-
tary nonsuit when defendant here testified, as plaintiff's witness, that he
did not at any time own the automobile.
' See EQUITABLE REMEDIES, Mistake of Law and Fact, supra.
'256 N.C. 91, 123 S.E.2d 108 (1961).
' "[T]he excess insurer is liable only for the amount of the loss in
excess of the limits of other valid and collectible insurance covering the
same loss." Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 45
Cal. App. 2d 288, -, 114 P.2d 34, 36 (1941); Cooper v. Commercial Ins.
Co., 26 Misc. 2d 179, 206 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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ment and for "any obligation for which the insured or any company
as his insurer may be held liable under a workmen's compensation
law." Plaintiff, however, contended that the driver was an addi-
tional insurer under the dealer's policy and the exclusion clauses in
that policy remove from coverage only the employees of the driver
and those to whom the driver pays workmen's compensation.
The trial court held that plaintiff was obligated under its policy
with the driver and that the dealer's insurer incurred no liability.
The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, finding that the use of the
term "employees" in the exclusions of the dealer's policy meant the
dealer's employees and not those of the driver.
There are two views' on this matter: (1) the term "insured"
includes the named insured and any additional insured under the
policy,8 and (2) the only employees excluded are those of the named
insured.' However, the appellant contends for a slightly different
approach in that it alleges that the term "employees of the insured"
should be limited to the employees of the insured invoking coverage
under the policy. Our Court in adopting the view that the excluded
employees are those of the named insured, stated: "to arrive at the
conclusion [the driver's] . . .employees and not [the dealer's] ...
are excluded requires complicated, circuitous and involved reason-
ing."'
0
In Roomy v. Allstate Ins. Co." husband and wife, residents of
New York, were passing through North Carolina and were involved
in an accident in which the wife sustained personal injuries. A suit
was brought by the wife wherein she was awarded a substantial
recovery against her husband. An execution was issued against the
husband, but was returned unsatisfied. The wife then brought this
action against the husband's insurer after having made demand for
payment to the limits of the policy. Insurer denies liability for the
injuries, contending that they were not covered under the provisions
of the policy, pleading the applicable New York statute.
12
0 256 N.C. at 92, 123 S.E.2d at 109.
For a discussion of the "employee exclusion" clause controversy, see
Kelly v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 288 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1961); Annot., 50
A.L.R.2d 78 (1956).
8 See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Cas. Co. v. Smith, 247 Minn. 151, 76 N.W.2d
486 (1956).
o See, e.g., Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stukes, 164 F.2d 571 (4th
Cir. 1947).10 256 N.C. at 95, 123 S.E.2d at 11.
11 256 N.C. 318, 123 S.E.2d 817 (1962).
1 N.Y. INsURANCE LAW § 167(3) provides "No policy or contract shall
19631
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The trial court held that "as a matter of law" there was no
coverage under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed and stated:
"Under the general doctrine, the interpretation of an insurance con-
tract depends on the law of the place where the policy is delivered ....
We see no reason.., to depart from this well established principle."1 8
In Crisp v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.14 the insurer issued
a policy on the car of the insured, and the FS-1 form1 had been de-
livered to the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. The
insurer attempted to cancel the policy for nonpayment of premiums
in November. In December the insured was involved in an accident
and the insurer refused to pay for the damages, claiming that the
policy was not in force.
The policy in this case was subject to the provisions of the Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Act of 1957.1' The applicable statute 7 for
cancellation and termination of automobile liability insurance is held
to be mandatory in its provisions and a failure to comply substantially
with the provisions fails to effectively cancel the policy. Here the in-
surer in its notice to the insured, failed to show on the face of the
notice of cancellation "that proof of financial responsibility is required
to be maintained... and that operation of a motor vehicle without
be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because of death of or
injuries to his or her spouse... unless express provision relating specifically
thereto is included in the policy."
256 N.C. at 322, 123 S.E.2d at 820. Accord, Myers v. Ocean Acc. &
Guarantee Corp., 99 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1938). In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Skurkay, 204 N.C. 227, 167 S.E. 802 (1933), the policy was executed
in Pennsylvania and the Court held that insurer's right to cancel would be
determined by Pennsylvania law.
1'256 N.C. 408, 124 S.E.2d 149 (1962); also discussed in CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Insurance-Nonpayment of Premiums,
.supra.
15 Issuance of the FS-1 form or certificate represents that the insurer has
issued and that there is in effect an owner's motor vehicle liability policy
which complies with G.S. § 20-279.21. Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
253 N.C. 120, 126, 116 S.E.2d 482, 487 (1960); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.19 (Supp. 1961)." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961).
'N.C. GmsN. STAT. § 20-310 (Supp. 1961), provides that "No contract of
insurance or renewal thereof shall be terminated by cancellation or failure
to renew by the insurer until at least fifteen (15) days after mailing a
notice of termination to the named insured at the address shown on the
policy . . . . Every such notice of termination for any cause whatsoever
sent to the insured shall include on the face of the notice a statement that
proof of financial responsibility is required to be maintained continuously
throughout the registration period and that operation of a motor vehicle
without maintaining such proof of financial responsibility is a misde-
meanor . ...
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maintaining such proof of financial responsibility is a misdemean-
or."
.'18
The Court determined that in the absence of circumstances indicating
a waiver or estoppel such a statement "is essential to a valid concella-
tion or termination, especially when the suit is by a member of the
class the Act is designed to protect."' 9
The Court in Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America,20
held that coverage under an "omnibus clause" in an automobile
liability insurance policy is confined "to situations where the use
made of the vehicle at the time of the accident is within the scope of
the permission granted."'"
BURGLARY INSURANCE
In Tayloe v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.2" plaintiff as lessee was
obligated, under the terms of the lease, to keep the premises in good
repair, "reasonable wear and tear and unavoidable accidents ex-
cepted."2 The lessee carried insurance which was to pay for dam-
ages to the premises resulting from robbery or burglary provided
that lessee is liable to the landlord for such damage. Burglars entered
the premises by "smashing the glass, locks and frame of the two
front doors, and by springing the hinges on which the doors
swung. ' 24 The trial judge allowed the plaintiff to recover for the
damage to the doors. Defendant appealed contending that the dam-
age resulted from an "unavoidable accident"; that the lease excepted
plaintiffs from such liability; and, therefore that, defendant was not
liable on its policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge, find-
ing that intentional damage to the premises is not an unavoidable
18 Ibid.
10256 N.C. at 414, 124 S.E.2d at 154. In Nixon v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 258 N.C. 41, 43, 127 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1962), the Court held that
"neither defective notice, nor failure to give notice, to the Commissioner
affects the validity or binding effect of the cancellation; the notice to the
Commissioner serves an entirely different purpose." (Emphasis by the
Court.) Here binding notice to the insured had been made, but the insurer
had not given the statutory notice to the Commissioner within the required
fifteen days. "Cancellation of a policy is not conditioned upon the statutory
notice to Commissioner." Id. at 44, 127 S.E.2d at 894.
20257 N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d 161 (1962). See Note, 41 N.C.L. REv.
232 (1963).
- Id. at 387, 126 S.E.2d at 167.
2 257 N.C. 626, 127 S.E.2d 238 (1962).
- Id. at 626, 127 S.E.2d at 239.
" Id. at 627, 127 S.E.2d at 239.
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accident within the terms of the lease, so as to except plaintiff from
liability to the lessor for the damages. 5
There is a split of authority as to whether or not intentional
damage or damage resulting from the negligence of a third person
is an unavoidable accident. This decision adopts what appears to be
the preferable position.2"
FIRE INSURANCE
In Rouse v. Albany Ins. Co." plaintiff sought to recover for the
contents of its building which was destroyed by fire. Included among
the contents were articles of clothing which were in plaintiff's posses-
sion, as bailee, for the purpose of dry cleaning. Defendants had each
issued to plaintiff a standard North Carolina fire insurance policy
containing stock coverage provisions.2 Defendant demurred on the
ground that the policies "were intended to insure the plaintiff against
liability to the owner and not to insure the property."2 The lower
court overruled the demurrer and was affirmed on appeal. The Court
noted that it was alleged that the policies insured the contents of a
building "used as a dry cleaning plant."30 It found that this language
put the defendants on notice as to the type of articles which would be
stored in the building and held that the policies insured the clothing
held by plaintiff as bailee. The Court pointed out, however, that
the recovery will be held by plaintiff as trustee for the benefit of the
owners of the clothing. 1
" The rationale of this decision is related to that of North Carolina
decisions holding that the intentional killing of the deceased party does not
come within the scope of the term "death by accidental means" as that term
is used in the standard life insurance policy. Slaughter v. State Capital
Life Ins. Co., 250 N.C. 265, 108 S.E.2d 438 (1959); Goldberg v. United
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 86, 102 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
2 In Kirby v. Davis, 210 Ala. 192, 97 So. 655 (1923), the court held
that unavoidable accidents include the acts of strangers. The opposite view
was taken in Leominster Fuel Co. v. Scanlon, 243 Mass. 126, 137 N.E. 271
(1922), where it was held that the breaking of a plate glass window through
the negligence of a stranger, under the control of neither the landlord nor
the tenant, was not an unavoidable accident. See generally Annot., 20
A.L.R. 1101 (1922), supplemented in Annot., 24 A.L.R. 1461 (1923)'.
27257 N.C. 267, 125 S.E.2d 424 (1962).
" "[W]hen this policy covers STOCK or merchandise it shall include
all stock items usual or incidental to the business of the occupancy de-
scribed . . . the property of the insured or for which the insured is liable
while contained in the described building .... ." 257 N.C. at 268, 125 S.E.2d
at 424.
20 Id. at 269, 125 S.E.2d at 425.
20 Ibid..
" Id. at 270, 125 S.E.2d at 426.
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There is a split of authority on the question whether the stock
coverage provision provides for indemnity insurance against the
insured's legal liability for loss or whether it insures the property
which the insured possesses as bailee. This decision adopts what
would appear to be the majority view.3
2
GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
In Iowa Mit. Ins. Co. v. Fred M. Simmons, Inc.3 an insurance
policy covering property damage provided that the insurer would
pay all damage for which the insured shall become liable because of
injury to property "caused by accident." Insured, a roofing contrac-
tor, removed the roof on a building in the process of replacing it. To
protect the interior of the building from rain damage, insured placed
a waterproof covering, secured by heavy blocks, over the opening.
During an ordinary shower of rain there was seepage resulting in
damage. On these facts the Court found that whether or not there
was an accident within the meaning of the policy was an issue of fact
to be determined by the jury, and that the existence of negligence
did not justify the trial court in ruling that there was no accident
as a matter of law. 4
32 See, e.g., American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., v. Gayle, 108 F.2d 116, 119
(6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940). See generally 29 Am.
JuR. Insurance §§ 295-96 (1960); PATTERSON, INsIRANCE LAW § 28 (1957);
4 APPLEmAN, IN SmANcE LAW & PRAcTcrE §§ 2345-46 (1941); Annot., 67
A.L.R.2d 1241, 1245 (1959).
In Smith v. Rochester Am. Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 718, 104 S.E.2d 822
(1958), an action was brought to recover on a policy covering loss of to-
bacco by fire, the property of others, in the custody of a warehouseman for
auction. Plaintiff, a "pin hooker," bought tobacco at a regular sale and
left it on the warehouseman's floor until he could re-work it for resale at
the next auction. Between the purchase date and the next auction the
warehouse burned. Defendant-insurer asked for a nonsuit on the basis that
the policy covered only tobacco held for sale and not for resale. Affirming
the trial court on appeal the Supreme Court found that the language of the
policy did not require such a technical construction, and that "the purpose
of insurance is to insure."
258 N.C. 69, 128 S.E.2d 19 (1962).
", See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 264 Fed. 66, 69 (4th Cir.
1920). See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R. 1409, 1411 (1921). Recent cases
have indicated an acceptance of this point of view, i.e., that negligence being
present as a causative element does not preclude an occurrence from being
an accident. Employers Ins. Co. v. Alabama Roofing & Siding Co., 271
Ala. 394, 124 So. 2d 261 (1960) ; Bennett v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 132 So. 2d
788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Wolk v. Royal Indem. Co., 27 Misc. 2d
478, 210 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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LIFE INSURANCE
In Blackman v. Liberty Life Ins. Co."5 the deceased and his wife
applied to a savings and loan association for a loan. The loan associa-
tion prepared a note and a deed of trust conveying certain lands to
their trustee as security. As further security the loan association
required a life insurance policy on deceased, to be issued by defendant-
insurer, for the purpose of mortgage redemption. The secretary-
treasurer and general manager of the loan association, who was also
local agent for defendant-insurer, prepared the application for insur-
ance and forwarded it to the insurer."0 The application was approved
and the policy sent to the local agent. The loan association set up a
credit for deceased and his wife designated as "loan in process" and
deducted items amounting to fifty-five dollars for expenses in connec-
tion with the loan. Several days after receipt of the policy by the
loan association insured was killed in an automobile accident. The
policy had not been delivered to him. The insurer would not honor
the policy and the loan association refused to allow any credit on the
loan.
The administrator of deceased's estate brought this action alleg-
ing a cause of action in tort for negligent failure to deliver the policy.
The trial court sustained a demurrer by the insurer, and this was
affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court, however, indicated that
there may be a cause of action in contract if plaintiff alleges and can
prove the policy was duly issued and delivered to the loan association.
It is not clear that delivery to the cestui que vie is essential; and the
Court intimated doubt as to whether delivery to the loan association
could be denied, since the policy was held by its general manager,
even though the same person was local agent for the insurer .3
" 256 N.C. 261, 123 S.E.2d 467 (1961).
"In Bank of French Broad, Inc. v. Bryan, 240 N.C. 610, 83 S.E.2d
485 (1954), where there was a similar relationship, the Court held1 that
where such agent had said that he would cause the insurance to issue, he
may be held liable for the amount of loss attributable to him.
" The Court recognized that there may be a problem of proof as to the
contract cause of action: "The savings association had charge of the . . .
account . . . from which it had already deducted certain expenses incident
to the loan. The policy provided for payment of the insurance premium
along with the interest to the Savings Association. There may or may not
be reason why it could not and should not deduct the premium due on the
insurance policy in the same manner it had deducted other expenses." 256
N.C. at 262, 123 S.E.2d at 469. Since the insurance premiums are included
in the loan repayments to the loan association and it appears that the insurer
is insuring the association's customers, as such, without any other incidents
that normally go along with the issuance of a life policy it would appear
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LABOR LAW
SECONDARY BOYCOTT-SUIT FOR DAMAGES UNDER 303 (b)
A secondary boycott involves a combination to exert coercive
pressure on the customers of a primary employer to induce them to
withhold or withdraw their patronage under fear of similar activity
directed against themselves. The Taft-Hartley Act in sections
8(b) (4) (A) and (B)' designates such conduct on the part of the
union an unfair labor practice. It further authorizes a suit for dam-
ages by the offended employer under section 3032 in any court having
jurisdiction of the parties.
In Overnite Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters'
plaintiff, a non-unionized trucking company, was engaged in the
interstate handling and transportation of direct freight within its
territory and exchange freight requiring the cooperation of carriers
outside its territory. The defendant, by establishing picket lines at
the plaintiff's terminals, unsuccessfully attempted to force its recog-
nition as the bargaining agent for the company employees even
though it had not been certified as such. Thereafter the defendant,
through its members who were employees of neutral carriers doing
exchange freight business with the plaintiff, organized a boycott
against the movement of such freight. The plaintiff brought an action
not unreasonable to find the insurance in effect. The provision for repay-
ment of the premium is incorporated in the policy and would seem to dis-
pense with any necessity for prepayment of premium before the insurance
goes into effect. An insurance contract is to be construed liberally for the
insured. Roberts v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 212 N.C. 1, 4, 192 S.E.
873, 876 (1937); see generally 29 Am. JuR. Insurance §§ 214-16, 221-22,
560 (1960).
For a discussion of the conflict as to whether or not there is a cause of
action for negligent failure to deliver the policy, see TORTS, Liability of
Insurer for Agent's Failure to Deliver Policy, infra.
'Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (4) (A), (B), amending National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (Wagner Act).
'Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 303,
61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 545
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. I, 1962). Section 303(b) is the pertinent
provision therein. It provides: "Whoever shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of any violation of subsection (a) of this section may
sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . or in any other
court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by
him sustained and the cost of the suit."
2257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d 277 (1962); also discussed in DAMAGES,
Punitive Damages-Loss of Profits, supra.
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to recover for damages sustained in its efforts to continue its business
and for punitive damages.
4
The trial court awarded 363,000 dollars actual and 500,000
dollars punitive damages to the plaintiff. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court, reversing as to the punitive damages, held that in a
cause of action arising under section 303 (b), actual damages only,
together with the costs of the action, are recoverable.' Undoubtedly
this is in accord with the literal wording and accepted interpretation
of that section.6
In the instant case the plaintiff alleged only one cause of action
based on section 303(b), and the Court had no jurisdiction to apply
any remedy apart from the prescribed measure of damages therein.
However, the Court pointed out that had the complaint, in a separate
cause of action, alleged conduct marked by violence and imminent
threats to the public order, they would have had jurisdiction to de-
termine both causes and award punitive damages to enforce a state
remedy.' This necessarily follows because of the compelling state
interest to maintain the peace and prevent and punish violent torts.
Yet the recognized rule is that absent such violence there is no juris-
diction in the state courts.8
UNION EXPENDITURE OF DUES FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-INJUNCTION
In an action to enjoin the enforcement of a union-shop agree-
ment it was alleged by the non-union employees of the defendant rail-
' The plaintiff alleged that as a result of the concerted refusal of its
customers and other trucking companies doing interchange freight business
with the plaintiff to handle any goods going to or coming from the plaintiff,
it has been deprived of otherwise profitable freight business and has been
required to expend extraordinary sums of money in its efforts to operate its
business despite the wrongful acts of the defendant.
'The Court considered the breadth of control conferred by the defend-
ant's constitution and the financial assistance contributed for the maintenance
of the boycott and concluded that a principal-agency relationship existed
between the defendant and its local unions.
6 See UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
824 (1954).
' International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, rehearing denied,
357 U.S. 944 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. "Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954); UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960); UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co.,
263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
' See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
North Dade Plumbing, Inc. v. Bowen, 116 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App.
1960).
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way company that the periodic dues, fees, and assessments which
they would be required to pay in order to retain their jobs would be
regularly and continuously used by the defendant unions for political
compaign contributions. The trial court enjoined the defendants
from placing any compulsion on the employees either to join or pay
any money to the unions except upon a further showing as to what
portion of the collections were reasonably related to bargainable sub-
jects. In Allen v. Southern Ry.9 the North Carolina Supreme Court,
by a six to one majority, reversed the trial court principally on the
authority of Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson.'" On petition to
rehear"' the Court divided evenly'" thereby affirming the judgment
of the trial court.
The unions have never offered to prove what portion of the
collections were reasonably necessary and related to collective bar-
gaining, and thus the injunction stands. The result is that North
Carolina has successfully enjoined the union-shop agreement in spite
of the provision of the Railway Labor Act authorizing this form of
union security notwithstanding any statute or law of the state to the
contrary.
1 3
The Allen cases are the subject of a note appearing elsewhere in
this Law Review. 4 Subsequent thereto certiorari has been granted
in the United States Supreme Court.
5
0249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959).
10351 U.S. 225 (1956). In this case the United States Supreme Court
held that a union-shop agreement may constitutionally require financial
support to a bargaining representative from all who benefit from its agency.
Compare Hanson, with International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961).
"1Allen v. Southern Ry., 256 N.C. 700, 124 S.E.2d 871 (1962).
"Justice Sharp presided at a hearing and entered an interlocutory de-
cree at the trial court level and took no part in the consideration of the case
on rehearing.
1" Railway Labor Act, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh
(1958).
1,41 N.C.L. REv. 285 (1963).
10 Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 371 U.S. 875 (No. 316, 1962
Term). The questions presented are: (1) Whether enforcement of a union-
shop agreement complying with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act
may be enjoined because the union uses a portion of its dues and fees for
political activity; (2) whether the enforcement of such agreement may be
enjoined with respect to employees who had no knowledge of the political
contributions and who did not inform the union of their opposition to such
activity and expenditures; (3) whether the enforcement of such agreement
may be enjoined with respect to employees who, since the date of the
agreement, have not joined the union and have paid no dues, fees or assess-
ments. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3081 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1962).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
CONFLICTS BETWEEN LOCAL AND STATE LAW
In Tastee Freeze, Inc. v. Raleig'1 the plaintiff instituted action
under the Declaratory Judgment Act2 challenging the validity of a
Raleigh city ordinance3 prohibiting the peddling of ice cream along
the city streets. Plaintiff's business included selling ice cream prod-
ucts to the public from mobile freezer units and it had secured a
state license to carry on such business. Plaintiff was refused a city
license on the basis of the local ordinance.
The Supreme Court, basing its decision on G.S. § 105-534 im-
posing a state license tax on peddlers, held the ordinance invalid in
that it prohibited the exercise of a privilege sanctioned by the General
Assembly. The Court, following the traditional pattern of refusing
to rule on constitutional issues unless squarely presented, left open
the question of whether a city has authority to enact such an ordi-
nance based on considerations of public safety."
HOUSING AUTHORITIES
Housing Authority v. Wooten6 involved a proceeding by the
Housing Authority of the City of Wilson to condemn respondent's
1-256 N.C. 208, 123 S.E.2d 632 (1962).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -67 (1953). Although the defendant did not
question whether an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act was proper
in this instance, the Court expressly refused to decide whether a municipal
ordinance could be tested by this procedure, deferring consideration until
the question was directly presented.
'The ordinance, contained in section 105 of chapter 14 of the City Code
of Raleigh, reads: "No ice cream shall be peddled along the streets and/or
sidewalks of the city from push carts or other vehicles or in any other
manner." This provision was adopted at some undisclosed date prior to
1950 and the Court pointed out that the reference to "push carts" suggested
it dated back to the "horse and buggy era." Neither is there any evidence
to indicate the reason for the provision. The Court suggested that it might
have been adopted as a health measure at a time when present methods of
refrigeration were unknown. This suggestion seems well taken in that the
provision is not included in chapter 21 of the city code which provides for
regulation of traffic on the city streets.
'N.C. Gmx. STAT. § 105-53 (1958).
5 Defendant's evidence in the lower court consisted of testimony to the
effect that the approach of similar mobile units, announced by the ringing
of bells or other signals, caused young children to become excited and to
hurry across the street and congregate about the mobile units, creating a
hazard to them and to other persons and traffic using the street. Based on
this evidence the lower court held that the operation of such units consti-
tuted a menace to the public safety and that the ordinance was a valid exer-
cise of the police power. But cf. State v. Byrd, 259 N.C. 141, 130 S.E.2d 55
(1963).
257 N.C. 358, 126 S.E.2d 101 (1962).
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land for a low-rent housing project. 7 Respondents contended that in
selecting their land the Housing Authority acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in that the land selected was not a slum area but con-
sisted of ninety per cent cleared land, and that the few houses therein
were not slum houses. They further contended that the erection of
dwelling units on cleared land was not a public use and that their land
was selected merely to save the expense of removing the dilapidated
slum buildings from the tract of land immediately adjoining.'
The Supreme Court upheld the action of the trial court in allowing
petitioner's motion to strike9 the above allegations from respondent's
answer. The Court said that housing authorities are vested with a
broad discretion in exercising the power of eminent domain and that
the selection of respondent's land was not an abuse of discretion.10
The Court, in accord with its previous holdings,1 said that there is
nothing in the law which requires housing projects to be located only
where slum areas exist.'
2
'Article 1 of chapter 157 of the General Statutes provides for the crea-
tion of housing authorities. G.S. § 157-2 declares slum clearance to be a
public purpose. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1952).
A petition to the city clerk signed by twenty-five or more residents of a
city is sufficient to require a public hearing at which the legislative body of
the city is empowered to determine the existence of facts necessary to create
an authority. The statute sets out guiding standards, and a finding that:
(1) unsanitary or unsafe dwellings exist in the city and/or that (2) there
is a lack of suitable accommodations is sufficient to establish an authority.
The existence of either of the above conditions is sufficient. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 156-4 (1961).
' Respondents also alleged that the entire plan perpetrated a fraud upon
the residents of the city of Wilson and that the Housing Authority was not
eliminating slum dwellings but was engaged in the private enterprise of rental
units.
' The basis of the Housing Authority's motion to strike portions of
respondent's answer was that the facts therein alleged constituted no legal
defense. The Supreme Court said that the motion was, in effect, a demurrer
to what was in substance a plea in bar and thus the respondents could appeal
from an order allowing the motion.
"0 See, e.g., In re Housing Authority of the City of Salisbury, 235 N.C.
463, 70 S.E.2d 500 (1952); In re Housing Authority of the City of'Char-
lotte, 233 N.C. 649, 65 S.E.2d 761 (1951).
11 In re Housing Authority of Charlotte, supra note 10. The fact that a
few desirable homes will be taken does not affect the public character of
the condemnation proceeding. See, e.g., In re Edward J. Jeffries Home
Housing Project of Detroit, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N.W.2d 272 (1943); Blake-
more v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 74 Ohio App.: 5, 57
N.E.2d 397 (1943).
1 The practicality of such a rule is readily apparent. The purposes of
the act would be defeated in many instances if the new project had to be
built in the slum area where topography, drainage, sewage, and space might
be undesirable or insufficient. This rule is in accord with the decisions in
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Thus our Court has defined "slum clearance" to include the erec-
tion of low-rental housing into which residents of undesirable and
congested areas may move, even though the project is built on vacant
land and the dilapidated buildings in the slum area are not removed.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
ACCELERATION CLAUSE-CO-MAKERS' LIABILITY
In Shoenterprise Corp. v. Willingham' the defendant and two
others signed a promissory note as co-makers. The note called for
installment payments of $200Z.90 each year for four years with a
final installment of $2002.98 in the fifth year until the total amount of
$10,014.58 was paid. There was an acceleration clause in the note
which provided that a default in the payment of principal or interest
would, at the option of the holder, cause all sums then remaining
unpaid to become immediately due and payable without notice. In
1957,2 two years after the execution of the note, the plaintiff elected
to accelerate the debt. It sued the other two co-makers in Tennessee,
but failed to notify the defendant of its election or of the action. The
two co-makers Were bankrupt and the judgment in plaintiff's favor
proved to be worthless. In 1960 plaintiff brought this action for
the amount of the note which remained unpaid. The trial court
held that the statute of limitations barred recovery for the first two
installments in 1956 and 1957, but that the installments for 1958,
1959 and 1960 were still recoverable. On appeal, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed this latter portion of the trial court's
decision and held that the statute of limitations barred recovery for
any amount.
This case presented for the first time,3 the question of whether
an acceleration clause affects the debt as a single obligation or
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Riggin v. Dockweiler, 15 Cal. 2d 651, 104
P.2d 367 (1940); Stockus v. Boston Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 507, 24
N.E.2d 333 (1939); Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 135 Texas 158,
143 S.W.2d 79 (1940); Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority, 121
W. Va. 319, 3 S.E.2d 502 (1939).
'258 N.C. 36, 127 S.E.2d 767 (1962).
2 The only payment ever made on the note was a payment of interest in
1955 and 1956. Thus, without payment of any principal, there was a
default.
' The Court said: "The question presented appears to be one of first
impression in this jurisdiction and elsewhere. No case involving an analo-
gous factual situation has been discovered by our research or by that of
counsel." 258 N.C. at 40, 127 S.E.2d at 770.
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whether it affects the separate liabilities of the several parties on the
note. The Court said that while these co-makers were jointly and
severally liable,4 the acceleration acted on the debt itself. On elec-
tion, the debt matured and the statute of limitations started running
on that date irrespective of a party's particular liability. This result
seems the most desirable here because it conforms to the express
language of the parties in this note and in most notes with accelera-
tion clauses. That is, it appears from the language that the inten-
tion of the parties is that on default the debt matures, and not their
liability as a separate matter, since the latter cannot support a judg-
ment in the absence of the former.
COLLECTING AGENT'S FAILURE TO GIVE PROMPT NOTICE OF
DISHONOR-DAMAGES-PAST ACQUIESCENCE AS ESTOPPEL
In Benthall v. Washington Hog Market, Inc.5 the plaintiff-seller
drew a sight draft on the buyer and made it payable to the Bank of
Rich Square. The bank took the draft for collection only and cred-
ited the plaintiff's account. The bank then sent the draft to the de-
fendant bank for collection from the drawee-buyer, who had a
deposit with the defendant. The defendant requested authority from
its depositor to honor the draft,' but the latter declined to give it.
The defendant delayed in returning the check for six days. When
the Bank of Rich Square received back the draft, it charged it to
the plaintiff's account. The plaintiff instituted this action against
the buyer and the defendant bank to recover the amount of the draft.
He obtained judgment by default against the insolvent buyer and
now seeks to obtain judgment against the defendant on the ground
that it was negligent in its failure to return the dishonored draft
within a reasonable time.7 The Court denied recovery on the
grounds that the plaintiff failed to show either that the bank's delay
' In the absence of a contrary intent on the face of the instrument, the
words, "I promise to pay" are held to indicate joint and several liability.
Granger v. Harper, 217 Cal. 16, 17 P.2d 135 (1932); Bullard v. Holman,
184 Ga. 788, 193 S.E. 586 (1937).
-257 N.C. 748, 127 S.E.2d 507 (1962).
' It was conceded that the defendant bank could not honor the draft
without specific authority from the buyer.
'The plaintiff could not rely on G.S. § 25-144, which provides that the
drawee's failure to give notice of nonacceptance of a draft within twenty-
four hours after it is presented, constitutes an acceptance, because the
Court has held that where the draft is drawn on the buyer, he is the drawee
and not his bank of deposit. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Bank of Wash-
ington, 255 N.C. 205, 120 S.E.2d 830 (1961).
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was negligent, or that he suffered any damages. The evidence
showed that the plaintiffs chances for collection from the buyer were
not jeopardized during the six business days the bank held the
draft.' There also were findings by the trial court to support non-
recovery on the ground that the plaintiff was estopped to assert
negligence because on fifteen prior occasions he had acquiesced in,
and actually benefited from the defendant's method of collection
without complaint or objection.'
PUBLIC UTILITIES
UTILITY RATE BASES
In State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Public Service Co. of North
Carolina' the defendant Public Service Co. applied to the Utilities
Commission for approval of a rate increase designed to absorb an
increase in the price of gas by its supplier. In addition to the in-
crease in costs due to the higher price paid for gas, Public Service
introduced evidence to show additional new expenses by way of in-
creased taxes resulting from changes in the depreciation rate of its
properties, large contributions to its employee's pension fund, and
requirement of a minimum balance by creditor-banks as working
capital.
The Utilities Commission refused to allow the increase and
reinstated the old rates.2 The majority found the fair value of de-
fendant's property for rate purposes to be 16,125,000 dollars, which
would allow net income to reflect a six per cent profit at the old rate.
The minority took the view that this was an arbitrary figure and
"257 N.C. at 750, 127 S.E.2d at 509.
' The defendant had found that chances of collecting from a drawee-
buyer were better if they did not press for collection too hard, but rather
allowed the buyer a short period of time with occasional reminders.
'257 N.C. 233, 125 S.E.2d 457 (1962).
2 The Commission had allowed Public Service to collect the new rates
under bond given to make refund if the increased rates were found to be
excessive.
The rules fixing rates are set forth in G.S. §§ 62-122-34; see especially
G.S. § 62-124. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-122-34 (1960). They are discussed
in Utilities Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536, 119 8.E.2d
469 (1961); State v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 250 N.C. 421, 109 S.E.2d
253 (1959); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. State, 239 N.C. 333, 80 S.E.2d
133 (1954). See Public Utilities, Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina
Case Law, 40 N.C.L. REv. 562 (1962). See also Hanft, Control of Electric
Rates in North Carolina, 12 N.C.L. REv. 289 (1934).
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was selected only to produce such net revenue by the use of a six
per cent rate of return as the rates in effect prior to the proposed
increase. Public Service made objections to these findings and
conclusions of law. On appeal to the superior court the objections
were overruled and an order entered affirming the Commission.
Public Service appealed.
The Supreme Court held that juggling of figures as charged
in the dissent was confirmed by an examination of the record and
that the statutory right to consider "all other facts"' does not give
the Commission the right to "roam at large in an unfenced field."4
The Court noted that both the rate base and the allowable deduc-
tions were arbitrarily reduced so that net income would reflect a
six per cent profit at the old rate. For example, despite an increase
in plant investment, the new rate base was less by 325,000 dollars
than the Commission had found it in a general rate hearing con-
ducted shortly before defendant's supplier increased its price.
The Court held that the evidence failed to support the rate base
fixed by the Commission and that the additional expenses introduced
by Public Service were proper items to be considered in fixing rates.5
MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES
Pee Dee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light
Co.0 and Duke Power Co. v. Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp.
1
involved similar facts and questions of law which were decided by
the Court on a former appeal.' These cases, both decided by a unani-
mous Court, stand for the proposition that electric membership cor-
porations can continue to serve their members who were changed
from citizens of a rural area to citizens of an urban area due to
annexation. The membership corporations may not, however,
expand their services into the urban area.'
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-124 (1962).
' 257 N.C. at 237, 125 S.E.2d at 460.
'The Court also said that original cost was an item to be considered and
that the weight it should be given was a matter of judgment, but that it
should not be ignored.
'256 N.C. 56, 122 S.E.2d 761 (1961).
256 N.C. 62, 122 S.E.2d 782 (1961).
'See Pee Dee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
253 N.C. 610, 117 S.E.2d 764 (1961); Duke Power Co. v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Membership Corp., 253 N.C. 596, 117 S.E.2d 812 (1961). For a treatment of
the issues involved in the first appeal see Public Utilities, Ninth Annual Sur-
vey of North Carolina Case Law, 40 N.C.L. REv. 559 (1962).
. Pee Dee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., supra
note 8. In Duke Power Co. v. Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp., supra
1963]
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In the Pee Dee case the superior court, on remand from the
former appeal, granted sweeping injunctive provisions which were
unnecessary to protect either plaintiff or defendant from irreparable
injury. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the present appeal,
held that the judgment should be limited to an adjudication of the
respective basic legal rights of the parties as found in the earlier
decision and that injunctive relief was not required.'0
In the Duke Power Co. case the superior court couched its judg-
ment on remand in terms indicating that residency in the town of
Hudson was an essential element to the right of the membership cor-
poration to continue service to members. The Supreme Court said
that a member who was receiving current in Hudson prior to the ex-
tension of the town's boundaries may continue to receive current even
though he was not then and is not now a resident of Hudson. The
Court held the test to be: "Where is the service rendered?, not the
residence of the member.":"' The judgment was reformed to permit




In Bowers v. Mitchell,' an action to recover damages for timber
cut by the defendant, the plaintiff sought to prove title in himself by
adverse possession of the land under color of title for the statutory
period, or by deeds vesting him with his father's title allegedly
acquired by adverse possession. But he was able to show color of
title merely to separate lots and not to the entire tract.2 Furthermore,
although he showed a record chain of title for a period in excess of
thirty years, the plaintiff failed to present evidence of actual posses-
sion in his predecessors in title. Consequently, nonsuit was entirely
note 8, it was not necessary to put this limitation on the right of the member-
ship corporation to continue existing service." There was no threat by either party to interfere with the rights of the
other as adjudicated by the Court and the injunctive provisions to protect
rights which were not threatened were unnecessary.
256 N.C. at 65, 122 S.E.2d at 784.
*258 N.C. 80, 128 S.E.2d 6 (1962).
2 Possession of a single tract is not constructively extended to a separate
and distinct tract even though both tracts are described in the same con-
veyance. Id. at 82, 128 S.E.2d at 8, and cases cited therein.
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proper if the plaintiff sought to prove title by adverse possession
under color.
The case is primarily significant, however, for its abrogation, in
effect, of the proviso added in 1959 to G.S. § 1-42. That proviso
reads: "Provided that a record chain of title to the premises for a
period of thirty years next preceding the commencement of the action
shall be prima facie evidence of possession thereof within the time
required by law." The possible applicability of this proviso was
involved here because the plaintiff in the course of a completely inade-
quate attempt to show title by adverse possession had shown a record
chain of title for a period of more than thirty years. While the plain-
tiff on appeal did not suggest that he had shown prima facie title
under the proviso, the defendant alluded to the statute in his brief,
submitting that it was not applicable to the facts of the case. The
Court agreed with the defendant and set out this dictum: "Suffice
it to say, the statute does not declare that one who claims title, rely-
ing merely on a paper writing more than thirty years old, thereby
acquires title to the land .. nor does it establish title prima facie."
3
By injecting these words the Court took the opportunity to construe
a statute which could be misleading if not carefully analyzed.
It must be kept in mind that in actions where title is in issue the
plaintiff has the dual burden of showing (1) legal title, relying on the
judicial rules set forth in the leading case of Mobley v. Gri in, 4 anl
(2) possession within the requisite statutory period, as a condition
precedent to maintaining the action.5 The latter requirement arises
out of the anomalous historical development of our statutes of limita-
tion relating to possessory actions and has never had direct bearing
on the traditional methods of showing title.6 In the event that neither
plaintiff nor defendant can show the necessary possession, G.S. § 1-42
'Bowers v. Mitchell, 258 N.C. 80, 84, 128 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1962).
' 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889). This opinion lists these methods
of showing prima facie title: showing chain of title from the state; showing
adverse possession for the statutory periods; title by estoppel; and connect-
ing the defendant with a common source of title and showing a better title
in the plaintiff. The Mobley rules are still valid, except that it is no longer
necessary to prove that the sovereign has parted with its title when it is
not a party to the action. Cothran v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.C.
782, 127 S.E.2d 578 (1962). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-36 (1953).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-39 (1953). The plaintiff need not allege that
he was seized or possessed of the premises within twenty years preceding
the action. Failure so to allege is not ground for demurrer. Elliott v. Goss,
250 N.C. 185, 108 S.E.2d 475 (1959).
See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPmT § 15.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
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merely allows one party to prevail over the other by virtue of the
presumption of possession which the statute raises from a showing
of title.' Since this is the only effect of that statute, it in no way aids
a party to show the critical element of title. This must be done by
one of the judicially approved methods. The proviso is quite properly
construed as not providing a new method of showing title prima
facie.'
FUTURE INTERESTS-G.S. § 41-6
In Scott v. Jackson9 the testator devised his real and personal
property to his wife "for and during the term of her natural life,"
with a remainder over in fee to Ethel Mae, the wife's niece; but "in
the event that the said Ethel Mae Stafford should die without leav-
ing any issue or the issue of such then I devise such of my real
estate to go to my heirs." The plaintiffs, who were the heirs-at-law
of Ethel Mae (who died intestate and without issue), contended
that G.S. § 41-6 converted the word "heirs" in the defeasance clause
to "children." If the will so read, the condition over would fail
because, the testator never having had children, there was never
anyone who could qualify as the ultimate devisee. Consequently,
the plaintiffs would be the owners. The Court held, however, that
G.S. § 41-6 was inapplicable for two reasons: (1) the statute applies
qnly when the conveyance is to the heirs of a living person, and (2)
the testator had no children when the will was executed. Under the
provisions of G.S. § 31-5.5, the devise to Ethel Mae would have
been defeated by a subsequent birth of issue to the devisor. Sub-
stituting the word "children" would do violence to the obvious in-
tent of the testator, in the opinion of the Court. Ethel Mae was
'Bland v. Beasley, 145 N.C. 168, 58 S.E. 993 (1907).
'The 1959 proviso to G.S. § 1-42 was probably intended to effect a
simplified procedure for showing title prima facie, but it seems misplaced
appended to G.S. § 1-42. The Georgia statute directly achieves this result:
"A prima facie case shall be made out in actions respecting title to land
upon showing good record title for a period of 40 years, and it shall not be
necessary under such circumstances to prove title to the original grant from
the State." GA. CODE ANN. § 38-637 (1954). Proceeding even farther
than the Georgia statute, which merely permits a prima facie case to be
made out, the various "merchantability acts" seek absolutely to cut off old
claims solely on the basis of showing a chain of title for a statutory period,
unless there is a legitimate reason for preserving the claim. The purpose of
these statutes, of course, is to facilitate conveyancing. See ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 83, §§ 12.1-.4- (Supp. 1962), a forty-year merchantability statute. For
a current discussion of merchantability acts see CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAw OF PROPERTY 255-58 (1962).
p257 N.C. 658, 127 S.E.2d 234 (1962).
[Vol. 41
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
given a defeasible fee, and when she died without issue her estate
terminated. Title vested in the heirs-at-law of the devisor. This
case is the subject of a note at page 317 of this volume of the Review.
LEASES AND OPTIONS-ASSIGNABILITY
In Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlonge° the plaintiff, an assignee
of a lease containing an option to purchase, brought an action
against the original lessor for specific performance of the option
agreement. Although not contesting the assignment of the lease,
the defendant argued, in part, that the option was personal between
the original parties and was therefore non-assignable. The Court
held that the lease and option were assignable, and that the pro-
vision in the option clause that "lessors agree not to sell ... to any
person other than the lessees" was merely an affirmation of the
option.
Generally, in the absence of a statutory or contractual restriction
on assignment, a lease, including an option to purchase, is assign-
able, irrespective of the presence or absence of the word "assigns"
in the instrument.1 An option involving personal services or per-
sonal confidence is usually not assignable. 2
Inasmuch as the lease-and-option agreement is a common trans-
action, the drafting attorney should not lose sight of the well-settled
principles of law stated in this case. If the intent of the parties is
that the option is extended to the optionor exclusively, a clause
making the option non-assignable is necessary.
PERCOLATING WATERS
Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co."3 was an action for damages result-
ing from alleged wrongful acts by the defendant in interfering with
the plaintiff's water supply. The defendant, who operated a rock
quarry on land adjacent to the plaintiff's lot, pumped percolating
waters14 from the quarry in order to reach the rock. Since the
10257 N.C. 388, 126 S.E.2d 167 (1962).
"1Pearson v. Millard, 150 N.C. 303, 63 S.E. 1053 (1909); Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1034 (1956); 32 Am. JUR. Landlord & Tenant § 319 (1941).
1.-55 Am. JUR. Vendor & Purchaser § 42 (1946). But see Harry's
Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N.C. 23, 51 S.E.2d 916 (1949). A
contract of sale executed in reliance upon the personal credit of the potential
vendee is assignable in the absence of some provision in the instrument
against assignment or some circumstance judicially recognizable dehors the
agreement.
10256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962).
,"Subterranean waters are generally classified as (1) streams or bodies
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locale was a coastal area, the diminution of the fresh water supply
caused salt water to seep into the plaintiff's well, rendering it unfit
for use. Defendant conducted its operation according to the best
practices of open pit mining. Holding that the defendant's motion
for judgment of involuntary nonsuit was improperly overruled, the
Court found that the defendant was using its land in a legitimate
and natural manner, and that in this factual situation the defendant
was not chargeable with waste for not using the water it removed.
The decision applies the settled North Carolina "reasonable use"
rule'5 to a mining or quarrying situation for the first time. Briefly
stated, the rule, as accepted by an increasing number of states,"0
is that "the landowner is said to have the right only to a reasonable
and beneficial use of the waters upon the land or its percolations or
to some useful purpose connected with his occupation and enjoy-
ment .... He may consume it, but he must not waste it to the
injury of others." This rule is a departure from the common-law
doctrine"8 which holds that in the absence of malice, negligence, or
any contractual or statutory restrictions, the owner of the surface
has the absolute right to make whatever use of percolating waters
he pleases.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Logan v. Sprinkle9 was an action to have restrictive covenants
in a deed declared void. The defendant divided a tract of land into
eight lots. He sold one lot to the plaintiff and six lots to another
party, retaining one lot himself. The plaintiff's deed contained a
covenant restricting the use of his lot to residential purposes. How-
ever, the deed conveying the six lots contained a covenant restrict-
of water flowing in fixed or definite channels, the existence and location of
which are known or ascertainable from surface indications or other means
without excavations for that purpose, and (2) percolating waters, which
ooze, seep or filter through the soil beneath the surface, or which flow in a
course that is unknown or undefined, and not discoverable from surface
indications without excavations for that purpose." Jones v. Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 252 N.C. 626, 634, 114 S.E.2d 638, 644 (1960).
" See Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 14; Rouse v. City
of Kinston, 188 N.C. 1, 123 S.E. 482 (1924). See also Real Property,
Eighth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 39 N.C.L. REV. 389
(1961).
"8 See Annots., 29 A.L.R.2d 1354, 1361 (1953); 109 A.L.R. 395, 399
(1937).
"' Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 517, 165 So.
764, 769 (1936), quoted with approval in the principal case.
18 See generally 56 Am. JuR. Waters § 113 (1947).
19256 N.C. 41, 123 S.E.2d 209 (1961).
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ing their use to residential and motel purposes. When the buyer
of the six lots subsequently built a motel, other businesses had
begun to move into the previously vacant surrounding area, so
that at the time of suit the plaintiff's lot was in a predominantly
business locale. Declaring the plaintiff's covenant void, the Court
held that by expressly permitting the motel to be built, the defendant
had abandoned any intention to restrict the subdivision to resi-
dences. The defendant thereby failed to develop the subdivision
according to a uniform scheme or plan,2" which was a requisite to
continued validity of the covenants.2"
An element of uncertainty rather frequently arises in North
Carolina in cases of this kind. Is it permissible to grant release of
restrictive covenants for reason of change of condition outside the
subdivision as well as inside. The Court in the instant case stated
that the trial court "had the right to consider the changed conditions
in the immediate area, without as well as within the development."
22
But the recent case of Tull v. Doctors Bldg., Inc.23 held flatly that
evidence of change without, even when there is also evidence of
change within, is not admissible.2 4 The distinction lies in whether or
not there is.proof of a uniform plan of development.25 The defendant's
failure to effectuate a uniform residential scheme26 is, in Logan, the
Court's basis for decision. The Tull rule is thus still controlling where
a uniform plan affecting the covenanted tract is shown.
2 Consequently, the grantees of property in the subdivision have no right
to enforce restrictions inter se. Maples v. Horton, 239 N.C. 394, 80 S.E.2d
38 (1954); Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N.C. 290, 37 S.E.2d 895 (1946); Hum-
phrey v. Beall, 215 N.C. 15, 200 S.E. 918 (1939).
21 See East Side Builders, Inc. v. Brown, 234 N.C. 517, 67 S.E.2d 489
(1951); Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 710
(1946); Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N.C. 74, 138 S.E. 408 (1927).
2 Logan v. Sprinkle, 256 N.C. 41, 48, 123 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1961).
Accord, Muilenburg v. Blevins, 242 N.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 493 (1955); Elrod
v. Phillips, 214 N.C. 472, 199 S.E. 722 (1938). See also Shuford v. Ashe-
ville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956); Snyder v. Caldwell, 207
N.C. 626, 178 S.E. 83 (1935); Oldham v. McPheeters, 203 N.C. 141, 164
S.E. 731 (1932); Higgins v. Hough, 195 N.C. 652, 143 S.E. 212 (1928);
Starkey v. Gardner, supra note 21.
22255 N.C. 23, 120 S.E.2d 817 (1961), noted in 41 N.C.L. Rnv. 147
(1962).
"Accord, Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949); Vernon
v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 710 (1946); Brenizer
v. Stephens, 220 N.C. 395, 17 S.E.2d 471 (1941).
25 See cases cited note 22 supra.
"The Court distinguished Tull v. Doctors Bldg., Inc., 255 N.C. 23, 120
S.E.2d 817 (1961) and Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58,
36 S.E.2d 710 (1946) on this point.
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SALES
EXPRESS WARRANTY
Failure to List Existing Liens on Motor Vehicle Title Certificate
In Seymour v. W. S. Boyd Sales Co.' the defendant sold a used
tractor truck to the plaintiff under a conditional sales agreement.
In the contract of sale the defendant represented that there were no
liens or encumbrances on the tractor, when in fact there was a New
York fuel tax lien existing at the time of the sale. After he was
denied an operating license in New York because of the lien, the
plaintiff requested the defendant to have the lien removed, which
the latter promptly agreed to do. After some delay, and without
discharging the lien, the defendant informed the plaintiff that no
further payments on the truck would be necessary until the lien was
removed. Several weeks later the defendant repossessed the truck
without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff. Held, plaintiff
has alleged facts sufficient to support a cause of action for breach of
warranty of title.
It is firmly established that in the sale of personal property
there is an implied warranty that the seller has good title, which
includes a warranty against liens, charges, and encumbrances.2
Moreover, in North Carolina every seller of a motor vehicle, when
he endorses and assigns the title, warrants that the title is good.
He must also list all liens and encumbrances. Failure to list an
existing lien is a warranty that it does not exist. Thus, the defend-
ant's failure to list the New York fuel tax lien was an express
warranty against such lien.
Reliance
Another problem of warranty arose in the case of Garner v.
Kearns.3 The plaintiff sold to the defendant his automobile dealer-
ship and franchise, including all stock and equipment. This suit
was for the balance of the purchase price. The defendant counter-
claimed in breach of express warranty4 that the parts and equip-
1 257 N.C. 603, 127 S.E.2d 265 (1962). Also discussed under DAMAGES,
Breach of Warranty, supra.
' J.I. Case Co. v. Cox, 207 N.C. 759, 178 S.E. 585 (1935); Martin v.
McDonald, 168 N.C. 232, 84 S.E. 258 (1915).
257 N.C. 149, 125 S.E.2d 390 (1962).
'Defendant's original theory was partial failure of consideration. On trial
he shifted to an express warranty theory. The Court held neither theory
tenable.
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ment were not worth what the plaintiff had represented. The evi-
dence showed that the defendant had conducted the business for
about a year before he took his first inventory. At that time he
found a shortage in the amount of parts, but made no complaints
to the plaintiff. There was additional evidence that the defendant
had checked the parts and equipment at the time of the sale.
In affirming a nonsuit of the counterclaim the Court held, in
a per curiam opinion, that the defendant's own evidence showed he
had not relied on the alleged representations of the defendant.
Therefore, no cause of action for breach of express warranty lay.5
Mere representation of fact is not an express warranty, giving rise
to a claim for damages when the fact proves false, unless there has
been reliance on its verity.6
IMPLIED WARRANTY
Seller's Knowledge of Buyer's Use
In Boy v. Riddle Airlines, Inc7 the plaintiffs bought from the
defendant the fuselage and center section of a wrecked plane which
defendant had purchased from the United States Air Force. The
plaintiffs intended to rebuild it and sell it in South America. When
they applied for a license from the Federal Aviation Agency, they
found that the defendant had agreed with the Air Force at the time
of the original sale that the parts would not be used in a rebuilt air-
craft. Because of this agreement the FAA refused to grant a license
for any plane built with the parts. The plaintiffs, contending the
parts had no value except as scrap, sued on implied and express
warranty.
The Supreme Court, reversing a judgment of involuntary non-
suit, held that the evidence, considered in a light most favorable to
the plaintiffs, established knowledge in the defendant of the special
purpose for which plaintiffs were purchasing the parts. This knowl-
edge would render the defendant liable on implied warranty.
In the usual case, where the seller knows of the buyer's special
purpose in making the purchase, there is an implied warranty that
the goods are reasonably fit for such purpose.' Here, while the
'Smith v. Alphin, 150 N.C. 425, 64 S.E. 210 (1909).
'Smith v. Reed, 141 Wis. 483, 124 N.W. 489 (1910).
256 N.C. 392, 124 S.E.2d 118 (1962).
8 Jones v. Siler City Mills, Inc., 250 N.C. 527, 108 S.E.2d 917 (1959);
Southern Box & Lumber Co. v. Home Chair Co., 250 N.C. 71, 108 S.E.2d
70 (1959).
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fuselage and center section was reasonably fit for the purpose of,
constructing a rebuilt plane, it was worthless for that purposep since
no license could be obtained for the finished product due to the
seller's own agreement with the Air Force-a fact peculiarly within
his knowledge. The Court was of the opinion that the doctrine of
implied warranty should be extended rather than restricted. To
stiicfly apply the rule of caveat emptor is inconsistent with the
principles underlying modern trade and commerce.' 0
TAXATION
SALES TAX
In Piedmont Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Johnson' the taxpayer oper-
ated vending machines which dispensed items costing less than ten
cents each to the purchaser. The Commissioner of Revenue con-
tended that the taxpayer was liable for the three per cent North
Carolina retail sales tax on these sales. The taxpayer argued that
the sales tax is a consumer's tax, and since the "retail bracket sys-
tem" specifically states that no tax is to be collected from the con-
sumer on sales of less than ten cents,' it is not liable for the tax.
The Court held for the Commissioner, affirming the result reached
by the lower court.
" In "support of its contention that the sales tax is a tax on the
consumer, the taxpayer cited certain language in a report filed in
1956 by the Tax Study Commission. In this report the Commis-
sion recommended, as one of the fundamental policies of the retail
sales tax law, that it be "a tax levied against the consumer . . . to
be.collected from him by the retailer and paid to the State."" The
'The seller is still liable for implied warranty even though the goods
can be reasonably used for another purpose. The S.S. Angelo Toso, 271
Fed. 245 (3d Cir. 1921). There, coal was bought for steam ships. While
th6 coal was merchantable for some purposes, it was unsuitable for steam
ships and the seller was held liable.
I ."UNIFORM SALES AcT, § 15(1) provides that "where a buyer, expressly
6r by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which
the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose." The principal case thus appears to be in accord with the Uniform
Sales Act, even though it has not yet been adopted in North Carolina.
, 256 N.C. 155, 123 S.E.2d 582 (1962).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.10 (1958).
8'[1956] REPORT OF THE TAx STUDY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NORTH,
CAROLINA 43.
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Court, however, felt that the legislature did not follow the recom-
mendation of the Commission when it revised the statute in 1957.4
The legislature provided, as the Court pointed out, that this
tax shall be a privilege or license tax upon the retailer ;' that it shall
be imposed in addition to all other license or privilege taxes ;' and
that it shall be collected from the retailer and paid by him.7 From
these provisions, the Court concluded that the legislative intent had
been expressed in clear and unambiguous terms.8
However, there is other language set forth in the retail sales tax
provisions which indicate a contrary legislative intent. G.S. § 105-
164.7 provides in part as follows:
Said tax shall be stated and charged separately from the
* sales price and shown separately on the retailer's sales rec-
ords and shall be paid by the purchaser to the retailer as trus-
tee for and on account of the state and the retailer shall be liable
for the collection thereof and for its payment to the Com-
missioner and the retailer's failure to charge to or collect said
tax from the purchaser shall not affect such liability. It is the
purpose and intent of this article that the tax herein levied
and imposed shall... be borne and passed on to the customer,
instead of being borne by the retailer.'
The legislature further provided that it was a misdemeanor for a
retailer to offer to absorb the tax.10 After setting forth the retail.
bracket system containing language which makes its use by the
retailer mandatory, the same statutory section goes on to provide
that the "use of the above bracket does not relieve the retailer from
the duty and liability to remit to the Commissioner an amount equal
to three per cent (3%) of the gross receipts derived from all taxable
retail sales during the taxable period."' Thus, it seems that the
lkgislature has indicated an intent that the retailer act merely as a
dollection agent of the tax for the state and as such agent, the
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1340, § 5.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4 (1958).'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.2 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(5)
(1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(4) (1958).
'Hedrick v. Graham, 245 N.C. 249, 96 S.E.2d 129 (1957); City of Raleigh
v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 223 N.C. 286, 26 S.E.2d 573 (1943).
'Emphasis added.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.9 (1958). Quaere why such a provision
would be enacted if the tax was actually one upon the retailer.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.10 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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retailer is faced with the duty and liability of remission of the tax
to the Commissioner.
The taxpayer also contended that the statute as applied discrimi-
nates against retailers who sell merchandise through vending ma-
chines and, therefore, violates the due process clause of the North
Carolina Constitution and the due process and equal protection
clauses of the federal constitution. The Court in rejecting this con-
tention relied on a case in which the Supreme Court of Washington
held that a similar statute was reasonable and was "designed to
accomplish the purposes of the tax law as effectively as possible
... "1 The Washington court pointed out that the use of the
bracket system may sometimes result in inequities, but the statute
makes no attempt to discriminate among sellers nor to provide an
arbitrary or unreasonable classification.
The Court seems to have correctly decided the constitutional
question raised since inequities are sometimes to be expected in our
tax laws.13 In regard to its construction of the retail sales tax pro-
visions, it may be conceded that there is internal contradiction to
some extent in the statute. However, the overall language of the
statute together with its practical operation support the conclusion
that the retail sales tax is a tax on the consumer. Such a con-
clusion would eliminate the harsh, although constitutional, inequity
which the result of the principal case incorporates into the sales tax
law.
GIFT AND INcomE TAx
In Boylan-Pearce, Inc. v. Johnson 4 an action was brought by a
family corporation to recover gift and income taxes assessed as a
result of payments made to the widow of the corporation's former
president and director. The decedent had served as president of the
corporation from 1940 until his death in May of 1958. In June of
1959 the board of directors of the corporation adopted a resolution
to pay the widow of the decedent 36,000 dollars over a two year
" White v. State, 49 Wash. 2d 716, 727, 306 P.2d 230, 236 (1957)." The United States Supreme Court has said that it is not necessary
"that government in levying a graduated tax upon all the members of a class
must satisfy itself by inquiry that every group within the class will be able
to pay the tax without the sacrifice of profits. The operation of a general
rule will seldom be the same for every one. If the accidents of trade lead to
inequality or hardship, the consequences must be accepted as inherent in
government by law instead of government by edict." Fox v. Standard Oil of
New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87, 102 (1934).' 257 N.C. 582, 126 S.E.2d 492 (1962).
[Vol. 41
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
period. The corporation deducted these payments as business
expenses on its North Carolina income tax returns in the years of
payment (1959 and 1960). The Commissioner disallowed the
deduction and contended that the payments were taxable gifts by
the corporation to the widow.'5 The Court in affirming the lower
court's decision in favor of the corporate taxpayer stated:
We attach no legal significance to the fact there was no pre-
existing plan or policy, or to the fact the resolution authoriz-
ing the payments was not adopted until June 26, 1959, or to
the fact plaintiff is a so-called 'family corporation.' At
most, these facts are of evidentiary significance in determin-
ing the nature of the employer's payments.16
In reaching this result the Court relied upon G.S. § 105-147 (23)
which provides that in computing net income there shall be allowed
as a deduction
the amount of the salary or other compensation of an em-
ployee which is paid for a period of not more than twenty-
four months after the employee's death to his estate, widow
or heirs provided such payment is made in recognition of
services rendered by the employee prior to his death and is
reasonable in amount."
5 The widow on her North Carolina tax returns claimed that the payments
were a gift to her from the corporation and not taxable compensation. The
Court would not directly say that the widow had to bear the tax burden on
the amount of the payments exceeding $5000, but there is dictum indicating
this as the result.
1 257 N.C. 582, 592, 126 S.E.2d 492, 499-500 (1962). The Commissioner
contended that payments by an employer are deductible only when there is a
legal obligation to make such payments. The Court refuted this by pointing
out that the 1957 amendment would be meaningless if the Commissioner was
correct since prior to 1957 the discharge of legal obligations to compensate
employees was clearly deductible under G.S. § 105-147.
"' This provision was recommended by the 1956 Tax Study Commission
and was enacted by the 1957 legislature. [1956] REPORT OF THE TAX STUDY
COMlISSION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 23; N.C. Sess. Laws 1957,
ch. 1340, § 4(au). In conjunction with this new provision the 1957" legis-
lature made an addition to G.S. § 105-141 (a) to provide that these payments
shall be income to the payee subject to a $5000 exclusion. N.C. Sess. Laws
1957, ch. 1340, § 4(q). In making this recommendation, the Tax Study
Commission considered it "to be desirable to encourage such payments. Such
encouragement is best accomplished by a tax deduction to the employer. It
is not believed desirable, however, to allow unlimited deductions of this
type." [1956] REPORT OF THE TAx STUDY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA 23. For a comparable federal income tax provision deal-
ing with an exclusion to the payee see INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 101 (b).
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This decision should make the statute one of popular use. It
should be pointed out, however, that the taxpayer has the burden
of proving both the purpose of these payments and that they were
"reasonable in amount." The assumption should not be made that
because the Commissioner did not contest the reasonableness of
the payments in the instant case, he will not do so in future cases
involving this statutory provision.
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE
Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law
When the plaintiff's own evidence shows that his negligence was
a proximate cause of the injury of which he complains, he will be
deemed contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Jenkins v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,' where the plaintiff did not heed a stop
sign at a crossing, but relied solely on the fact that he had heard no
train whistle, and in Carter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,2 where the
momentum of the plaintiff's car carried him into the path of a train
even though he had begun applying his brakes when thirty feet from
the track, the Court so held.
On the other hand, the Court will not find contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law when reasonable minds might differ as to
the effect of the plaintiff's conduct. In Johnson v. Southern Ry.
the trial court granted a nonsuit when the plaintiff's evidence showed
that even though he had stopped thirty feet before reaching the track
at a point where his view was unobstructed and the automatic
signaling device at the crossing was not working, it would have
been possible for him to have gotten a later view of the track. The
Court reversed because "the failure of automatic signal lights at a
railroad crossing to work has the tendency to abate the ordinary
caution of a traveler on the highway, and... he has a right to place
some reliance on such failure."4
-258 N.C. 58, 127 S.E.2d 778 (1962).
2256 N.C. 545, 124 S.E.2d 561 (1962).
-257 N.C. 712, 127 S.E.2d 521 (1962), affirming 255 N.C. 386, 121
S.E.2d 580 (1961). The trial judge granted a second nonsuit because he
thought the earlier decision had been based on the Court's belief that plaintiff
had stopped his vehicle and looked and listened at the best vantage point
available to him. Id. at 715-16, 127 S.E.2d at 524.
'257 N.C. at 716, 127 S.E.2d at 524.
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If a train and a car reach a crossing at the same time, the train
has the right-of-way.5 For this reason the motorist has a duty to
look and listen before attempting to cross. When, however, the
circumstances are such that looking and listening make difficult the
discovery of the train's presence, the motorist is under no duty to
turn around and go the other way or to go upon the track and look
before crossing.6 Rather, he may rely on a warning from the train
of its approach, and if no warning is forthcoming, his presence on
the track when the train approaches is not necessarily negligence.
An automatic signal light is a method adopted by the railroad to
give this warning, and the Court was correct in holding that the
question of the plaintiff's prudence was for the jury.
Effect of Misplaced Stop Signs
Kelly v. Ashburn7 clarifies the Court's holding in Tucker v.
Moorfields concerning the rights and duties of motorists entering
an intersection at the same time. Ordinarily when two vehicles
reach an intersection at approximately the same time the driver of
the vehicle on the left must yield to the vehicle on the right.' How-
ever, when either the State Highway Commission or local authori-
ties have designated a street under their jurisdiction a through
highway by erecting stop signs regulating secondary streets, the
driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection on the secondary
street must stop and yield the right-of-way.' ° In other jurisdictions
with similar rules, once a street has been designated a main thorough-
fare such status is not lost merely because the sign on an intersecting
street has become illegible, destroyed or otherwise removed."
In Tucker, however, the Court said that if a stop sign had been
erected pursuant to authority other than that designated in G.S. § 20-
158 (a),"2 motorists would have no right to rely on the fact that they
believed a sign to .belong there, but could only rely on the actual
"From the character and momentum of a railroad train, and the require-
ment of public travel by means thereof, it cannot be expected that it will
stop and give precedence .... ." Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead,
95 U.S. 161, 164 (1877).
'E.g., Norton v. North Carolina R.R., 122 N.C. 910, 29 S.E. 886 (1898).
"256 N.C. 338, 123 S.E.2d 775 (1962).
"250 N.C. 340, 108 S.E.2d 637 (1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-155(a) (Supp. 1961).
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-158(a) (Supp. 1961).
"1E.g., Jones v. McCullough, 148 Kan. 561, 83 P.2d 669 (1938); Schmit
v. Jansen, 247 Wis. 648, 20 N.W.2d 542 (1946).
2 See note 9 supra.
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physical presence of the sign.1" Since the stop sign was not in place
at the time of the collision, the driver of the vehicle on the left was
negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way and would be liable if
the jury found this to be a proximate cause of the collision. 4
In Kelly a stop sign had been originally erected by proper au-
thority but was not in place at the time of the collision. The defend-
ant had known that the stop sign was normally there, but the trial
judge gave preemptory instructions to the effect that the driver of
the vehicle approaching from the left was negligent unless there had
actually been a stop sign in place at the time of the collision giving
notice to the driver approaching from the right. The Supreme Court
reversed because a motorist traveling on a favored highway does not
lose his right to assume that he has the right-of-way if the stop sign
governing the secondary highway has been removed unless he has
actual or constructive notice of the removal.'" He may be found to
be negligent, however, if other circumstances indicate that a reason-
able man would have yielded.
Joint Tortfeasors
Technically, either concert of action or breach of a joint duty is
essential to the commission of a joint tort;6 however, the term has
been extended to include situations where a single indivisible injury
is sustained as a result of the independent, concurring, tortious acts
of two or more persons.'" If the act of either person alone would
250 N.C. at 343, 108 S.E.2d at 639.
14 Since this same motorist crossed the intersection at least once a week
in the course of his employment and since the sign had been down for ap-
proximately two months before the collision, he would probably have been
liable absent this holding. However, the Court makes clear the fact that
the decision will be considered to have turned on the failure of lawful
authority for the original placing of the stop sign in Kelly where it said
that "decision was based on the premise the evidence affirmatively showed
the sign to have been erected by the city engineer on account of a special
hazard and not by either the State Highway Commission or the local
authorities (the governing body of the city) as specified in G.S. § 20-158(a),
leaving G.S. § 20-155 (a) applicable." 256 N.C. at 343, 123 S.E.2d at 778.
" Bobbitt, J., dissented because he thought the motorist should have had
to sustain the burden of bringing himself within the exception by showing
that he had reasonable grounds to believe that there was a stop sign giving
him the right-of-way at the time of the collision.
1 Bost v. Metcalfe, 219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648 (1941). "Strictly
speaking, the words 'joint tort' should be used only where the behavior of
two or more tort-feasors is such as to make it proper to treat the conduct of
each as the conduct of the others as well." 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 10.1,
at 692 (1956)."'Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962); Rouse v.
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have caused the indivisible injury, joint and several liability for the
entire damage is almost uniformly imposed.18 The same is true
when no damage would have been caused except for the concurring
negligent acts. 9 Such is the situation when the independent negli-
gence of two drivers causes their vehicles to collide injuring the
plaintiff, and North Carolina holds the drivers jointly and severally
liable.2" However, in the event of a chain collision where the negli-
gence of several drivers causes more than one collision, it may be
said that some damage would have been done even if one or more
of the drivers had not been negligent. In this situation, the problem
is different in nature from that presented in the two-car collision
because the harm is, at least theoretically, divisible.
The recent case of Fo% v. Hollar2l illustrates the difficulty that
is presented when two collisions occur in close proximity. Plaintiff
was riding in the car of A when it slid into the center of the highway
and collided with a truck being driven by B. The impact of this
collision knocked the car of A into the car of C which had been
following it before the first collision. Plaintiff suffered severe per-
sonal injuries and sued A, B and C as joint tortfeasors. The trial
judge granted C's motion for nonsuit despite evidence that he had
been following too closely, and the jury found for A and B on the
issues of their negligence. On appeal the Court affirmed the verdict
but reversed the nonsuit making this statement:
[P]laintiff can no longer proceed upon the theory that his
injuries were the cumulative effect of successive, joint and
concurring torts, but he is entitled to show, if he can, that
Jones, 254 N.C. 575, 119 S.E.2d 628 (1961); Evans v. Johnson, 225 N.C.
238, 34 S.E.2d 73 (1945) ; Cunningham v. Haynes, 214 N.C. 456, 19.9 S.E.
627 (1938).
S E.g., Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902) (horses
frightened when two motorcycles passed plaintiff on different sides at the
same time); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.R.R., 146 Minn. 430,
179 N.W. 45 (1920) (defendant's fire combined with fire of unknown
origin). Analogous, but distinguishable because only a single bullet strikes
the victim, are cases where joint and several liability has been imposed
when several hunters fire at a single object or movement and discover a
dead body in the spot at which they aimed. E.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.
2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
" E.g., Town of Sharon v. Anahma Realty Corp., 97 Vt. 336, 126 At.
192 (1924) (pier of one defendant and dam of another together caused an
ice jam).
"E.g., Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962). Also
discussed in DAMAGES, Collateral Recovery, and EVIDENCE, Spontaneous
Statements and Res Gestae, supra.
2- 257 N.C. 65, 125 S.E.2d 334 (1962).
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negligence on the part of the defendant... [C] proximately
caused him injury. He can recover from . . . [C] for only
those injuries he may have suffered in the collision between
... [A's] car and... [C's] car.22
If taken literally, the statement indicates that the plaintiff may
only recover if he shows exactly what injury he suffered in each
collision; however, when considered in context the statement may
be the first step toward the recognition of an important distinction
applicable to joint and several liability. But before this distinction
may be discussed, three aspects of the Court's statement must be
clarified: (1) C's liability for the consequences of his negligent act
is in no way affected by the culpability of A and B for their acts ;2"
(2) the acts of the defendants need not be simultaneous to be "con-
current";24 and (3) the problem should be considered as one of
actual cause.25 Accordingly it may be said that the liability of C
turns on the Court's attitude toward joint tortfeasors in a situation
where the acts of each is responsible for part, but not all, of the total
injury.
The general rule applicable in situations where the acts of inde-
pendent parties combine to produce an injury, but where neither
causes the entire injury, is that each is responsible only for that
portion of the injuries attributable to his own negligence.2" One
Id. at 71, 125 S.E.2d at 338.
Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 276, 8 A.2d 201, 204 (1939); 4 RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 879, comment (1939). If only one of the drivers is negligent,
he is responsible for all damage, but if both are negligent, either is responsi-
ble for all damage, irrespective of the comparative degree of fault between
them. Cunningham v. Haynes, 214 N.C. 456, 199 S.E. 627 (1938).
" Hill v. Perex, 76 Cal. App. 74, 28 P.2d 946 (1934); McHorney v.
Wooten, 234 N.C. 110, 66 S.E.2d 692 (1951); Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C.
107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951) ; Micelli v. Hirsh, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 426, 83 N.E.2d
240 (1948); Roush v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 80 S.E.2d 857 (1954).
Contra, Frye v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich. 466, 239 N.W. 886 (1932).
"North Carolina regards proximate cause as that cause which produces
the resulting injury through a continuous sequence, without which the
injury would not have occurred, and from which any man of ordinary
prudence could have foreseen that such a result was probable under the
existing facts. E.g., Mattingly v. North Carolina R.R., 253 N.C. 746, 117
S.E.2d 844 (1961); Boone v. North Carolina R.R., 240 N.C. 152, 81
S.E.2d 380 (1954). Consequently it is correct to use "proximate" in this
situation; however, there is no question but that such a result was fore-
seeable. The problem is whether the negligence was in fact a cause. See
Micelli v. Hirsh, supra note 24.
",Glen v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P.2d 165 (1952); Garret v.
Garret, 228 N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948); Rice v. McAdams, 149 N.C.
29, 62 S.E. 774 (1908); Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430,
78 S.W. 93 (1905).
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result of this rule has been that the plaintiff is sometimes denied any
recovery at all because he cannot show the amount caused by each,
even though he can show that each did cause some damage.2T
Probably because of this harsh consequence, many jurisdictions, in-
cluding North Carolina, have recognized exceptions in certain fact
situations. One of these exceptions is that drivers whose negligence
combines to cause a collision are held jointly and severally liable"
even though the conduct of one driver was seriously wrongful and
that of the other "mere" negligence.
In other jurisdictions, the problem has turned on whether the
damages are apportionable. Where they usually are not as a practi-
cal matter, as in automobile collisions, 0 the plaintiff must only
show that each of the defendants contributed to the harm in order
to be allowed a joint and several recovery. However, either of the
defendants may reduce his liability by proving to the jury's satisfac-
tion that his negligence definitely was not the cause of a specific
part of the injury. If this reasoning is applied to the facts of the
Fox case, the Court's statement becomes understandable in another
light. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that B's truck was
being driven at a considerable rate of speed just before the first colli-
sion occurred, whereas all the evidence indicated that C's car was
moving slowly at the time it collided with A's car. Moreover, the
evidence showed that A's car had not been extensively damaged in
the collision with C's car. Under these circumstances, it may well
be that the jury would find that C had shown he was not responsible
for much of the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Due to the circumstances of this case it is difficult to predict
what the Court will do in the future. Perhaps it will consider
negligent drivers causing successive collisions jointly and severally
liable without allowing them to attempt to prove to the jury that
they were not responsible for all the damage, as it has done in the
past ;31 however, this does not seem to be the most desirable state
"'E.g., Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., supra note 26..8 Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N.C. 515, 11 S.E.2d 721 (1940); Myers v.
Southern Public Util. Co., 208 N.C. 293, 180 S.E. 694 (1935); West v.
Collins Baking Co., 208 N.C. 526, 181 S.E. 551 (1935).
" Cunningham v. Haynes, 214 N.C. 456, 199 S.E. 627 (1938).
"0 Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961) (facts
strikingly similar to those in Fox). See also Landers v. East Texas Salt
Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952), discussed in 34
N.C.L. REv. 137 (1957).
"' Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951); Lewis v.
Hunter, 212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814 (1937); West v. Collins Baking Co.,
1963J
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of affairs even if it is the simplest. Certainly, it would not be de-
sirable for the Court to interpret such language literally. The right
of an injured person to full compensation must be balanced against
the right of the other party to pay only that which he should justly
be compelled to pay. As long as the burden is on the defendant to
show that he should not be held responsible for the entire damage,
the rights of the plaintiff are protected. Moreover, such a rule would
be analogous to that applied when the negligent act of the defendant
aggravates and adds to an already existing injury and, therefore,
should not be contrary to public policy. 2
Liability of Insurer for Agent's Failure to Deliver Policy
There is a sharp split of authority on whether or not an insur-
ance company is under a legal duty to act upon an application for
insurance with reasonable diligence. Some courts have said that
the insurer is a mere offeree and under no duty to act on the applica-
tion at all;"3 others have held that the insurer does have such a duty
though they support this conclusion with different theories. 4 In
Fox v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co.35 North Carolina apparently
adopted the latter view by holding the defendant liable for its agent's
negligence in failing to deliver the policy to the insured. The ra-
tionale was that "the liability of the agent for negligently failing to
perform his duties is clear, and the defendant is also liable for the
acts and omissions of its agent within the scope of his employ-
208 N.C. 526, 181 S.E. 551 (1935); Hodgin v. North Carolina Public Serv.
Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102 S.E. 748 (1920).
"Wise v. Carter, 119 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1960). See Cauble v. Hill,
257 N.C. 120, 125 S.E.2d 322 (1962); Dempster v. Fite, 203 N.C. 697, 167
S.E. 33 (1932).
" National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 122 Ark. 179, 182 S.W.
547 (1916); Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 165 Atl. 686
(1933); Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487
(1929); Thornton v. National Council Jr. O.U.O.M., 110 W. Va. 412, 158
S.E. 507 (1931).
" DeFord v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049
(1924), later appeal 81 Colo. 518, 256 Pac. 317 (1927) (duty arises upon
payment of premium); Duffie v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Ia. 19, 139 N.W.
1087 (1913) (duty arises because business of insurance is affected with a
public interest); Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442,
121 Pac. 329 (1912) (implied contract); Berkin v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940) (duty imposed because of in-
surer's superior bargaining position); Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923) (implied contract).
* 185 N.C. 121, 116 S.E. 266, later appeal, 186 N.C. 763, 119 S.E. 172
(1923).
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ment."'3  Consequently if the jury found unreasonable delay in
delivery, the defendant would be liable. However, a strong dissent37
pointed out that the application had specifically stated that the policy
was to take effect only upon the payment of the premium and that
by imposing this duty the Court had obligated the defendant to a
contract when the plaintiff's intestate was at liberty to reject the
policy. Moreover, a concurring opinion" pointed out that the agent
was guilty of a breach of duty only because he had promised prompt
delivery when the plaintiff's intestate told him that he was ready to
pay the premium. It was this split that caused the Court to later
express doubt as to the authority of the decision. 9
In 1962 the Court decided Blackman v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.40 in
a most unusual manner in light of the questionable status of Fox.
Plaintiff's intestate was required to purchase life insurance in order
to obtain a loan. An officer of the bank was also an agent of the
defendant insurance company, and he filled out the application and
submitted it to the defendant. The application was approved and a
standard policy was returned to the agent. Several days later the
plaintiff's intestate was killed in an automobile accident. No action
had been taken to complete negotiations on either the loan or the
insurance, and defendant denied liability on the policy. The litiga-
tion in question ensued and the trial judge sustained a demurrer.
On appeal the plaintiff's brief relied on Fox exclusively, and much
of defendant's brief was directed at distinguishing Fox and arguing
that it should be overruled. The Court made no mention of Fox
and only said that "the court properly sustained the demurrers for
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action in tort based on
the negligent failure to deliver the insurance policy."41 The rest of
the opinion discussed a possible action on a contract theory.4
3
0 Id. at 125, 116 S.E. at 268.
37 185 N.C. at 130, 116 S.E. at 271 (Stacy, J.).
Id. at 127, 116 S.E. at 269 (Adams, J.).
""The Fox case was the subject of sharp debate .... But it is unnec-
essary for us to determine whether the Fox case was correctly decided or
not . . . ." Sturgill v. New York Life Ins. Co., 195 N.C. 34, 36-37, 141
S.E. 280, 282 (1928).
,0256 N.C. 261, 123 S.E.2d 467 (1962).
"Id. at 262, 123 S.E.2d at 469.
42 The Court's reasoning here was that the lender may have been obli-
gated under the loan contract to pay the premium out of the money to be
loaned as it had other expenses, but the Court says: "There may or may
not be reason why it could not and should not deduct the premium due on
the insurance policy in the same manner it had deducted other expenses."
256 N.C. at 263, 123 S.E.2d at 469. This case is discussed in INSURANCE,
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Obviously, the problem needs to be re-examined. Insurance
companies must calculate premiums on ascertainable contingencies,
and both they and future applicants for insurance would be benefited
by a definite answer. It may be that the Blackman case overrules
the position taken in Fox but who can tell? Moreover, even if it
does not, the question needs to be discussed in light of the public
policy considerations involved.
4 3
Liability of Parent for Tort of Child
In Langford v. Shu44 the Court held a parent liable for injuries
resulting from a practical joke played by her son. The plaintiff
suffered injuries while fleeing from a furry object which she had
been induced to believe was a mongoose. Actually the furry object
was a foxtail which the son had sprung from a box labeled "Danger,
African Mongoose, Live Snake Eater." The mother had known
that plaintiff was afraid of such animals and that her son was
talking to the plaintiff about the contents of the box.
With one exception,45 North Carolina is in accord with the
common-law rule that the mere relation of parent and child does
not impose liability on the parent for the torts of the child.4" How-
ever, liability has been imposed on parents where they failed to
exercise their power of control over the child under circumstances
which indicated, or reasonably should have indicated, that the child
Life Insurance, supra. Assuming that the lender had reason not to deduct
the premium, why would the plaintiff not have a cause of action in tort? Is
this decision not res judicata as to the defendant's tort liability?
IS Of these the theory that the insurer has a duty to act upon an applica-
tion with reasonable care if the premium was paid when the application
was made seems the best solution. See, e.g., Swentusky v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 116 Conn. 526, 165 Atl. 686 (1933). After all, in most cases where
the first premium is not submitted with the application, no sale has been
made, and it does not seem that public policy demands that insurance com-
panies be subjected to this type of litigation without something more to base
the insured's reliance on than an application. On the other hand, however,
very few persons will pay a premium when the application is being sub-
mitted unless they have already definitely decided to buy the insurance.
To these the insurance company owes more than the legal duty generally
owed by an offeree. There can be no question that there is an unequal
bargaining position, and there is none of the pressure on the insurance
company that the normal offeree has on him to act with diligence.
"'258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (Supp. 1961) specifies a liability of parents
to a maximum of $500 for malicious or wilful destruction of property by
any minor under eighteen living with his parents. The statute is commented
on in 40 N.C.L. Rav. 619 (1962).
" 'E.g., Hawes v. Haynes, 219 N.C. 535, 14 S.E.2d 503 (1941).
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was likely to commit a negligent act.47 In such a case the basis of
liability is the negligence of the parent.
The negligence in Langford was the mother's breach of her duty
not to subject the plaintiff "to a fright which, in the exercise of due
care or reasonable foresight, she should have known was likely to
result in some injury to her,"48 and the Court said that she should
have foreseen that her son would play the joke because "to reach any
other conclusion would be to ignore the propensities of little boys,
who, since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, have
delighted to stampede timorous ladies with snakes . . . and other
rewarding creatures which hold no terror for youngsters."
49
Spreading Fires-Proving Their Origin
If the negligence of a person- causes a fire to originate on his'
property, North Carolina holds him liable for the damage done by
the spread of the fire to the property of another.Y On 'the other
hand, the owner is ordinarily not liable for the spread of such a fire
to the property of another if it is accidentally started by the act of a
stranger or by some other cause with which he has no connection.5'
However, the owner may be liable even though he is not responsible
for the starting of the fire if he has left his property in an unsafe
condition so that a fire may easily become ignited thereon.52 Courts
usually consider the distinguishing factor here to be that the condition
of the premises is one of the actual causes of the fire.53
' Lane v. Chatam, 251 N.C. 400, 111 S.E.2d 598 (1959).
8 258 N.C. at 139, 128 S.E.2d at 212.
" Id. at 140, 128 S.E.2d at 213.
"Royal v. Dodd, 177 N.C. 206, 98 S.E. 599 (1919); Brady v. Wacca-
maw Lumber Co., 175 N.C. 704, 95 S.E. 483 (1918). Negligence is in-
ferred if the cause of the fire is an instrumentality under the control of the
defendant at the time the fire originates. Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235,
111 S.E. 177 (1922) (boiler); Simmons v. John L. Roper Co., 174 N.C.
220, 93 S.E. 736 (1917) (locomotive).
" McBee v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 171 N.C. 111, 8 S.E. 985 (1916);
Kemp v. Norfolk S.R.R., 169 N.C. 731, 86 S.E. 621 (1915); Hamburg-
Bremem Fire Ins. Co., 132 N.C. 75, 43 S.E. 548 (1903).
5" Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735
(1925) (lightning caused a molten insulator to fall among drying grass
and decaying vegetation). Accord, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Berry,
188 Ark. 431, 65 S.W.2d 533 (1933); Menth v. Breez Corp., 4 N.J. 428,
73 A.2d 183 (1950).
8 "If the right of way beneath the tower had been free of inflammable
matter, the moulten mass and fragments of the shattered insulator would
have quickly cooled, and no harm would have resulted to the plaintiff." Id.
at 672, 130 S.E. at 739.
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In Maharias v. Weathers Bros. Moving & Storage14 a fire started
in the northwestern part of the defendant's warehouse and spread
to the plaintiff's restaurant which was located approximately four
feet to the North. The only evidence tending to establish the cause
of the fire was the opinion of an assistant fire chief who had examined
the premises of the defendant after the fire. He had found an over-
turned metal cabinet, evidence of burned rags, and about a half-bushel
of charred rags piled in the northwest corner on which there was some
type of furniture polish. He stated that the cause of the fire could
have been the spontaneous combustion of these rags, but on cross-
examination admitted that he did not know where the rags had been
before the fire and that the fire could have been started in other ways.
The Court affirmed a nonsuit because "the evidence raised a mere
conjecture, surmise and speculation as to the cause of the fire." 55
In situations such as Maharias it is often difficult, if not impos-
sible, to prove the cause of the fire. For this reason it seems worth-
while to point out that there may be another approach to establish-
ing liability. If the plaintiff produces evidence that the defendant
maintained his premises in such a manner that a fire hazard existed
thereon to his knowledge, should not the actual cause of the fire-
whether an act of God or a deliberate or accidental act-be imma-
terial? The defendant's negligence is in allowing such a condition
to exist. It would certainly be foreseeable that the existence of a fire
hazard might be the cause of the fire, and if a fire did break out it
would be foreseeable that it would result in injury to the property
four feet from his premises because the fire hazard would cause the
fire to spread faster. To maintain an action for negligence the
plaintiff must show that the negligence was a substantial factor in
the circumstances that caused the injury. In this type of situation
the cause of the injury is the fire's spreading as well as the fire itself,
and the existence of the fire hazard is a substantial factor in the
spread of the fire. There is authority supporting this reasoning."
DEFAMATION
In North Carolina the consequence of participation in the pub-
lication of a libel is joint liability for damages,57 whereas, slander is
"'257 N.C. 767, 127 S.E.2d 548 (1962) (per curiam).
Id. at 768, 127 S.E.2d at 549.
M Chicago, M. St. P. & P.R.R. v. Poarch, 292 F.2d 449 (1961); Prince
v. Chahalis Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290 (1936).
" Taylor v. Kinston Free Press Co., 237 N.C. 551, 75 S.E.2d 528 (1953).
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considered an individual tort incapable of joint commission unless
the perpetrators were acting as conspirators. s Consequently alle-
gations of conspiracy are only necessary if joining defendants for
slander.
In Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co.59 the Court held that the
complaint did not fail for a misjoinder of causes and parties since
the allegations showed "a common agreement or conspiracy exist-
ing between them to injure plaintiff."6  The acts complained of
were the publication both of false statements concerning the plaintiff
in television broadcasts and of films showing him in the custody of
police officers.
In view of the fact that the complaint alleges publication on tele-
vision, it is difficult to see why an allegation of conspiracy would be
necessary,6' unless North Carolina adopts a novel approach to such
publication and considers it slander. If this is in fact what the Court
is doing, it seems worthwhile to point out that such a position would
be unique among American jurisdictions.6" Moreover, the distinc-
tions between libel and slander are primarily historical,63 and many
cases have held that such distinctions provide no assistance when
dealing with defamation over radio and television. 4 The Court notes
this in its opinion65 but makes no evaluation of its feeling on the
"Manley v. Greensboro News Co., 241 N.C. 455, 85 S.E.2d 672 (.1955).
'256 N.C. 382, 124 S.E.2d 98 (1962).
00 Id. at 391, 124 S.E.2d at 104.
" North Carolina requires proof of malice when a misstatement of fact,
as contrasted with opinion, is made to the general public uider a qualified
privilege; however that requirement would be satisfied here by the allegation
that employees of the broadcasting company accepted the sheriff's state-
ment that the victim of the alleged rape had identified the plaintiff when
she was in the building and it could easily have been verified by these
employees. Lewis v. Carr, 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919). Furthermore,
such a requirement places North Carolina in the minority when a misstate-
ment of fact is involved. See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and
Candidates, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 875, 896-900 (1949) ; 41 N.C.L. REV. 153, 157-
58 (1962).
2 Australia considers defamation by radio to be slander. Meldrum v.
Australian Broadcasting Co., [1932] Vict. L. Rep. 425, [1932] Aust. L.
Rep. -. In New York, the question has apparently turned on whether or
not there was a script. Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30
(1947).
See PRossnn, ToRTs 585-86 (2d ed. 1955); 33 N.C.L. REV. 674 (1955).
Niehoff v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 149 Me. 412, 103 A.2d 219
(1954); Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948); Irwin v.
Ashurst, 158 Or. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938); Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 320 (1939). A recent case suggests
that the tort should be labeled "defamacast," American Broadcasting-Para-
mount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962).
61 256 N.C. at 390-91, 124 S.E.2d at 104.
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matter; therefore Greer should not be considered to stand for rejec-
tion of such a rule. The fact remains that, while it would be desira-
ble for the Court to talk in terms of substantive issues when they
are present, the very same result was reached by finding a conspiracy




In Byrd v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.' plaintiff instituted suit to
recover for the death of his intestate who was killed while traveling
as a passenger in an airplane owned and operated by a Michigan
partnership of which the defendant, Bergsma, a resident of Michigan,
was a general partner. Summons was sought to be served on the
defendant Bergsma by serving the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
of North Carolina who in turn forwarded the summons and com-
plaint with appropriate notice by registered mail to the defendant in
Michigan.
Defendant Bergsma entered a special appearance and moved to
quash the purported service of the summons on the ground that the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is not a proper person on whom
service can be made for the defendant. The trial court denied defend-
ant's motion.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that G.S. § 1-105 which
provides for the service of process upon nonresident drivers of motor
vehicles does not apply in this case since an airplane is not such a
motor vehicle as is contemplated by the statute. The motor vehicle
contemplated by the statute, said the Court, is one which travels on
land and not one which uses the airlanes.
PROCESS-WAIVER OF INVALIDITY
In Harris v. Harris' the defendant entered a special appearance
and challenged the validity of process by warrant of attachment and
publication before the clerk of the court. Defendant's motion was
denied. Plaintiff then served notice on the defendant that she would
" This case is discussed in CIVIL PROCEDURE, Joinder of Causes and
Parties, supra.
1256 N.C. 684, 124 S.E.2d 880 (1962).
2257 N.C. 416, 126 S.E.2d 83 (1962).
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apply to the superior court judge for alimony pendente lite. Defend-
ant, although he had appealed from the clerk's refusal to dismiss the
suit, did not request a ruling on the motion to dismiss but partici-
pated in the hearing of plaintiff's motion for alimony. The
Supreme Court held that by taking part in the motion for alimony
the defendant had waived his right to object to the invalidity of the
process. Defendant should have asked for a ruling by the judge on
his appeal from the action of the clerk before taking part in the ali-
mony motion. If the judge had sustained the clerk, defendant should
have taken an exception and proceeded to oppose the allowance of
alimony. This he could have done without waiving his objection to
the validity of the process by reason of G.S. § 1-134.1.
VENUE
In Lowther v. Wilson? defendant, before otherwise pleading,
moved for a change of venue for the convenience of witnesses and
assigned various grounds supporting his request. The trial court
granted defendant's motion and ordered the cause removed to another
county because of the convenience of witnesses.
In reversing this action, the Supreme Court held that a motion to
change the venue on the ground of the convenience of witnesses is
premature if made before answer is filed. While there is no such
provision in the applicable statute, G.S. § 1-83, the ruling of the
Supreme Court is sound because, until the answer is filed, one cannot
know just what witnesses will be required.
PLEA IN ABATEMENT
In Perry v. Owens4 A had instituted suit in the Durham County
Civil Court, a court with a jurisdictional limit of 1,500 dollars. The
action arose out of a motor car collision. B, the defendant in the
action, then instituted suit for more than 1,500 dollars in the Superior
Court of Wake County, in which county he was a resident, and
sought to recover damages he had suffered as a result of the collision
aforesaid. A filed a plea of abatement in his answer to B's suit alleg-
ing the pendency of his action in the Durham County Civil Court.
B demurred to this plea in writing and at a hearing on B's demurrer
the trial judge sustained the plea in abatement and ordered B's action
dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that since B could
257 N.C. 484, 126 S.E.2d 50 (1962).
'257 N.C. 98, 125 S.E.2d 287 (1962), also discussed in CIVIL PROCEDUE ,
Plea of Abatement, supra.
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not have counterclaimed in A's action for the amount he claimed in
his own superior court suit, the plea in abatement setting up A's
prior action was ineffective.
Whether a judgment in either action would be res judicata as
to the other, the Court said, was unnecessary to determine at this
time.
The case points up the deficiency in North Carolina procedure
and the desirability of legislation which would, on the filing of a
counterclaim in a court of limited jurisdiction, result in a transfer of
the entire case to the superior court where both the original claim
and counterclaim could be disposed of in one action. It is significant
that the Court suggests the General Assembly give attention to the
desirability of such a statute and refers to a North Carolina Law
Review note in which such statute is recommended5
PLEA OF RELEASE-PREMATURE APPEAL
In Cowart v. Honeycutt6 plaintiff sued to recover for injuries
she had sustained in a car collision. Defendant pleaded, among
other defenses, release. Plaintiff alleged fraud in obtaining the re-
lease. The trial court ordered the fraud issue to be tried first and
the jury found there was fraud. The defense of release was accord-
ingly held invalid. Defendant appealed on the ground there was
inadequate evidence from which the jury could find fraud and that
the trial court should have granted a nonsuit since the plaintiff
admitted the execution of the release.
The Supreme Court held that the appeal from the trial court's
judgment declaring the release invalid was premature since that
judgment does not prevent the defendant from prevailing at the
trial on the merits of the case. Had the release been sustained, then
the plaintiff could have immediately appealed for such reason as
she deemed valid. But when the release is not sustained the case
is not over, the defendant's appeal is fragmentary and premature.
If defendant loses on the merits, he then may appeal on the release
issue as well as on such other grounds that may be available.
VOLUNTARY NONSUIT-TIME FOR TAKING
It is well recognized that in this state a plaintiff may, when no
counterclaim has been filed, take a voluntary nonsuit before verdict.
The question of whether plaintiff's motion was made "before verdict"
'32 N.C.L. REv. 231 (1954).257 N.C. 136, 125 S.E.2d 382 (1962).
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has been before the Court on various occasions. In Southeastern
Fire Ins. Co. v. Walton' the Court has reviewed earlier cases and
has laid down certain guide rules which counsel will find helpful.
In the specific case a jury returned with the issues answered.
The clerk was absent at the time and the judge instructed the deputy
sheriff to take the paper containing the issues and jury's answers
from the jury and bring it to him. While the deputy sheriff was
walking with the issue paper to the judge the plaintiff's attorney
asked that he be permitted to take a voluntary nonsuit. The trial
judge did not grant the plaintiff's motion but took the issue paper,
read the answers to the jury, asked them if that was their verdict
and upon an affirmative answer entered judgment on the verdict
for the defendant. Later, at the same term of court, the judge on
his own motion set aside the verdict, vacated the judgment for the
defendant and entered judgment of voluntary nonsuit for the plain-
tiff stating he did so because the plaintiff had moved for such non-
suit before the verdict was rendered by the jury.
On appeal by defendant, the Supreme Court affirmed the
trial judge. In so doing the Court referred to the old case of
Graham v. Tate8 in which it stated that the plaintiff could take a
voluntary nonsuit even though the jury had made up their verdict
provided the verdict had not been known. It also referred to G.S.
§ 1-224 which provides that, "In actions where a verdict passes
against the plaintiff, judgment shall be entered against him."
When is a verdict "made known" and when does a verdict
"pass"? The Court in Southeastern declared that a verdict is made
known "when its contents have been seen or heard by any person
or persons other than the jury serving on the case, the trial judge,
and a court official or court officials acting in the presence of the
judge under his direction with respect to the verdict." 9  On the
basis of that test, the verdict had not been "made known" when
the plaintiff's counsel moved for a voluntary nonsuit.
When does a verdict "pass"? As to that question the Court said
a verdict passes "when it has been accepted by the trial judge for
record."'1  On that test, it is also clear the plaintiff's motion for
voluntary nonsuit had been made in ample time. Acceptance of the
1256 N.C. 345, 123 S.E.2d 780 (1962).77 N.C. 120 (1877).
256 N.C. at 349-50, 123 S.E.2d at 784." Id. at 349, 123 S.E.2d at 784.
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verdict by the judge is a "prerequisite for a complete, valid and bind-
ing verdict"'- but the trial judge must accept a proper verdict which
determines the issues submitted to the jury in accordance with the
law applicable.
JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA EFFECT
In Masters v. Dunstanr2 plaintiffs sought damages against de-
fendant alleging that defendant had been their attorney in a prior
action in which plaintiffs were defendants and that as a result of the
negligence of the defendant-attorney in not filing a pleading in said
prior action a judgment by default had been entered against the
plaintiffs. Defendant herein, by way of answer, alleged that after
the default judgment had been entered in the prior action he engaged
counsel to represent the defendants (the present plaintiffs) in said
action in moving to set aside the default judgment under the pro-
visions of G.S. § 1-220. Defendant further alleged that on the hear-
ing of that motion the court found that the defendants in said action
(plaintiffs herein) did not have a meritorious defense and accordingly
denied the motion to vacate.
Defendant-attorney in this action claims that the decision of the
court in the previous proceeding, namely, that defendants therein
did not have a meritorious defense, is res judicata as to the plain-
tiff's claim in this case. In short, defendant-attorney says that, since
it has been determined that the plaintiffs in this action had no meri-
torious defense in the prior action, they were in no way prejudiced
by the failure of the defendant-attorney to file an answering pleading.
Plaintiffs moved to strike out the said res judicata defense of
the defendant-attorney and their motion was granted by the trial
court. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed declaring that the
principle of res judicata did not apply because the parties were
neither the same in both suits nor was defendant in privity with the
plaintiffs herein.
In Taylor v. Taylor"3 plaintiff-husband sought a divorce on the
ground of two years separation. Defendant-wife pleaded the separa-
tion was due to the husband's abandonment and pleaded a convic-
tion of the husband for the abandonment alleged. The husband
had not appealed said conviction but in the present action he con-
"' Id. at 348, 123 S.E.2d at 783.
12 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962).
12257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962).
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tended he was not guilty then, nor now, of abandonment. The trial
judge ordered the husband's action dismissed because of the ad-
mitted conviction.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal declar-
ing that although in the criminal action the parties were the hus-
band and the state, and here they are husband and wife, the hus-
band had had his day in court on the abandonment issue and hence
the said conviction bars the husband from obtaining a divorce on the
facts alleged in his complaint.
In the course of its opinion the Court considers the general
question of the effect to be given judgments of acquittal and of con-
viction in a criminal case in which the same fact issue is involved
in the pending civil action. The Court points out that a conviction
is the result of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and that an
acquittal judgment merely establishes that the state has not proved
its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court refers to the decision
of the Virginia court in the oft cited Heller"4 case wherein it was
held that a judgment of conviction for wilfully burning insured
goods barred the insured from recovering in a civil action on the
policy.
In its opinion in Taylor the Court stresses the fact that in Heller
the plaintiff was seeking a civil recovery for a loss occasioned by
his own criminal action for which he was convicted, and in Taylor
the plaintiff is seeking a divorce based on a separation which was
the result of the criminal act of the plaintiff in abandoning his wife
for which he had been convicted. The Court was careful to limit
the scope of its decision saying, "As in Heller, our decision is lim-
ited to a factual situation where the plaintiff is seeking to profit
from the criminal conduct for which he has been prosecuted and
convicted."
It is clear, therefore, that the Taylor decision is no authority for
permitting a plaintiff, who is seeking a civil recovery, to claim that
his recovery follows as a matter of law because the defendant was
convicted in the criminal court for the very act which caused the
civil loss. Nor is it authority for the admission of evidence of the
conviction in the civil case. 15
" Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140
S.E. 314 (1927), noted in 6 N.C.L. REv. 334 (1928).
" In this connection see Swinson v. Nance, 219 N.C. 772, 15 S.E.2d 284
(1941) where in an auto accident case evidence offered by the plaintiff that
the defendant had been convicted of reckless driving by reason of the acci-
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EFFECT OF EQUAL DIVISIoN OF THE COURT ON REHEARING
In Allen v. Southern Ry."6 plaintiffs had sought an injunction
against certain labor unions. The unions moved for an involuntary
nonsuit which motion was denied by the trial judge. On appeal
the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that it had
erred in overruling the nonsuit motion." A rehearing before the
Supreme Court was had and this time the Court divided three to
three, the seventh Justice not sitting."8 In this situation, what is
the effect of the equal division on rehearing? Does the Supreme
Court's first opinion stand or does the trial court's opinion stand?
The Court held that the result of the equal division on the re-
hearing in the Supreme Court is that the trial court's decision
stands without becoming a precedent. In short the rehearing in the
Supreme Court operates to eliminate the decisional force of the
Supreme Court's first holding.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
ACCELERATION-PARTIAL RENUNCIATION
In Keesler v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank' the testator was sur-
vived by his wife, a son, and a daughter. The residuary clause of
the will declared a trust in favor of the widow. The testator's son
and daughter were named as remaindermen in the trust, with a
further provision that accumulated surplus should be added to the
corpus. A substantial portion of the res consisted of corporate
stock. The widow subsequently by written instrument released and
quitclaimed all right, title, and interest in the stock, but expressly re-
served all other rights under the will. Testator's son and daughter
joined as parties plaintiff in this action, alleging that the renuncia-
tion accelerated their remainder interests, and asked that the stock
be divided equally between them and administered as if their mother
dent in question was held inadmissible. See also Durham Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104 (1961) where in an action
for wrongful death the Court held it was error for the trial court not to strike
from the plaintiff's complaint allegations that the defendant had been con-
victed of manslaughter for the very death in question. The Pollard case is
discussed under EVIDENcE, Evidence of Prior Criminal Convictions, supra.
10256 N.C. 700, 124 S.E.2d 871 (1962).
249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1961) (one justice dissenting).
1 See note 16 supra.
'256 N.C. 12, 122 S.E.2d 807 (1961).
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had died. The Court held the stock to be accumulated surplus, and
ordered it to be added to the corpus.
North Carolina has recognized the doctrine of acceleration2 of
estates in remainder where a widow, given a life estate by the will
of her husband, dissents and elects to take her dower or statutory
share.' There was a dictum in an earlier case,4 however, that a par-
tial renunciation would not be recognized in this jurisdiction. The
Court in the principal case casts doubt upon the validity of the prior
dictum by observing that "this rule probably would not be applica-
ble in all situations."' It was suggested that a beneficiary under a
will would be entitled to accept one gift and disclaim others where
there are two or more "separate and independent" gifts.
In Keesler, however, since the widow had accepted and enjoyed
the benefits of the will, she had not affected even a partial renuncia-
tion.6
ACTS BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS
In In re Estate of Perry7 a husband and wife held property as
tenants by the entireties and the wife murdered her husband. The
wife filed a petition asserting her rights to her intestate share in the
undistributed rents and profits of the land. An answer was filed on
behalf of the only child born of the marriage. The clerk of superior
court awarded the rents to the wife. The superior court reversed
and awarded them to the child. On appeal, both parties cited the
earlier case of Bryant v. Bryant,' where a husband and wife held
property as tenants by the entireties and the husband murdered the
wife. One of the incidents of a tenancy by the entirety in North
Carolina is that the husband is entitled during coverture to the full
possession, use and control of the property, and to the rents and
'The Court stated that "under the doctrine of acceleration the general
rule is that vested remainders take effect immediately upon the death of the
testator where the life estate has failed prior to testator's death, or immediately
after the determination of the life estate subsequent to the death of the testa-
tor, whether the failure or determination of the life estate is due to death,
revocation, incapacity of the devisee to take, or any other circumstance."
256 N.C. at 17, 122 S.E.2d at 811.
'Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. McEwen, 241 N.C. 166, 84 S.E.2d 642
(1954).
'Bailey v. McLain, 215 N.C. 150, 155, 1 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1939).
256 N.C. at 19, 122 S.E.2d at 813.
'See Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588 (1945).
"256 N.C. 65, 123 S.E.2d 99 (1961)."193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
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profits." Since only the husband has this vested right, and the wife
has only a contingent right of survivorship in the real property,10
the Court had, in the earlier Bryant decision, declared the husband
a constructive trustee of the interest of the deceased wife for the
benefit of the children. In the principal case, the Court concluded
that petitioner had forfeited her contingent right of survivorship,
and, applying the equitable principle that no one will be allowed to
profit from his own wrong," awarded the rents to the minor child
born of the marriage.
It should be noted that had the murder occurred after October 1,
1961, the case would have been controlled by G.S. § 31A-5(1).2
CONTRACTS TO DEVISE-SUFFICIENCY OF MEMORANDUM
In McCraw v. Llewellyn.' testatrix devised and bequeathed her
real and personal property to plaintiff in consideration of services
which he had rendered to her. The will was revoked by her subse-
quent marriage. 4 Upon the testatrix's death plaintiff sued her
estate on the theory of an express contract to devise. The issue
raised was whether a revoked will constitutes a sufficient memoran-
dum of a contract to devise so as to take the contract out of the
Statute of Frauds. Answering the question negatively, the Court
quoted the following language: " 'A potential factor in furtherance
of fraud would be engendered were a will containing a simple
bequest permitted to operate as evidence of a binding contract to
make such a bequest.' ,,'
' Nesbitt v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 239 N.C. 481, 80 S.E.2d 472 (1954).
See generally Lee, Tenancy by the Entirety in North Carolina, 41 N.C.L.
REv. 65 (1962).
'0Dvsv. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924).
2'See Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948).
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-5(1) (Supp. 1961) provides that "where the
slayer and the decedent hold property as tenants by the entirety if the wife
is the slayer, one-half of the property shall pass upon the death of the husband
to his estate, and the other one-half shall be held by the wife during her life,
subject to pass upon her death to the estate of the husband." For an extended
discussion of this statute, see Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40
N.C.L. REV. 175 (1962).
13256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962). Also discussed under CIVIL
PROCEDURE, Express and Implied Contracts, and CONTRACTS, Contracts to
Devise, supra.
2' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.3 (Supp. 1961) provides that, with two excep-
tions not material here, "a will is revoked by the subsequent marriage of the
maker."
" The Court quoted this language from Luders v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, 121 Cal. App. 408, 9 P.2d 271 (1932).
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DISSENT-TIME ALLOWED
In First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Willis'8 testator's will
specifically excluded his wife, a mental incompetent, because he had
been advised by her physicians that she would have to be confined
to a mental institution for the balance of her life, which confine-
ment would be provided without charge by the government. The
will was probated on December 1, 1953, and a guardian for the
widow, defendant here, was appointed eight days later. In 1961
plaintiff, executor of the will, instituted this action for a declaratory
judgment to guide it in making a distribution of the estate. It
alleged that no dissent had been filed by the widow and that her
right to dissent was now barred. Defendant's answer admitted that
no dissent had been filed, but alleged that the defendant had no
knowledge of the will until 1961. It was held that having failed
to exercise the right to dissent17 within six months,' the right was
now barred.
In an earlier case'" where an insane widow had been without
a guardian for over four years after probate of her deceased hus-
band's will, the guardian was allowed six months from the date of
appointment in which to dissent. But in the instant case, the guard-
ian had failed to assert the widow's rights for approximately eight
years after his appointment. The further contention of the defend-
ant that since a will which gives the widow nothing provides nothing
from which she can dissent was termed "specious" by the Court.
FAMILY SETTLEMENTS
In First Union Nat'l Bank v. Bryant20 testatrix was survived
by her daughter and two grandsons (the children of her daughter).
The will bequeathed one-half of the testatrix's personal property to
her daughter for life, with no disposition as to the remainder. The
remaining one-half was bequeathed to the children of the daughter
when they attained specified ages. The income from the property
left to the grandchildren was to be reinvested unless the daughter
needed it "very badly." Plaintiff was named executor and guard-
ians were appointed for the grandchildren as well as children not
18257 N.C. 59, 125 S.E.2d 359 (1962).
'7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp. 1961).'8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (Supp. 1961).
10Whitted v. Wade, 247 N.C. 81, 100 S.E.2d 263 (1957). For a brief
discussion of this case, see Wills, Fifth Annual North Carolina Case Law
Survey, 36 N.C.L. lRv. 470 (1958).
20 257 N.C. 42, 125 S.E.2d 291 (1962).
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in esse. Subsequently, a family settlement was made providing that
the property should be held in two separate trusts. The daughter
was to receive the income from one for life with the remainder
going to her children. The children were named beneficiaries of
the second trust. Applying the Court's traditional test of the validity
of a family settlement-the trusts must be fairly made, carry out the
intent of the testatrix as found in the will, and not have an adverse
effect on the rights of infants-the settlement was upheld."'
The Court was again called upon to rule on the validity of a
family settlement in Stellings v. Autry.2 2  Litigation had been
threatened to have certain testamentary trust provisions construed
and to have determined the validity of provisions relating to the
duration of the trust. The settlement was entered into to obviate
the necessity of such litigation. Family settlements entered into to
avoid caveat,23 or dissent,24 or threatened litigation involving "nu-
merous and complicated questions of law and fact, and of such
nature as to dissipate the trust estate and adversely affect the
interests of minors"25 have been upheld in numerous cases. These
cases were distinguished in the instant case, however, because the
threatened suit only involved construction of, and a ruling on, the
validity of duration provisions. The Court quoted the limitations
on the power to alter a testamentary trust by family settlement set
out in Carter v. Kempto 20 and found that there was no emergency
growing out of the trust itself or directly affecting its corpus suffi-
"This test was approved in Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 38
S.E.2d 203 (1946). Mr. Justice Moore dissented in the principal case be-
cause, as he viewed the facts, the trust did not adequately protect the rights
of infants.
22257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962).
2 Wagner v. Honbaier, 248 N.C. 363, 103 S.E.2d 474 (1958).
2 Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Alexander, 188 N.C. 667, 125 S.E. 385
(1924).22Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 578, 182 S.E. 341 (1935).
26233 N.C. 1, 62 S.E.Zd 713 (1950). Those limitations are: (1) The
will creating the trust is not to be treated as an instrument to be revoked at
the will of the devisees or to be sustained sub mnodo only after something has
been sweated out of it by the heirs. (2) The rule that the law favors family
settlements does not apply when an infant's rights are involved. (3) Equity
will not permit the modification of a trust on technical objections merely
because its terms are objectionable to the interested parties. Rather, some
exigency, contingency or emergency must have arisen rendering modification
necessary to preserve the trust and to protect infants. (4) The emergency
must be one not contemplated by the testator and which, had it been antici-
pated, would undoubtedly have been provided for. (5) The exigency must
relate to and grow out of the trust itself or directly affect the corpus or the
income from the trust.
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cient to justify alteration. In addition, it was found that the pro-
posed settlement might adversely affect the rights of minors or
persons as yet unborn.
HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
In In re Will of Gilkey" the testatrix's son was given a power
of attorney to transact her affairs. While the testatrix was still
living, the son found a metal box containing life insurance policies
and a handwritten will, all of which he placed in his own safe
deposit box. On the death of testatrix the son presented the will
for probate and his sister filed a caveat. The caveator argued that
the statute2' required an original discovery subsequent to death, and
a fortiori, a paper could not be found after death within the meaning
of the statute by a person who had knowledge of the will and had
seen it prior to the author's death. The Court answered this con-
tention by observing that such a construction of the statute would
defeat the legislative intent. The requirement that the will be found
after death among the valuable papers was to show the author's
evaluation of the document and thereby establish the necessary
animus testandi.
RELEASE OF AN EXPECTANCY BY A NON-HEIR
In Stewart v. McDade29 testator conveyed all his real property to
defendant by warranty deed and, on the same date, executed a pur-
ported will devising all his property to defendant and naming her
executrix. Seven months later he executed another purported will
to the same effect. A few days later, testator was declared incompe-
tent. His guardian commenced an action to have the deed set aside
on the ground that he lacked sufficient mental capacity to execute it.
Defendant, to terminate the litigation, reconveyed the land to the
testator and executed a release for valuable consideration of all her
rights under the will. Plaintiff brought this action for a declaratory
judgment to determine what interest, if any, defendant had in the
'- 256 N.C. 415, 124 S.E.2d 155 (1962).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(a) (3) (Supp. 1961) provides that "a holo-
graphic will is a will found after the testator's death among his valuable
papers or effects, or in a safe deposit box or other safe place where it was
deposited by him or under his authority, or in the possession or custody of
some person with whom, or some firm with which, it was deposited by him
or under his authority for safekeeping."28256 N.C. 630, 124 S.E.2d 822 (1962).
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estate. The Court held that the release executed by the defendant
was valid and, consequently, that she was barred from claiming any
interest in the estate. The public policy which militates against the
release of an expectancy is for the protection of heirs, and is designed
to protect children from spending their inheritance before it comes to
them.30 But it has no application, where, as here, the person with the
expectant interest is a stranger to the blood of the testator.
" Price v. Davis, 244 N.C. 229, 93 S.E.2d 93 (1956); See Note, 35 N.C.L.
REV. 127 (1956).
